



# TECHNICAL REPORT









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# 'A FASCINATING TOURNAMENT OF GREAT DIVERSITY'

MORE GOALS, GREAT TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY AND A HIGH LEVEL OF COMPETITIVENESS COMBINED TO PRODUCE A BRILLIANT SHOWCASE FOR NATIONAL TEAM FOOTBALL

The restrictions imposed by the pandemic gave us a good motive for assembling an impressive team of UEFA technical observers captained by Fabio Capello. We would have liked more chances for face-to-face contacts. But, at the series of online meetings we arranged, the sixteen coaches who covered the 51 matches were not short of topics to talk about.

Team structures, for example, showed a clear trend away from the previous final tournament in France, where 1-4-2-3-1 had been the favourite formation. During UEFA EURO 2020, 14 teams fielded, at some stage, three centre-backs. With more coaches opting for a front line of three along with attack-minded wing-backs, many teams had enough players in advanced areas for collective high pressing. Others preferred rapid transitions into deeper defensive blocks that gave them more space for fast counterattacking. Many of the teams showed great tactical flexibility from game to game and within individual matches. The result was a fascinating tournament of great diversity – and many more goals than the 108 we had seen at the first 24-team tournament in 2016. The total increased by more than 30%.

We also saw an intensely competitive tournament. On the final day of the group stage, there were no meaningless fixtures. In fact, in the so-called “group of death”, France, Germany, Portugal and Hungary shuffled up and down the Group F standings during the 90 minutes of play. When the tournament advanced into its knockout phase, eight ties were extended into extra-time and four of them required a penalty shoot-out to determine the winner.

The record books reflect the interesting trivia that Spain played extra-time in all three of their knockout rounds and that champions Italy, after posting three straight wins in Group A, lifted the trophy without beating anybody else over the 90 minutes of normal time. And the final was decided by a shoot-out for the first time since Antonín Panenka's

legendary spot-kick clinched victory for Czechoslovakia way back in 1976. In the round of 16, four former winners were knocked out, including world champions France along with Portugal, the defending champions. It demonstrated that, at EURO 2020, there was little to choose between well-prepared contestants.

In football, some of the strongest emotions come in predictable parts of the game like penalty shoot-outs, for example. But none of us were prepared for the human drama when Christian Eriksen collapsed during Denmark's opening match against Finland. We had to live through terrible moments while he was being resuscitated on the field of play and we all breathed a tremendous sigh of relief when we heard that he was on the road to recovery. We were all moved by the Danish team's dignified behaviour on the field of play and, afterwards, by their sporting reaction. Denmark made history by reaching the knockout stage despite losing their first two games – and they played some attractive football as they went on to take England into extra-time in the semi-finals. It was a wonderful tribute to their team-mate.

UEFA EURO 2020 gave us so many positives – not least the widespread applause for the standard of refereeing. This report reflects the topics raised by our team of technical observers and is backed by digital links to passages of play that illustrate the points they highlighted. We hope that this will be valuable to the coaches and coach educators who will be looking to use the trends we saw at EURO 2020 in their work in developing the elite players and technicians of the future.

**MAXWELL SCHERRER**  
UEFA Chief of Football Development



## GROUP A



**TURKEY**  
(TUR)



**ITALY**  
(ITA)



**WALES**  
(WAL)



**SWITZERLAND**  
(SUI)

## GROUP B



**DENMARK**  
(DEN)



**FINLAND**  
(FIN)



**BELGIUM**  
(BEL)



**RUSSIA**  
(RUS)

## GROUP C



**NETHERLANDS**  
(NED)



**UKRAINE**  
(UKR)



**AUSTRIA**  
(AUT)



**NORTH MACEDONIA**  
(MKD)

## GROUP D



**ENGLAND**  
(ENG)



**CROATIA**  
(CRO)



**SCOTLAND**  
(SCO)



**CZECH REPUBLIC**  
(CZE)

## GROUP E



**SPAIN**  
(ESP)



**SWEDEN**  
(SWE)



**POLAND**  
(POL)



**SLOVAKIA**  
(SVK)

## GROUP F



**HUNGARY**  
(HUN)



**PORTUGAL**  
(POR)



**FRANCE**  
(FRA)




**GERMANY**  
(GER)




# THE ROAD TO WEMBLEY

While Italy burst out of the blocks, England were happy to set their own pace in a contest filled with drama to the very end



The final: Italy v England,  
Sunday 11 July







## GROUP A

### ITALY ISSUE EARLY WARNING

The tournament curtain-raiser in Rome set the scene for Group A. Turkey coach Şenol Güneş reflected “we are aware that we were not good enough. But the first match had such a negative effect on my players.” Against the hosts, Turkey set themselves up in 1-4-1-4-1 formation to counter Italy’s 1-4-3-3. Defending with a midfield or low block and struggling to play through the hosts’ aggressive high pressing, their counterattacking relied mostly on long deliveries to target striker Burak Yılmaz. Italy, attacking relentlessly with long phases of possession and dynamic forward running by left-back Leonardo Spinazzola, looked permanently threatening but were frustratingly unable to deliver a telling blow until early in the second half. Even then, it took an own goal to push the door open. Tranquilised by their advantage, Roberto Mancini’s team overloaded the flanks with even greater conviction and extended their lead to 3-0. “The better they were,” Güneş rued, “the further we strayed from our own game.”

The outcome of Group A could be regarded as rough justice for a young Turkey who forged openings for more goal attempts than 16

of the other contestants, including the likes of Belgium, France, Portugal or England. In their second game, overloads in wide areas generated good crosses, with Zeki Çelik and Cengiz Ünder combining menacingly on the right. But Wales, strong in the air, dealt comfortably with the crosses and, as technical observer Willi Rutensteiner commented, “Turkey conceded goals when they were significantly dominant in ball possession.”

Robert Page’s team, mirroring Turkey’s 1-4-1-4-1, countered at speed via their two wingers and exploited the spaces in their opponent’s stretched defensive set-up with purposeful runs from deep positions – notably by Aaron Ramsey whose goal put Wales 1-0 ahead. And the last of a stream of attacking sparks from Gareth Bale allowed right-back Connor Roberts to seal a 2-0 win.

The Welsh had needed to rely on mental resilience and goalkeeper Danny Ward to earn a point from their opener against Switzerland. Troubled by high pressing and penetrating runs by Breel Embolo, Wales defended deep and were frequently obliged to play long to target striker Kieffer Moore and look for second-ball success against opponents who had 65% of possession. It was Moore’s header which cancelled out Embolo’s opener in the 1-1 draw.

Vladimir Petković then took his team from

Baku to Rome to take on Italy. Sticking to his 1-3-4-1-2 set-up and pressing high to disturb the hosts’ composed build-up play, he saw his defence caught in 3v3 situations after Italy’s regains in midfield. The density of Mancini’s team’s defensive structure slowed the tempo of Swiss possession play while runs in the deep from midfielder Manuel Locatelli ushered Italy into a 2-0 lead, with Ciro Immobile, a minute before time, sealing another 3-0 scoreline – and progress into the knockout stage.

This left the other three to battle for qualification on the final matchday. Mancini, rotating his squad and scrutinising his team’s performance when switching to three at the back against Wales’s 1-5-4-1 formation, saw 63% of possession and a tally of 23 goal attempts (to three by the opposition) yield a single goal from a free-kick. The red card for Ethan Ampadu, early in the second half, obliged Wales to, as Page said, “put on their tin hats” and dig a deep defensive trench aimed at protecting goal difference. The 1-0 defeat was celebrated as a victory.

Simultaneously, Switzerland and Turkey were disputing a must-win fixture in Baku. Turkey, loyal to their 1-4-1-4-1 set-up, again ticked boxes with neat combinations and quality passing, only to encounter problems with final passes, final



Manuel Locatelli  
after victory over  
the Swiss





Switzerland  
overcame Turkey  
in Baku



Kieffer Moore  
celebrates an  
equaliser against  
Switzerland

The Welsh had needed to rely on mental resilience to earn a point from their opener against Switzerland

decisions and the accuracy of their long-range shooting. Switzerland played 1-3-4-1-2 with strikers ready to move wide to create overloads on the left; right-back Silvan Widmer dropping back into a 1-4-4-1-1 defensive block and Xherdan Shaqiri exploiting pockets around Turkey's single screening midfielder, building on solid central support by the balancing midfielders Granit Xhaka and Remo Freuler. Fierce pressing after loss of possession and fast attacking transitions stretched Turkey's defensive shape and, although a long-range strike gave them their only goal of the tournament, Gunes's promising team was sent home by three Swiss goals, two of them struck from that central area by Shaqiri. Three teams qualified from a group dominated by an Italy side whose intensity and consistency earned them a place among the tournament favourites.

## GROUP B

### DENMARK UNITE IN ADVERSITY

Christian Eriksen injected emotional components into the Group B equation. The Denmark playmaker's collapse as he ran to receive a throw-in brought the opening fixture to a traumatic halt while the fight to revive him provoked tears, consternation and reflections about the relevance of football in a situation of human drama. When play resumed, a distraught Denmark missed a penalty and allowed Finland to convert their only attempt of the match – a counterattack, a cross and a header by striker Joel Pohjanpalo, rewarded for good movement and an intelligent run. The 0-1 scoreline wrote an unexpected opening chapter in a fairy-tale for the hosts who, remarkably, were not one of the two teams to be eliminated, despite losing their first two fixtures.

Bonded, energised and inspired by the quasi-tragedy, Denmark rebounded with a stunning first half against Belgium, which prompted coach Roberto Martínez to admit: "It's been a while since we were put to the test like this. The players seemed shell-shocked. But they have the experience to turn a game around." And they did. Switching from the 1-4-3-3 against Finland to three at the back, Denmark pressed high against Belgium's three-man defence, forcing them to play long towards striker Romelu Lukaku, closely policed by Simon Kjær. After the break, Martínez moved his striker to the right, making space for Kevin De Bruyne to run at Denmark's centre-backs from deeper positions. His ploy paid off with two goals.

Belgium had opened their campaign with a dominant display against Russia, whose classic 1-4-4-2 was outstripped by their opponents' use of the wide areas and compact communication





Group B (from top): Denmark's inspiring team spirit; Romelu Lukaku was among the goals; Finland fans enjoying their first EURO

between lines. Coerced into playing the long ball towards target striker Artem Dzyuba, Russia lacked penetration and shipped three goals without reply. Damage was repaired when, in the second appearance as host in Saint Petersburg, Stanislav Cherchesov switched to a 1-3-4-2-1 formation against Finland's deep 1-5-3-2, laying foundations for enhanced construction play via work between lines by Aleksandr Golovin and Aleksei Miranchuk. The latter scored the solitary goal that defeated Finland's discipline, endeavour and well-organised defending.

The combination of results set up a final matchday when any of the four teams could qualify. Belgium, with six points in their back pocket, started as favourites against Finland's debutants. They translated quick passing combinations, high-speed 1v1 runs, aggressive pressing and a high defensive line into domination against a low compact defensive block very quickly assembled after losses of possession. Finland built from defence into midfield; pushed their wing-backs forward to support attacking moves; and attempted to hit passes from midfield into areas beyond Belgium's high back line. They resisted stoutly, with Lukáš Hrádecký again producing excellent shot-stopping (and competent ball-distribution) to keep the scoresheet blank. The keeper, however, was unluckily beaten in the 74th minute when, after a corner, a rebound off the woodwork entered the net via his left hand. A late goal by Lukaku then sealed a 2-0 win and first place.

Down in Copenhagen, a draw would suffice for Russia; a handsome win was required by point-less Denmark. Both coaches opted for a 1-3-4-2-1 formation, with Russia focusing on pressing high and, if unsuccessful, retreating rapidly into a low block with either two lines of five or Dzyuba remaining upfield as a counterattacking reference point. If a fast break was not viable, ball-winning was followed by patient possession play.

Kasper Hjulmund's formation was elastic in that two players had freedom to roam: Mikkel Damsgaard behind main striker Yussuf Poulsen; and centre-back Andreas Christensen, licensed to beef-up the midfield. Struggling to create clear chances, Denmark waited until shortly before half-time to score the crucial opening goal. Then, just before the hour-mark, a wayward crossfield pass gave Poulsen a tap-in goal and Denmark the two-goal winning margin that they required. When that was halved by a Dzyuba penalty, Hjulmund adjusted his team structure to 1-3-5-2 and, with Russia pushing forward to chase the result, Denmark scored two excellent goals – one an elaborate attacking move and the other a swift counterattack. The 4-1 victory gave Denmark an against-all-odds second place, while Russia finished fourth and Finland were ultimately to lose out in the tussle among the third-placed teams.



## GROUP C

### BREAK FROM TRADITION WORKS FOR DUTCH

Having finished behind Austria and Poland in their qualifying group and ultimately securing a debut in the final tournament via a UEFA Nations League pathway, North Macedonia proudly marched into Group C with underdog labels all over their baggage. Although the form book was respected, few would disagree with head coach Igor Angelovski's view that: "This team has quality and deserved to be there. We are sorry that it didn't end with a positive result."

In the opener against Austria, he set up the debutants in 1-5-3-2 formation with Arijan Ademi screening in front of the back line; Enis Bardi and Eljif Elmas enjoying freedom of movement in midfield; and Aleksandar Trajkovski accompanying the country's 37-year-old idol Goran Pandev in attack. They set out to defend solidly from a midfield block and counterattack rapidly using the aggressive upfield running of left wing-back Ezgjan Alioski, the skills of Bardi and Elmas and the intelligent movement and ball skills of the experienced Pandev. Coming back to equalise against Austria, they conceded two late

goals when their tempo slackened.

It was a similar story in their second match against Ukraine whose two first-half goals prompted Angelovski to switch to a 1-4-2-3-1 structure which served as a platform for 25 minutes of domination and a comeback to 2-1. But there it stayed. Against the rampant Netherlands in Amsterdam, the team made sporadic attacking forays but bowed out with a 3-0 defeat.

Andriy Shevchenko's Ukraine mixed light and shade during their three matches. Setting out their stall in a 1-4-3-3 shape, they struggled for possession against the hosts' 1-3-5-2 in Amsterdam but scored twice in five minutes (an excellent open-play effort and a second stemming from a set play) to rebound from 2-0 down late in the game, only for the ebullient right wing-back Denzel Dumfries to burst inside for an 85th-minute winner. An excellent first half against North Macedonia, impelled by intelligent work between lines by Oleksandr Zinchenko, was followed by a less brilliant second-half spell that prompted Shevchenko to adjust to 1-4-2-3-1 in order regain control of the game and see it out with 2-1 on the scoreboard.

In the decisive fixture against Austria, the team enjoyed an equal share of possession but laboured to sustain a high tempo against energetic pressing. They were fortunate that only four of Austria's 18

The Dutch showed  
a nice blend of  
combination play  
through the thirds

Dutch captain  
Giorginio Wijnaldum  
accepts the adulation







Roman Yaremchuk on target against North Macedonia in Group C

goal attempts were on target but nonetheless failed to respond to an early goal by Christoph Baumgartner and needed to wait for the third-place equations to be resolved before they could plan for the next round.

In the meantime, the Netherlands' switch from the hallowed 1-4-3-3 to a 1-3-5-2 had generated much media debate and even a banner displayed from a low-flying aircraft. Frank de Boer's decision, however, was endorsed by three straight wins. The main ingredients were a nice blend of combination play through the thirds and more direct supply to the front men; an equally nice blend of skill and physicality in a midfield controlled by Frenkie de Jong; speed of execution; and positional rotations that allowed half their goals to come from midfield (with Giorginio Wijnaldum always ready to make penetrating runs into the opposition box) or from the adventurous right wing-back Dumfries.

Austria were the only team to wrest possession from the Dutch. Franco Foda set his team up in 1-3-4-1-2 formation for the first two games, changing to a 4-2-3-1 against Ukraine, led always by David

Alaba from centre-back or wider on the left. The team set out to build from the back whenever possible, mixing more patient construction with direct supply to the front men, with Marcel Säbitzer lurking indefatigably in their wake. Both wing-backs attacked aggressively, overlapping or running through the interior channels. Out of possession, the team pressed fiercely, harrassing opponents into losses of possession. Although outgunned by the Dutch, they laid claim to second place in the group with a degree of comfort.

## GROUP D ENGLAND ASSUME CONTROL

Nine hours of football produced ten goals in the most miserly of the six groups. And, while the other three contestants stepped into the knockout rounds, Scotland fell by the wayside after converting one of their 41 goal attempts. Injuries

and illness undermined their reappearance at a major tournament after a prolonged absence. The most accomplished performance was the goalless draw against England at Wembley when Billy Gilmour earned UEFA's Star of the Match award because, to quote UEFA's technical observer Robbie Keane, "He patrolled in front of the centre-backs and was the main player, constantly looking for the ball and receiving it in good areas to keep the ball and the team moving." Gilmour, however, didn't play in the other two fixtures, obliging Steve Clarke to shuffle his pack in search of a nice balance in midfield to support the striking partnership of Che Adams and Lyndon Dykes, often supplied by direct back-to-front passing.

This was evident in their opening game against the Czechs. Initially fielding Scott McTominay as a single screening midfielder in his 1-5-3-2 formation, Clarke changed the shape in the second half, with John McGinn dropping deeper alongside Callum McGregor, allowing Scotland to gain better possession in midfield and better control of the game – but not the result. By



that time, two goals from Czech striker Patrik Schick had sealed a 2-0 win, the second from an outstanding lob from midfield after a Scottish long-range shot had rebounded to him. The defeat, as Clarke put it, “meant we had to go to Wembley and expend a lot of energy, physically and mentally, to give ourselves a chance”.

After the 0-0 draw, the only chance was a victory over Croatia in Glasgow. But Scotland were on the wrong end of the group’s most ample scoreline. Playing with greater tempo and urgency than in their two previous games, with great rotation in midfield, Zlatko Dalić’s team created opportunities to dominate possession and dictate the game, notably through Luka Modrić who dropped deep into the right-back position to receive with time and space to mastermind his side’s attacking play – and then, further upfield, to strike the second goal in the 3-1 victory. As Clarke said, “We were against a tournament-hardened team who knew how to play the third game in the group – and we probably didn’t. That’s why we are going home.”

Croatia’s win allowed them to become one of the four teams to qualify despite losing their opening game. At Wembley, England had put the brakes on their potent midfield trio of Modrić, Mateo Kovačić and Marcelo Brozović and had also stifled their wing play – especially on the left flank. After succumbing to Raheem Sterling’s solitary goal, Croatia produced a low-temperature performance against a Czech side who already had three points in the bag. As they had been against Scotland, Jaroslav Šilhavý’s team was well-organised with hardworking players operating in a well-defined 1-4-2-3-1 structure. The only adjustment was a two-man midfield screen replacing the single holding midfielder deployed against the Scots. After falling behind to a first-half penalty, Dalić was rewarded for two half-time changes with an equaliser within two minutes of the restart. The 1-1 draw allowed the Czechs to travel to Wembley without worry beads in their kit-bags.

England, in the meantime, had been mostly about “tournament management”. Defensively solid in their 1-4-3-3 set-up and effective in their high pressing, Gareth Southgate’s team had not conceded a goal but, on the other hand, occupied the lower echelons of the goal-attempts ranking with an average in single figures per game. Against the Czechs, they were more successful in overloading the wide areas than they had been against Scotland – especially on the left when Sterling combined with Jack Grealish and left-back Luke Shaw. Indeed, this was the origin of the only goal in the game. Even so, the Czechs had periods of good control thanks to a high-energy game with short passing through midfield and a supply of threatening crosses. It was a sign of things to come.

## England were defensively solid and effective in their high pressing



Raheem Sterling got off the mark against Croatia



Ivan Perišić found the net against the Czechs



## GROUP E

### SWEDEN EMERGE ON TOP

Anyone searching for evidence that football is a crazy game need look no further than Spain v Sweden in Seville. Janne Andersson's team covered 113km but had the ball for just under 16 minutes. Goalkeeper Robin Olsen made substantially more passes than any of his teammates. All 28 were long clearances and seven of them reached a friendly destination. Each of four Spanish players delivered more accurate passes than the entire Sweden team – whose five substitutes totalled 14 passes. The result: 0-0. And Sweden's striking partnership of Alexander Isak and Marcus Berg might have converted clear chances into a victory that might have been described as "against the run of play".

The draw heaped pressure on the hosts and animated the other Group E contenders. Especially Slovakia, who topped the group after the opening matchday. They took the lead when winger Róbert Mak lured the Poland right-back to the touchline and dribbled into the space behind him. Poland, struggling to find the final pass through Slovakia's compact defensive block,

equalised after the break only to concede again within minutes of being reduced to ten men. For the second match against Spain, Paulo Sousa swapped his 1-4-3-3 for a 1-5-3-2 structure which allowed Poland to counterattack at pace along the flanks and it was a cross by right wing-back Kamil Jóźwiak which allowed Robert Lewandowski to cancel out Spain's first-half opener. The 1-1 draw piled even greater pressure on the hosts and kept Poland alive.

Slovakia, in the meantime, had adopted a conservative approach to their encounter with Sweden, who had travelled from Seville to somewhat less torrid Saint Petersburg. Their patient build-up allowed Sweden to assemble their well-drilled 1-4-4-2 defensive formation and Štefan Tarkovič's team found it problematical to get in behind the back four. Although both goalkeepers made important saves, defensive work was the dominant factor in a game where Slovakia's bid for a point was undone by a late penalty. At kick-off time on Matchday 3, Sweden topped the group, Slovakia were second and Spain third.

Travelling from Russia to Spain, Slovakia felt the heat literally and figuratively. Sticking to their 1-4-2-3-1 set-up, they frustrated Spain for half an hour – and the hosts' nerves twitched more

strongly when Álvaro Morata failed to convert a penalty. But a bizarre own goal by the otherwise outstanding keeper Martin Dúbravka opened the floodgates. With Sergio Busquets now available to stabilise the midfield, Spain, spearing along the flanks and through the interior channels, struck four more goals against opponents who rarely made coherent sorties beyond the halfway line. When the final whistle sounded, Slovakia trooped off the field well aware that the radical change to their goal difference spelt trouble.

At the same time, Poland were playing their final card against group-leaders Sweden. Morale was badly damaged when they conceded, within two minutes, a goal which allowed Andersson's team to protect their lead with trademark compact defending, aggressive collective pressing and synchronised movements towards the ball-carrier. Poland, condemned to risk-taking, left Lewandowski up front while his attacking accomplice Karol Świdorski often dropped alongside Piotr Zieliński to form a duo of shadow strikers – with those three then forming a first line of defence to prevent Sweden from opening the game from the back.

But, unruffled by a minority share of possession, Sweden produced a fast transition which allowed







Group E (clockwise from left): Marcus Danielson rises highest against Spain; Álvaro Morata celebrates against Poland; Lukáš Haraslín of Slovakia

them to go 2-0 ahead. This was the cue for a table-tennis exchange of transition moves. Poland halved the deficit when Lewandowski brilliantly culminated a counterattack to a Swedish counterattack. And he drew his team level when, in another fast break, two Sweden defenders uncharacteristically went for the same opponent and left the deadly No9 unmarked in front of goal. This left the Poles within one goal of their objective. And, while overstretching in search of it, they were caught by another fast transition that allowed substitute Viktor Claesson to put 3-2 on the scoreboard and send Poland home. Once all the pieces of the third-place jigsaw had settled into place, Slovakia too were heading home, while Sweden, against pre-tournament expectations, progressed to the knockout stage as group winners.

## GROUP F

### HUNGARY DESPAIR AS HEAVY-WEIGHTS ADVANCE

In the tournament's Group of Death, all four contestants had a glimpse of the guillotine. And Hungary, billed as the sacrificial lamb, made a strong bid for the role of executioner. The first show of strength was a plucky performance against the defending champions. Marco Rossi set out his stall in a 1-5-3-2 structure with a compact low block, great physical presence and high-density attention to the opponent with the ball. And, when they won it, they propelled it forwards with pace and purpose. Unfazed by Portugal's possession play, they minimised spaces between lines and suffocated wing play, responding with dangerous direct counters aimed at main striker Ádám Szalai. Curiously, Hungary were deflated by a goal ruled out by VAR for offside and, conceding goals timed at 84, 87 and 90+2, were beaten by a score which, as UEFA observer Corinne Diacre said "did not reflect the physiognomy of the match".

On the same day, Germany had opened a rollercoaster campaign with a competent display against France but insufficient cutting edge to inflict damage. "There were spells when we were able to increase the pressure on them," Joachim Löw admitted, "but we didn't create any clear chances." "It was a strong match with quality and talent," Didier Deschamps agreed, "but we didn't suffer that much in the second half." France's winner was an own goal.

Self-inflicted wounds also marked Germany's next fixture when, after Cristiano Ronaldo had put them ahead, Portugal fell behind to a brace of own goals, conceding twice more after the break to lose 4-2. The next twist came when France, sticking to their 1-4-3-3 against Hungary's five-man defensive line, found life difficult against their opponents' power play. Happy to launch vertical counters, Rossi's team



took the lead when left wing-back Attila Fiola broke into the box and, after the break, France huffed and puffed but managed no more than an equaliser.

Deschamps adjusted his team shape for the final fixture against Portugal on a day when positions within the group were passed around like hot potatoes. Corentin Tolisso was drafted in to support Antoine Griezmann and Kylian Mbappé, with Karim Benzema as the reference striker. In approach play, Portugal pushed their full-backs up to gain numerical superiority in midfield while Ronaldo once again operated in a “false striker” role in attacking play based on mobility and positional interchanging. Defensively, Fernando Santos’ team matched the world champions’ physical presence in midfield, and mixed their reaction to ball-winning by either playing directly to the front men or settling into short-passing combination approaches, with Renato Sanches the standout performer according to Diacre. “He was very active offensively and defensively,” she said. “He set the offensive tone for his team.” The result was an even contest where penalties moved the pendulum – two for Portugal; one for France – with one open-play goal by Benzema rounding off the 2-2 draw which qualified both teams.

Simultaneously, Germany were entertaining Hungary in Munich in an encounter which sent the hosts up and down the group table like a yo-yo. Hungary, faithful to their 1-5-3-2 defend-and-counter strategy, relied on disciplined containment work; excellent goalkeeping by Péter Gulácsi; vigorous attacking work by Szalai; and indefatigable endeavour by András Schäfer and László Kleinheisler in the engine room. Casting aside inhibitions, they took an early lead when another top-class defence-to-attack transition allowed Szalai to head home a cross from the right and send Germany to the foot of the table.

Löw, starting with three centre-backs, used Toni Kroos and İlkay Gündogan as the controlling midfielders and Serge Gnabry as the reference striker. At half-time, he moved Leroy Sané to the right wing; brought Joshua Kimmich into the centre alongside Kroos and pushed Gündogan forward to support Gnabry. The ploy was rewarded by a Kai Havertz equaliser but, while the German team was adjusting to a double substitution, another vertical attack allowed Szalai to hit an excellent forward pass to the onrushing Schäfer who, racing between defender and keeper, nodded the goal that pushed German heads below water again, only for substitute Leon Goretzka to bring them back to the surface by ramming home a loose ball.

There had been twists and turns but, as the curtain came down on the group stage, the form book had been respected. At that stage, few would have predicted that, within six days, the three heavyweights who had fought through the Group of Death would all have hit the canvas.

There had been twists and turns but, as the curtain came down on the group stage, the form book had been respected



## ROUND OF 16

### THE SMALLEST DETAILS MADE ALL THE DIFFERENCE

The round of 16 demonstrated that the EURO 2008 slogan Expect Emotions was still valid over a decade later. “We are disillusioned and sad,” said Portugal coach Fernando Santos. “There is no justice or injustice. No good luck or bad luck. We conceded a goal and we couldn’t score.” “This is a huge disappointment,” Joachim Löw confessed after ending an era as Germany’s head coach. “We hoped to achieve a lot more and the belief in the team was high. It feels pretty bad that we are out.” “Everyone’s disappointed. Quiet. Just silence,” commented Sweden’s Janne Andersson. “It’s probably my most bitter experience in football,

to be knocked out so close to the end.” The first knockout round generated intense emotions. And the margins between euphoria and despair were minimal, sometimes infinitesimal.

#### WALES 0-4 DENMARK

Wales 0 Denmark 4 is a scoreline that appears to refute that notion that margins between success and failure were small. But Wales manager Rob Page lamented, “We’re disappointed and hurt. We didn’t want our supporters to see a scoreline like that.” Frans Hoek, technical observer at the match in Amsterdam, remarked that “the goals came at unfortunate moments for Wales. Denmark deserved their win – but 4-0 was a lot.” For the opening 20 minutes, Wales were rampant, with Gareth Bale forging a series of chances. “Denmark arrived a bit late to all situations and didn’t have any control at all,” Hoek commented.





This prompted Kasper Hjulmand to make a tactical adjustment which changed the face of the game. Having opted for a 1-3-4-2-1 formation with two high wing-backs, he ordered a switch to 1-4-3-3, converting the wing-backs into full-backs and sending centre-back Andreas Christensen into midfield to pick up runs from deep, notably by Aaron Ramsey. Denmark slowly gained control – and a 2-0 lead thanks to a brace of strikes by Kasper Dolberg. Late, late goals by Joakim Mæhle and Martin Braithwaite, with a red card for Harry Wilson sandwiched between them, passed a harsh sentence on Wales.

#### ITALY 2-1 AUSTRIA (AET)

Italy, so dominant in their group, were made to dig unexpectedly deep into physical and mental reserves by Franco Foda's Austria. Roberto Mancini's side started strongly, creating good angles to pass their

way through the lines and penetrate the attacking third – and, after losses of possession, looking to regain rapidly and counter in numbers. After a reactive – rather than proactive – first half, it was in the second period that Austrian players began to catch the eye: Florian Grillitsch working well in front of the centre-backs; Xaver Schlager grafting defensively and getting forward to support attacks; Martin Hinteregger making defensive interceptions and using the ball well; Marcel Sabitzer finding dividends in the pockets between midfield and the Italy back line; and striker Marko Arnautović a real handful in and around the box. Austria started to out-muscle Italy's midfield and reached the 90-minute mark with 0-0 still on the scoreboard.

This prompted Mancini to make three telling changes: two in midfield and the third in attack, where he sent on Federico Chiesa to replace Domenico

Group F (from left): Robin Gosens powers home v Portugal; Lucas Digne beats the Hungarian defence



## England and Germany brought down the curtain on the round of 16 with a resounding bang

Berardi on the right. The result was two extra-time goals from two of his subs – Chiesa and midfielder Matteo Pessina. Austria, refusing to raise the white flag, forced Italy to concede for the first time in the tournament and bowed out with heads unbowed.

### BELGIUM 1-0 PORTUGAL

Portugal fought to the last after falling behind against Belgium in Seville, with Thorgan Hazard, left wing-back in Roberto Martínez's 1-3-4-2-1 formation, striking from long range just before half-time. Belgium were hampered by injuries to Kevin De Bruyne and Eden Hazard in a match where the key attackers Cristiano Ronaldo and Romelu Lukaku were shackled by efficient centre-backs. Portugal, prompted by midfielder Renato Sanches' penetrating running and passing, swarmed like hornets in search of the equaliser but failed to deliver a sting. Santos's team won a statistical battle 23-6 on goal attempts, though only four were on target and Thibaut Courtois provided three outstanding saves to preserve Belgium's stoutly-defended advantage until the final whistle. Martínez

admitted, "As Portugal gained momentum in the second half, we showed an incredible mentality. We were disciplined tactically and we were very, very astute."

### NETHERLANDS 0-2 CZECH REPUBLIC

The Netherlands, backed by three straight victories, travelled confidently to Budapest, only to be taken out of their comfort zone by a combative Czech Republic who denied space to key opponents in midfield thanks to outstanding work by Tomáš Holeš and, slightly ahead of him, Tomáš Souček and Antonín Barák. The Dutch team's most effective response was creative passing from centre-back Daley Blind allied with the pace of Donyell Malen in attack. The turning point, however, was the red card to Matthijs de Ligt early in the second half followed by a Holeš goal 16 minutes later. Frank de Boer initially responded by defending with two while pushing for an equaliser and, just as he was contemplating an audacious switch to 1-3-3-3, the Czechs sealed victory with a second goal.



Harry Kane celebrates England's second goal against Germany



**CROATIA 3-5 SPAIN (AET)**

Monday June 28 showcased the never-say-die mentality. In Copenhagen, Croatia took a 1-0 lead in 20 minutes without managing a shot at goal. The back pass misread by goalkeeper Unai Simón intensified Spanish anxieties and frustrations. Their trademark possession play had, as in two of their group games, lacked a cutting edge. Hence the relief when Pablo Sarabia lashed in an equaliser before half-time. Probing insistently along the flanks, they were calmed – maybe excessively – by two further goals. Zlatko Dalić made attacking substitutions and Croatia pumped the ball forward, creating chaos in the final third. And with two of the subs hitting goals timed at 85 and 90+2, they forced extra-time. But their extraordinary fighting spirit was finally doused by two Spanish goals early in the extra half-hour.

**FRANCE 3-3 SWITZERLAND (AET)****Switzerland win 5-4 on penalties**

Over to Bucharest, where Didier Deschamps, contending with injuries to his full-backs, started with a 1-3-5-2 formation against Switzerland's 1-3-4-1-2. Fast in their transition play, Vladimir Petković's team defended stoutly with Remo Freuler and Granit Xhaka working tirelessly to protect the back line and launch attacking moves and a header by striker Haris Seferović gave the Swiss a half-time lead. But the psychological pendulum swung radically when a Swiss penalty was not converted and, in the moments of deflation, Karim Benzema scored twice in as many minutes. An outstanding strike by Paul Pogba rounded off a purple patch of French attacking panache through the central areas and, at 1-3 with 15 minutes remaining, the Swiss had every excuse to claudicate. But no. Another Seferović header and a last-minute strike by sub Mario Gavranović following a penetrating assist by Xhaka forced extra-time and when Yann Sommer saved the 10th penalty of the shoot-out by Kylian Mbappé, the world champions were out.

**SWEDEN 1-2 UKRAINE (AET)**

Glasgow provided the scenario for another emotional see-saw on the following day. Sweden, always well-organised and hard to break down, produced incisive attacking play with Emil Forsberg a constant threat to the Ukraine defence. But Oleksandr Zinchenko, playing wider on the left than in previous matches as wing-back in a 1-3-5-2, put Andriy Shevchenko's side ahead with a technically brilliant volley. Forsberg equalised just before half-time and Sweden, dominant during the second half, exploited spaces between lines and created chances to win – but failed to convert them. Extra-time was eight minutes old when centre-back Marcus Danielson was dismissed, prompting a late attacking flurry by Ukraine and, with 120+1 on the clock, the header by substitute Artem Dovbyk spelt victory for



Ukraine's three-at-the-back system over Sweden's classic 1-4-4-2 and sent Andersson's team home with the bitterest of tastes in their mouths.

**ENGLAND 2-0 GERMANY**

That left England and Germany to bring down the curtain on the round of 16 with a resounding bang. Gareth Southgate opted for a 1-5-3-2 to mirror Joachim Löw's three-at-the-back formation in a match marked by mutual respect fuelled by historic rivalry. England defended compactly with a high back line. Germany defended deeper, giving

themselves room for fast transitions after regains. But defensive acumen signalled a shortage of joy for attackers until the game was well into its final quarter. Southgate's decision to replace right-winger Bukayo Saka with Jack Grealish facilitated overloads on the left, where the sub opened space for left wing-back Luke Shaw to cross for Raheem Sterling to beat Manuel Neuer from close range. After Germany had squandered a golden chance to equalise, Shaw and Grealish combined again, the latter crossing for Harry Kane to seal a hard-earned 2-0 victory.



## QUARTER-FINALS

### DRAMA, INTRIGUE AND, OF COURSE, A PENALTY SHOOT-OUT

#### SWITZERLAND 1-1 SPAIN (AET)

##### Spain win 3-1 on penalties

When the quarter-finals kicked-off in Saint Petersburg, the fans had barely settled into seats when a long-range shot by Jordi Alba was deflected into the Swiss net by Denis Zakaria to put Spain ahead. From then on, the script was unsurprising. Spain had two-thirds of possession; played just under 1,000 passes to less than 400 by their opponents; dominated goal attempts by a ratio of 3:1; and the Swiss player who made more passes than any of his team-mates was goalkeeper Yann Sommer who emerged as a hero. Switzerland's attacking was muted. The wide players stayed wide; the full-backs rarely advanced; strikers were starved of supplies. But Vladimir Petković's team defended with spirit in a tight, narrow 1-4-2-3-1 formation,

looking for opportunities to counter or playing out of Spain's high press in a laudably controlled manner. And, against the run of play, Xherdan Shaqiri found an equaliser in the 68th minute.

However, a red card for controlling midfielder Remo Freuler nine minutes later prompted a switch to 1-4-4-1 and even greater reliance on well-designed arts of defending. Extra-time yielded no goals and, even though two Spanish spot-kicks failed to hit the net, the Swiss exuberance that had earned the shoot-out victory over France gave way to nerves and wilting conviction. Of their four penalties, one went in. The plucky Swiss were out and Spain breathed a sigh of relief.

#### BELGIUM 1-2 ITALY

Belgium against Italy in Munich was a high-level tactical battle pitting a 1-3-4-2-1 structure against the habitual 1-4-3-3 of Roberto Mancini's side. Roberto Martínez fielded three experienced centre-backs; two adventurous wing-backs; two holding midfielders; two middle-to-front attackers (Kevin Bruyne and the mercurial Jeremy Doku);

with Romelu Lukaku looking for niches between Italy's two centre-backs. They ticked boxes with positional play, high-tempo passing, neat play between lines, runs from deep and fast transitions. But they fell two goals behind before an added-time penalty allowed them to go in at half-time with only a one-goal deficit.

Their problem was that Italy ticked the same boxes: brilliant positional attacking with one-touch combinations; good diagonal passing; intense high pressure which allowed them to make 17 pressure regains; and top-class wing play, especially on the left, where the uninhibited runs by right-footed full-back Leonardo Spinazzola created diversions that allowed Lorenzo Insigne to make dangerous runs through the inside channels – one of them securing the second goal with an impeccable long-range finish. After the break, Belgium created chances to draw level but, when all else failed, Italy could rely on the shot-stopping, positional expertise and rational distribution from the back by Gianluigi Donnarumma. Belgium pressed. But Italy's defensive acumen gave the scoreboard operator a tranquil second half.





The quarter-finals (clockwise from left): Thibaut Courtois can't stop Lorenzo Insigne's stunner; Spanish joy; Thomas Delaney scores for Denmark



#### CZECH REPUBLIC 1-2 DENMARK

Mistakes are costly. The age-old message was broadcast at full volume shortly after the Czechs had taken the field in Baku. Defending Denmark's first corner, two men went for the same opponent, leaving midfielder Thomas Delaney isolated long enough for him to calmly direct a conclusive header into the net. The sucker punch forced adjustments to the Czech's initial game plan. Their virtues were still evident. The midfield, led by Tomáš Souček provided intensive labour; attacks were given width with energetic support from the full-backs. But pressing the Danes in their own half yielded poor dividends and pushing the unit higher left them exposed to passes behind the defence for the pacy Mikkell Damsgaard to exploit. And, just before the break, the damage was compounded when left wing-back Joakim Mæhle bent in an exceptional cross with the outside of his right foot for Kasper Dolberg to meet at the back post.

At half-time, Jaroslav Šilhavý made two changes, removing a screening midfielder to make room for an extra front man and switching to a 1-4-4-2 formation in search of greater impact in the box. The reward was immediate, with Patrik Schick halving the deficit within four minutes. Kasper Hjulmand's response was to add a central midfielder; to focus on defensive security with Kasper Schmeichel as a solid last bastion; and to lay foundations for fast counterattacking. Even though battery warning lights were flickering, Denmark mustered enough power to see out the game with an unchanged scoreline against opponents who, although also flagging, fought to the last.

#### UKRAINE 0-4 ENGLAND

Like the Czechs, Ukraine needed to regain their balance after an early blow when a neat forward pass by Raheem Sterling allowed Harry Kane to put England ahead in Rome. An injury to centre-back Serhiy Kryvtsov then prompted Andriy Shevchenko to switch from his initial 1-3-4-3 formation to a back four – a ploy which seemed to offer greater stability against Gareth Southgate's 1-4-2-3-1. But, although Oleksandr Zinchenko tried to create disbalance on the left, the Yarmolenko/Yaremchuk attacking spearhead was blunted by a compact defensive block. The contest was effectively ended by three England goals in the first 18 minutes of the second half – a rapid-fire sequence of deliveries from wide areas yielding a hat-trick of headers by centre-back Harry Maguire, striker Kane and substitute midfielder Jordan Henderson. Ukraine had rivalled England in possession and passes – but not in goals.



## SEMI-FINALS

### ITALY DEFY SPAIN AND ENGLAND BATTLE THROUGH AGAINST DENMARK

#### ITALY 1-1 SPAIN (AET)

Italy win 4-2 on penalties

At Wembley, Italy were diverted well away from their comfort zone. They were obliged to chase the ball as Spain dominated two-thirds of possession. Stretched by the mobility of their opponents' attackers and confused by Dani Olmo's work as a false nine, their normally-solid defensive wall showed fissures. And they struggled to play out of Spain's high press, with Pedri and Koke so close to key midfielders Jorginho and Marco Verratti that, at times, it appeared to be man-for-man marking. The former, supplier of 112 passes against Austria, was restricted to 33 in two hours against Spain; Verratti only 30. Of their 63 passes, 30 were to their keeper or to defenders. Italy's top three passers were the two centre-backs and the goalkeeper. They looked uncomfortable with and without the ball. Spain, on the other hand, used their technical mastery to impose and maintain a high-tempo combination game with Sergio Busquets balancing the midfield; Pedri constantly looking for the imaginative pass completed 26 line breaking passes and 97% of the 67 passes he attempted; and the two full-backs repeatedly troubling their Italian counterparts – especially Jordi Alba on the left.

Italy played with lesser assurance – but not with lesser conviction. They turned to traditional qualities in the art of defending and in the art of counterattacking. And, on the hour-mark, Donnarumma raced to the edge of the box to roll the ball forward and initiate the end-to-end counter which culminated in a spectacular finish by Chiesa. Luis Enrique's response was to send on two strikers – and it was Morata who rolled home an equaliser with only 10 minutes to play. Extra-time provided more of the same: 76% of possession for Spain and incessant attacking. But, as technical observer Aitor Karanka remarked, "Spain were penalised by their lack of efficiency in taking their chances while Italy demonstrated exactly the opposite in the very few opportunities they created." Spain missed two of their four penalties and the shoot-out victory sent Mancini's team into the final.



Federico Chiesa curls in a sublime effort



Jorginho and team-mates enjoy their win

Italy played with lesser assurance – but not with lesser conviction. They turned to traditional qualities in the art of defending and counterattacking



Harry Kane  
wheels away  
having found  
the net



#### ENGLAND 2-1 DENMARK (AET)

A day later, Denmark started with an away-team complex against their hosts at Wembley but gradually played their way towards equality and even a spell of domination midway through the first half. Tactically, they stuck to the guns that had served them well: three central defenders and two wingbacks combining in a compact five-man defence; two holding midfield players; and three up front who kept close and dropped off to try to keep lines close. In attack the wingbacks pushed forward and stayed wide, always available for the switch of play. They also tried to build play through the thirds but lacked penetration to get behind the opposition defence and chances were created by shots from distance. But they took the lead. A wide free-kick

combined with clumsy defending led to a second, more central free-kick which Mikkel Damsgaard, with team-mates creating a visual barrier adjacent to the England wall, spectacularly converted into the first and only such success of the tournament.

England, initially fazed by conceding their first goal of the tournament were relieved when a fierce low cross was turned into his own net by Simon Kjær to earn half-time equality. Gareth Southgate's team had also stuck to its guns: a solid structure with two holding midfielders making it difficult to penetrate the lines; and real pace in key positions – especially Raheem Sterling and Bukayo Saka, constantly dangerous when going 1v1 in the wide areas.

Domination, however, was met with stout defending (especially by centre-backs Kjær, Andrea Christensen

and Jannik Vestergaard); top-class goalkeeping by Kasper Schmeichel and excellent balancing work in midfield by the indefatigable Pierre-Emile Højbjerg. With energy levels ebbing, Hjulmand made five changes within the 90 minutes and a sixth in the first half of extra-time – only for one of them, Mathias Jensen, to suffer an injury and leave his side a man short.

The misfortune was even more acute because England had, in the meantime, taken the lead. Schmeichel leapt so far towards his left post to repel Harry Kane's penalty that his parry took the ball back towards the centre, where the relieved England striker met the rebound and prompted fans and media to replay the music from EURO '96 and hope that, a quarter of a century later, football really was "coming home".





Celebrations  
with fans after  
the final at  
Wembley



# EXPERIENCE PAYS FOR ITALY

The Azzurri's old guard stopped England's youth movement in its tracks to lift the trophy for a second time



## “The decisive element was that Jorginho, Bonucci and Chiellini are players with a whole heap of experience”

The presence of 67,173 spectators in Wembley Stadium allowed the UEFA European Championship final to show itself in its true colours as one of the planet's top sporting events and to provide a fitting climax to a month-long football extravaganza. And the fans were given high-value entertainment by a fascinating contest between Italy and England that ebbed and flowed way beyond sunset on an overcast summer evening in London. Technical observer Ginés Meléndez, a serial finalist with Spain's age-limit teams, said after the 1-1 draw: “Finals are often decided by small details. And I think that the decisive element was that Jorginho, Bonucci and Chiellini are players with a whole heap of experience. In my opinion, the experience of those Italy players came out on top against the youth of England.”

When the fireworks and celebrations had fizzled out, hindsight offered reminders that there is nothing quite like a penalty shoot-out to blur judgements. A handful of kicks from 11 metres can influence perceptions of the 1,246 passes which had preceded the shoot-out. And, when one team lifts the trophy, the temptation is to regard everything they did as good and to be uncharitable with the losers. But, as technical observer Packie Bonner remarked, “I looked at my notes and, after 17 minutes, I hadn't written a word about Italy. It was all about England. They were tactically excellent, getting deep into the wide areas, with Raheem Sterling and Mason Mount finding pockets of space and giving the Italy defenders plenty to think about.”

Sterling found space in the first half



Gareth Southgate had also provided food for thought. As he had done against Germany, the England manager opted for three centre-backs, positioning Kyle Walker alongside John Stones and Harry Maguire to complete the trio, while Kieran Trippier and Luke Shaw operated as wing-backs. In midfield, Declan Rice and Calvin Phillips played the controlling roles – the former catching the eye with interceptions, tackling and, after ball-winning, the ability to twist and turn his way out of Italy's aggressive high press. Up front, Sterling and Mount patrolled the wider areas while Harry Kane dropped away from Italy's centre-backs to collaborate with approach play. The clock had yet to reach the two-minute mark when Southgate's game plan yielded a dividend. England played out of a press on their left; Kane hit a raking diagonal to Trippier on the right and his deep cross beyond the far post reached Shaw who, with right-back Giovanni Di Lorenzo lured into the middle, was unmarked. Shaw's volley sped past Gianluigi Donnarumma at his near post to put England ahead.

“During the tournament we had been talking about a team with three at the back winning the title, even though it finally didn't work out that way,” said technical observer David Moyes. “And England's system at the start was very successful, with one wing-back crossing for the other to score. We thought how well Gareth had prepared the game and found a way of creating problems for Italy. At that point, it looked as though England had caught them out.”

Roberto Mancini was watching the proceedings with a wry expression. He had remained loyal to his 1-4-3-3 structure and the eleven who had started the semi-final against Spain – including Emerson, in at left-back for the injured Leonardo Spinazzola. His patience and persistence were rewarded as the first half wore on.

“The pressure seemed to change direction,” technical observer Aitor Karanka reflected. “When you are winning a game, you can easily become scared to lose it, especially when you have to manage the pressure of playing in front of your own crowd as a young team against such experienced opponents. Little by little, Italy worked it round so they could play the game as they wanted to play it.”

Gradually, Italy wrested control from the hosts. “At the beginning,” said technical observer Willi Rutensteiner, “Mount or Sterling were pressing up to prevent Italy's centre-backs from playing to their playmaker Jorginho. If he got the ball, he had to deal with pressing by Rice and Phillips. So they couldn't use him. But Mancini obviously made a good team talk at half-time because the game changed totally.





Leonardo Bonucci scores Italy's equaliser

## When England started to give away possession, they started to lose control of the game"

Their positional play was much better and Jorginho was able to get on to the ball and become the absolute leader on the pitch."

Gradually the game began to endorse the adage about possession being nine tenths of the law. "When you use wing-backs," Packie Bonner reflected, "you need to play out from the back and have a good share of possession. When England started to give away possession, they started to lose control of the game. And when Jordan Pickford felt obliged to play long, the wing-backs found it difficult to get into attacking mode and Kane was losing the ball in the air instead of being able to drop deep and receive along the ground." Aerial bombardment did little to perturb Giorgio Chiellini and Leonardo Bonucci, the warriors who had, jointly, practised defensive arts in over 200 international matches.

Statistics testified the change of tide. Despite their dominant start, England's ball-

possession dropped to 35% – their lowest share in the tournament. Ditto, their passing accuracy (one in four went astray). Their shift towards a fast-forward approach could be gauged by an advance rate of 1.59 metres per second – another tournament high, along with their highest average pass distance (20 metres), with Pickford making 26 long clearances. As England retreated into an ever-deeper defensive block, Italy controlled the ball with enough comfort to record their lowest average passing distance of the tournament (15.3 metres) and total twice as many passes as England.

The result was a second half when England, no longer exerting energetic high pressure, gave Italy's midfield trio the time and space they needed to take a stranglehold. Jorginho, from his controlling position in front of the centre-backs, played 98 passes – more than the combined total of England's midfield.





Italy lift the cup

“Italy won because they had a very good goalkeeper and two very experienced stoppers”

Marco Verratti pushed forward to link with attack; Nicolò Barella did likewise on the right. And, in the final third, Federico Chiesa posed constant threats with aggressive running, 1v1 skills and sharp shooting, while England's defence had to solve problems when Mancini sent on Domenico Berardi to replace target striker Ciro Immobile, with Insigne moving inside to inject a false 9 into the attacking equation. Italy attacked in waves. But the inevitable equaliser came in unexpected fashion – Bonucci poking the ball home in a pinball scenario following a corner from the right, nodded on at the near post.

“We know that with midfield players of the quality of Verratti and Jorginho, that's always going to be a strength of Italy,” Southgate commented afterwards. “So they were going to have possession. We were controlling the game without the ball for long periods but then couldn't release that pressure by keeping the

ball, which we had done so well in the first half.”

His reaction to Italy's goal was to switch to four at the back, replacing Trippier with winger Bukayo Saka and allowing England's middle-to-front play to gain in coherence. Although Sterling's solo runs were threatening, Italy continued to control the game throughout extra-time, ending the contest with 20 goal attempts against England's six. Southgate made strategic changes for the shoot-out, sending on Marcus Rashford and Jadon Sancho in the 120th minute – only for both to leave the net unruffled in a shoot-out where England accounted for three of the five unconverted spot-kicks.

“In five years' time, if I close my eyes and think back to this tournament,” Peter Rudbæk said, “I'm sure I'll recall that Italy won because they had a very good goalkeeper and two very, very experienced stoppers. Those two guys were the fathers of the team.”



## MATCH STATISTICS

1-1

aet; Italy win 3-2 on pens

SUNDAY 11 JULY 2021  
Wembley Stadium, London

## ITALY

Donnarumma	21
Di Lorenzo	2
Bonucci	19
Chiellini (c)	3
Emerson	
24 Florenzi 118	13
Barella	
16 Cristante 54	18
Jorginho	8
Verratti	
5 Locatelli 96	6
Chiesa	
20 Bernardeschi 86	14
Immobile	
11 Berardi 55	17
Insigne	
9 Belotti 91	10

## UNUSED SUBSTITUTES

Sirigu	1
Meret	26
Pessina	12
Acerbi	15
Bastoni	23
Totti	25

## COACH

Roberto Mancini

## GOALS

Shaw 2 (0-1); Bonucci 67 (1-1)


## PENALTIES

ITALY	3-2	ENGLAND
Berardi (s)		Kane (s)
Belotti (m)		Maguire (s)
Bonucci (s)		Rashford (m)
Bernardeschi (s)		Sancho (m)
Jorginho (m)		Saka (m)

## REFEREE

Björn Kuipers (NED)

## TEAM SHAPES



ITALY		ENGLAND
1	GOALS	1
20	ATTEMPTS	6
6	ON TARGET	1
3	CORNERS	5
61%	POSSESSION	39%
91%	PASSING ACCURACY	78%
836	PASSES ATTEMPTED	436
758	PASSES COMPLETED	340
144.6	DISTANCE COVERED (KM)	143.3
42	BALLS RECOVERED	42
25	TACKLES	12
5	YELLOW CARDS	1
0	RED CARDS	0
21	FOULS COMMITTED	13



## ENGLAND

1	Pickford
2	Walker
17 Sancho 120	
5	Stones
6	Maguire
12	Trippier
25 Saka 70	
3	Shaw
14	Phillips
	Rice
4	8 Henderson 74
11 Rashford 120	
	Mount
19	7 Grealish 99
10	Sterling
9	Kane (c)

## UNUSED SUBSTITUTES

13	Ramsdale
23	Johnstone
15	Mings
16	Coady
18	Calvert-Lewin
24	James
26	Bellingham

## COACH

Gareth Southgate



# RESULTS AND STANDINGS

## GROUP STAGE

Group A	P	W	D	L	F	A	Pts
Italy (H)	3	3	0	0	7	0	9
Wales	3	1	1	1	3	2	4
Switzerland	3	1	1	1	4	5	4
Turkey	3	0	0	3	1	8	0

11 June					Rome
Turkey	0-3				Italy

12 June					Baku
Wales	1-1				Switzerland

16 June					Baku
Turkey	0-2				Wales

16 June					Rome
Italy	3-0				Switzerland

20 June					Baku
Switzerland	3-1				Turkey

20 June					Rome
Italy	1-0				Wales

Group D	P	W	D	L	F	A	Pts
England (H)	3	2	1	0	2	0	7
Croatia	3	1	1	1	4	3	4
Czech Republic	3	1	1	1	3	2	4
Scotland (H)	3	0	1	2	1	5	1

13 June					London
England	1-0				Croatia

14 June					Glasgow
Scotland	0-2				Czech Republic

18 June					Glasgow
Croatia	1-1				Czech Republic

18 June					London
England	0-0				Scotland

22 June					Glasgow
Croatia	3-1				Scotland

22 June					London
Czech Republic	0-1				England

Group B	P	W	D	L	F	A	Pts
Belgium	3	3	0	0	7	1	9
Denmark (H)	3	1	0	2	5	4	3
Finland	3	1	0	2	1	3	3
Russia (H)	3	1	0	2	2	7	3

12 June					Copenhagen
Denmark	0-1				Finland

12 June					Saint Petersburg
Belgium	3-0				Russia

16 June					Saint Petersburg
Finland	0-1				Russia

17 June					Copenhagen
Denmark	1-2				Belgium

21 June					Copenhagen
Russia	1-4				Denmark

21 June					Saint Petersburg
Finland	0-2				Belgium

Group E	P	W	D	L	F	A	Pts
Sweden	3	2	1	0	4	2	7
Spain (H)	3	1	2	0	6	1	5
Slovakia	3	1	0	2	2	7	3
Poland	3	0	1	2	4	6	1

14 June					Saint Petersburg
Poland	1-2				Slovakia

14 June					Seville
Spain	0-0				Sweden

18 June					Saint Petersburg
Sweden	1-0				Slovakia

19 June					Seville
Spain	1-1				Poland

23 June					Seville
Slovakia	0-5				Spain

23 June					Saint Petersburg
Sweden	3-2				Poland

Group C	P	W	D	L	F	A	Pts
Netherlands (H)	3	3	0	0	8	2	9
Austria	3	2	0	1	4	3	6
Ukraine	3	1	0	2	4	5	3
North Macedonia	3	0	0	3	2	8	0

13 June					Bucharest
Austria	3-1				North Macedonia

13 June					Amsterdam
Netherlands	3-2				Ukraine

17 June					Bucharest
Ukraine	2-1				North Macedonia

17 June					Amsterdam
Netherlands	2-0				Austria

21 June					Amsterdam
North Macedonia	0-3				Netherlands

21 June					Bucharest
Ukraine	0-1				Austria

Group F	P	W	D	L	F	A	Pts
France	3	1	2	0	4	3	5
Germany (H)	3	1	1	1	6	5	4
Portugal	3	1	1	1	7	6	4
Hungary (H)	3	0	2	1	3	6	2

15 June					Budapest
Hungary	0-3				Portugal

15 June					Munich
France	1-0				Germany

19 June					Budapest
Hungary	1-1				France

19 June					Munich
Portugal	2-4				Germany

23 June					Budapest
Portugal	2-2				France

23 June					Munich
Germany	2-2				Hungary

## THIRD-PLACED TEAMS RANKING

GROUP	TEAM	P	W	D	L	F	A	Pts
F	Portugal	3	1	1	1	7	6	4
D	Czech Republic	3	1	1	1	3	2	4
A	Switzerland	3	1	1	1	4	5	4
C	Ukraine	3	1	0	2	4	5	3
B	Finland	3	1	0	2	1	3	3
E	Slovakia	3	1	0	2	2	7	3

H = Host city  
Bold = Qualified from the group stage



## ROUND OF 16

26 June Amsterdam  
Wales 0-4 Denmark

26 June London  
Italy 2-1 Austria  
AET

27 June Budapest  
Netherlands 0-2 Czech Republic

27 June Seville  
Belgium 1-0 Portugal

28 June Copenhagen  
Croatia 3-5 Spain  
AET

28 June Bucharest  
France 3-3 Switzerland  
AET; Switzerland win 5-4 on penalties

29 June London  
England 2-0 Germany

29 June Glasgow  
Sweden 1-2 Ukraine  
AET

## QUARTER-FINALS

2 July Saint Petersburg  
Switzerland 1-1 Spain  
AET; Spain win 3-1 on penalties

2 July Munich  
Belgium 1-2 Italy

3 July Baku  
Czech Republic 1-2 Denmark

3 July Rome  
Ukraine 0-4 England

## SEMI-FINALS

6 July London  
Italy 1-1 Spain  
AET; Italy win 4-2 on penalties

7 July London  
England 2-1 Denmark  
AET

## FINAL

11 July

London



Italy

1-1



England

AET; Italy win 3-2 on penalties



Roberto Mancini explains how he lifted Italy from the depths of despair to EURO glory

# SMELLS LIKE TEAM SPIRIT





"This is a group that has never lost heart, even in difficult times, supporting each other and putting the interest of the team before the individual. If we are where we are today, it's not only because of an extra penalty scored. It's because we have been transformed by our friendship – one of the most beautiful feelings in life." These words, not spoken by Roberto Mancini but by his captain, Giorgio Chiellini, reflect the team spirit built by a coach who took the baton at a delicate moment in the wake of Italy's historic failure to qualify for the 2018 FIFA World Cup.

Triumph at UEFA EURO 2020 also reaffirmed the notion that a collective ethos has equal relevance in the team-behind-the-team as among the players themselves. Mancini embarked on his renaissance project with the support of former team-mates such as Alberico Evani, Fausto Salsano, Giulio Nucciari and Angelo Gregucci, with his strike partner in the great Sampdoria team of the late 1980s and early 1990s, Gianluca Vialli, head of delegation. Clips of their touchline celebrations bear witness to the passion and commitment that united them.

#### **HOW IMPORTANT WAS TEAM SPIRIT? AND WHAT DID YOU DO TO CREATE IT?**

The team did well because they formed a good group of guys – great guys first and foremost. Plus, the more experienced players helped the younger players integrate. They deserve a lot of credit for creating a group that really wanted to play good football. It's not that I felt everything would be easy because there are always difficulties, but we made it. We were together for 50 days, which was tough, but I have to say that time went quickly. That's a sign that the guys got on well with each other.

#### **YOU ALSO IMPLEMENTED A MORE POSITIVE STYLE. HOW DIFFICULT WAS IT TO DO THIS AFTER THE DISAPPOINTMENT OF 2018?**

It was actually quite simple, because I found players who wanted to do something special. They were enthusiastic about the project because it was something different for them. They were curious to see what we Italians could do. Obviously it took some time, but not that much. Whenever we got to see each other it went well, because they got something special out of it.

**Everyone, every time, in each game: they came on and did something special. It's important that the identity of the team remains the same even when we change three or four players"**

#### **AS YOU DON'T WORK WITH THE PLAYERS AS FREQUENTLY AS YOU WOULD AT CLUB LEVEL, HOW DID YOU MANAGE TO PREPARE DIFFERENT TACTICAL SYSTEMS?**

It was a group effort. We tried to work on different ways of playing as well as on the physical fitness side. We tried to improve our qualities as individuals and as a team. We succeeded, all together – the staff and the players – because they showed a lot of desire.

#### **HOW IMPORTANT WAS IT FOR THE GROUP THAT YOU COULD MAKE FIVE OR SIX SUBSTITUTIONS?**

It was important for everyone because the players had all just come off the end of an exhausting season. We'd been working as a group for a long time and the guys who came off the bench knew what to do. Indeed, I have to say that whenever they came on, they gave us something extra, because when a tired player came off, a fresh player came on with a desire to improve the team – and that's not always the case. I have to say they were excellent. Everyone, every time, in each game: they came on and did something special. It's important that the identity of the team remains the same even when we change three or four players. They all know what to do and the end product does not change.

#### **EVERYBODY SETS OUT TO WIN. BUT AT WHAT POINT DID YOU THINK YOU COULD GO ALL THE WAY?**

I always believed it was possible to win, from day one. But there are lots of other factors as well. We knew what we were doing, even during qualifying, and we believed it was possible to do something special. The teams who played

at the EURO were all very strong and they all wanted to win, so there was a good balance. At the moment there are many strong teams in Europe who could have won the EURO and who could win the World Cup. Winning wasn't a simple task.

#### **WHAT WERE THE KEY MOMENTS?**

We really believed in what we had done in the lead-up to the EURO but, of course, the important – crucial – match was the first. In a knockout competition, the first is always the most difficult. But then when you settle into it, it becomes different.

#### **DID THE PERFORMANCE AGAINST BELGIUM IN THE QUARTER-FINALS ILLUSTRATE YOUR CONFIDENCE AND PHYSICAL CONDITION?**

I think that was a very important match. The final against England was a great match too. We suffered a bit more against Spain because they played probably their best match of the whole tournament and they are a very strong team. I think from the round of 16 onwards, they were all great matches. There are some games when you have to suffer. Spain surprised us at the start by playing without a striker. They caused us a lot of trouble and we had a hard time because we didn't have much of the ball.

#### **DID YOU SEE ANY TACTICAL TRENDS THAT COULD BE USEFUL IN COACH EDUCATION?**

Every coach played to attack and to win, so this is the trend to follow. At a European level, if you follow this trend and have quality players, you can win. You can change the formation or the way you play but, in the end, you have the pitch and 11 players. So it comes down to mentality and desire to win – even if you're giving opponents more opportunities by giving them more space. I believe this is the foundation of it all.

#### **IS THERE A LESSON THAT EURO 2020 TAUGHT YOU?**

That you never give up until the end. It's not something we learned at EURO 2020, but it's something that was confirmed there. When you play you should always believe in your abilities and your qualities, because every match starts 0-0. You must never give up for any reason because in today's football, you can always mount a comeback.



# "FOOD FOR THE SOUL OF FOOTBALL"



National team tournaments provide a guide to the tactical direction of the game and the EURO produced much to discuss, from defensive formations and the changing role of strikers and playmakers to the impact of pressing



There are quotes that deserve to be framed and hung on the boot room wall. This one, for example. "International football is the soul of football. There are no directors involved, no transfers made. It's just about pure education and about tactical cultures created over decades." It was signed by Pep – but not the one readers might immediately think of. The comment on a fascinating EURO 2020 was made by Pepijn 'Pep' Lijnders, a member of Jürgen Klopp's coaching staff at Liverpool.

As a Dutchman, he would surely like to reflect on the Netherlands' move away from their hallowed 1-4-3-3 culture, while coaches in France might be equally eager to discuss the change of playing system for the fixture against the Swiss. As Ginés Meléndez said at the technical observers' online meeting after the final, "It was an immensely competitive tournament with eight matches going to extra time and four to penalties. Coaches all over Europe will take away good points to discuss and to use in coach education."

## NUMBERS AT THE BACK

### THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT TOWARDS PLAYING THREE AT THE BACK

The Dutch and the French were among the 15 teams who, at some stage of the tournament, played with three at the back and provided a glaring contrast with EURO 2016 when this style of architecture was displayed by a minority which included, ironically, Italy. In that tournament, Antonio Conte fielded Andrea Barzagli to form a trio of centre-backs with Leonardo Bonucci and Giorgio Chiellini. Wales along with, sporadically, Germany and Northern Ireland adopted similar structures.

At the end of the group stage in 2020, David Moyes remarked: "I think the teams who've played 3-4-3 have looked better. We need to be careful about categorising too precisely when systems are versatile and are changing between in-possession and out-of-possession play. But I think the teams with wing-backs against 4-2-3-1 or 4-3-3 are causing problems because of the extra width. I think teams will need to vary their approach."



Germany's wing-backs positioned high and wide against Portugal

He rightly predicted that England might need to switch for their next game against Germany and was not far off the mark when he speculated that EURO 2020 might be the first tournament to be won by a team with three at the back. Another feature brought in by the tactical winds of change was that, whereas five teams had done so in 2016, Sweden were alone in deploying a classic 1-4-4-2 – and to great effect.

"They operated their out-of-possession play to perfection," Meléndez commented after watching them hold Spain to a goalless draw. "And the way they defended with a back four should be used as an example on coach education courses."

The perennial question attached to the three-at-the-back label is whether, in practice, the back line consists of three or five. "Hungary gave us a clear example of a deep five in their game against Germany," Dušan Fitzel recalled. "Hungary focused on not conceding and looking for the chance to break. Germany dominated. But Hungary were comfortable with that."

Corinne Diacre considered three centre-backs as a more defensive ploy to date, for the security the extra centre-back brings. Teams moved from five defenders when out of possession to a 3-2-5 shape when attacking and Mixu Paatelainen saw the back three as providing a structure for an offensive approach: Poland, for example, went to 3-1-6 when chasing a result. Four of the group stage's top five pressing teams played with three centre-backs. This set-up allows for a good balance in the central area, with two midfielders covering the space in front of the defenders for defensive transitions.

Esteban Cambiasso commented: "Maybe the mentality of the coaches is to be sure with the three centre-backs and to press high. This is different from waiting in a low block. The most important thing is to understand how we must place players on the pitch, the mentality and the approach. It is not the quantity of defenders or the quantity of midfielders. So these teams show us that with five at the back they are the teams that play with high press."

Steffen Freund quoted Germany's game against France as an example of how back fours can be given headaches by five-man attacking in the other system. "Benjamin Pavard and Lucas Hernandez were made to work very hard by the wing-backs Joshua Kimmich and Robin Gosens and, after taking an early lead, France stayed very deep. But their best moments came when they were able to create 3v2 situations in central midfield. That's the danger area when you're playing with wing-backs. Toni Kroos sometimes lacked a bit of cover and that made it difficult to defend. But then the wing-backs were decisive in the next game against Portugal's back four."

Frans Hoek was interested in the direct duels between teams with three or four at the back. "Netherlands played three, whereas Ukraine's back line of four really struggled to deal with the wing-back on the opposite side. And I saw exactly the same in Germany v Portugal." The final, however, produced conflicting evidence. Initially, England's wing-backs – and the overloads they helped to create in the wide areas – gave Italy a rough ride. But then, with Jorginho conducting the orchestra, they fought back into the game by taking control of that central midfield area, obliging Gareth Southgate to switch to a back four midway through the second half. The jury is out...



# THE CENTRE-FORWARD: TRUE OR FALSE?

## THE TRADITIONAL NO9 MUST ADAPT TO SURVIVE

Do three centre-backs mean extra headaches for central attackers? The question cues up more conflicting evidence about the impact of Lewandowski, Kane, Immobile, Lukaku, Benzema, Poulsen, Moore, Seferović, Yaremchuk, Morata, Weghorst, Dzyuba... Frans Hoek said: "The fact that we have spoken so much about this indicates that, over the whole tournament, a very limited number of centre-forwards have really made an impact." "The trend among the modern centre-forwards," Moyes commented, "is that they are often converted wide players with more speed and flexibility. I didn't see many teams playing direct to a target striker, while more attackers are playing in roles that, in days gone by, we called inside-forwards." "Lewandowski is a classic striker," Fitzel added, "and Patrik Schick had an excellent tournament. But look what happened in the final when England started playing the long ball. Italy's two stoppers dominated Harry Kane. They won the ball every time. So what we saw was the type of central attacker who moved wide or went deep."

The observers reflected at length on the difficulties of finding routes through central areas where three centre-backs were protected by one or two screening midfielders. "Germany played with three attackers rather than a No9," said Freund. "The No9 isn't dead – he just has to be more flexible, rotate and still appear in the right places to score goals."

Germany's attacking options epitomised the trend away from the classic centre-forward. "For me," Corinne Diacre reflected, "it was interesting to compare how France used Karim Benzema with how Portugal used Cristiano Ronaldo. Fernando Santos brought Ronaldo in from the wing to use him as a false 9 – and his movements created a lot of space for his team-mates to exploit." David Moyes agreed: "OK, he was a No9 in terms of goalscoring, but certainly not a No9 in his positional play."

"As a coach," added Dušan Fitzel, "you try to find a different solution if you feel you don't have enough good strikers. Or you use the false 9 as a tactical solution, as we have seen teams like Manchester City and Barcelona doing." "We've seen the false 9 since Johan Cruyff introduced it about 20 years ago," added Frans Hoek. "You need to distract and trouble the centre-backs – especially if there are three of them. Make them decide to come out of their zone or stay."


This point was graphically illustrated by the Denmark v Belgium game, as Peter Rudbæk explained. "Denmark were 1-0 up and central defender Simon Kjær managed to handle Lukaku well in the first half. At half-time, Roberto Martínez sent Lukaku out to the right and played Kevin De Bruyne through the middle, making runs from everywhere as what I call a 'free electron'. Kjær didn't like that. And the left-back didn't like having Lukaku out there. He

delivered assists for both goals and changed the match."


Mancini and his players admitted that they were made to suffer mightily in the semi-final against Spain. "I think Italy were surprised, as they expected a striker high up the pitch," Aitor Karanka reported. But Luis Enrique fielded Dani Olmo as a false 9. He appeared everywhere and it was very difficult for Italy's players to pick him up. On average, Olmo offered to receive the ball behind the midfield line 37 times a game, the second most of any player in the competition, behind Eden Hazard (39). At the same time, Pedri found a lot of space when Spain were in possession and, as soon as the ball was lost, he picked up Jorginho while Koke shut down Verratti. Italy looked completely lost."

Statistics confirm that Verratti and Jorginho, who jointly delivered 167 passes in the quarter-final against Belgium and 224 in the final at Wembley, totalled only 65 in the two hours against Spain. "For the coach, it is an interesting topic," Karanka mused. "Maybe most would play a central striker if they had a good one. Olmo as false 9 posed Italy a lot of problems and Spain controlled the game. But they didn't score until Morata came on as striker. That's the puzzle you have to solve: if you play a false 9, do you have enough power up front?"

### Cristiano Ronaldo actions map during the tournament



### Dani Olmo offers to receive against Italy







Joakim Mæhle (No5) scores Denmark's third goal against Wales

## WING-BACK OR WING-FRONT?

### STRIKING RISE IN GOALS FROM WING-BACKS HIGHLIGHTS THEIR GROWING THREAT

At EURO 2020 full-backs or wing-backs scored 16 goals. OK, you could discount Ezgjan Alioski's goal for North Macedonia against Ukraine as it was a rebound from a penalty. On the other hand, although Spain's quarter-final goal against Switzerland went into the record books as an own goal, it was a deflected shot by left-back Jordi Alba to culminate an interior run. So 16 is a decent ball-park figure to work on. At EURO 2016, the grand total was one, by Wales left-back Neil Taylor against Russia, to be precise.

In addition to the striking stat, discussion focused on the graphic showing where the wide defenders had scored from. It blurred the traditional image of the overlapping full-back who runs towards the corner flag and sends in a high cross. At EURO 2020, the wing-backs' job descriptions included internal runs into scoring positions and a willingness to get ahead of the ball epitomised by the sight, for example, of Croatia winger Ivan Perišić playing a forward pass to left-back Joško Gvardiol.

Interestingly, 12 of those 16 goals were scored against opponents who were, at the time, defending with a back four. Frans Hoek's comment about Ukraine's defence struggling to cope with the wing-back on the opposite flank was borne out by the goal for Dutch right wing-back Denzel Dumfries, who was also on the scoresheet against Austria. Likewise, Luke Shaw's early opener in the final when Giovanni Di Lorenzo tucked in beside Italy's centre-backs and England's left wing-back sneaked into a critical area deep inside the box. Shaw's goal was one of seven which opened the scoring and changed the complexion of a match.

"This is coming more and more into the game," Mixu Paatelainen remarked. "Full-backs like to come inside as, when they do, they take the opposing winger out of his comfort zone. I see this as a symptom that coaches are

working on ways of getting opponents away from their comfort zones."

During the tournament, this type of defender was not exclusive to three-at-the-back systems – as vividly illustrated by Italy left-back Leonardo Spinazzola. Packie Bonner, after watching him in action against Austria, noted: "He always threatened to get to the byline and we saw him twice in the six-yard box. He linked exceptionally well with Lorenzo Insigne, who took Austria's right-back infield to open space. And Verratti did a good job of covering any counters on that side."

While sightings of change-footed wingers have become commonplace in major competitions (Sterling, Yarmolenko, Insigne, Oyarzabal, Bale, Perišić...), Spinazzola was among the examples at EURO 2020 of a proliferating species: the inverted full-back. The Italian was joined by right-footed left-backs such as Jan Bořil (Czech Republic), Tomáš Hubočan (Slovakia), Kieran Trippier (England) and Joakim Mæhle, who weighed in with two goals – one with his left, one with his right – in a tournament where he appeared on both flanks of the Denmark defence. "He's good with both feet," Peter Rudbæk said, "and there was an example against the Czechs of how he can deliver a good cross from the left with the outside of his right foot."



Denzel Dumfries' infield runs from the right wing-back position were a feature of the tournament





## METHODS OF DELIVERY

### ACCURATE PASSES, NOT HOPEFUL HIGH BALLS, ARE THE NEW FACE OF CROSSING


Contributions by full-backs and wingers provided a cue for debate on the changing face of crossing. "The increasing use of inverted wingers and full-backs might be an invitation to cut inside and deliver inswinging crosses, rather than penetrate on the outside," David Moyes reflected. The trend towards three centre-backs protected by one or two central midfielders gave extra relevance to wing play – and its end product. As Mixu Paatelainen said, "We saw wingers and full-backs who, when they got near the box, had their heads high and tried to deliver a pass. It's much more about passes inside the box, low crosses or cut-backs. So we were looking at the type of winger or full-back who tried to deliver an accurate pass rather than the hopeful high cross."

The topic of crossing (dealt with later in this report) interlocks with other aspects, such as the inward runs by inverted wide players into areas where their delivery can, in statistical terms, be on the borderline between the cross and final pass categories. It also interlocks with playing styles. Given the effectiveness of Robert Lewandowski (pictured), it was no surprise that Poland – excluding set plays – averaged 25 crosses per game, compared with eight by Belgium, Sweden or the champions Italy – or

five by Hungary, reflecting their preference for direct counterattacking through the inside channels. Spain, whose figures were inflated by three periods of extra time and extensive far-post crossing against Croatia, averaged 18.

The topic also interlocks with the total of 11 own goals (only nine had been recorded in 15 previous tournaments). The record-breaking figure can be partly explained by a change of criteria; and partly by goalkeeping errors or misfortune. However, the commonest denominator was a low cross driven across the face of the goal from a departure point within the confines of the penalty area. "It's incredibly difficult to defend," Frans Hoek admitted. "There is so much pressure in front of goal and, if a defender gets to the ball, it's a corner or an own goal."

#### Assist locations of crosses and cut-backs






# THE PRESS KIT


## THREE FORWARDS AND A HIGH PRESS PAID DIVIDENDS

The perennial question attached to three-centre-back formations is whether they are offensive or defensive. "This is an issue related to the increased number of goals," Ginés Meléndez believed. "At the two previous EUROS, the default structure was a 1-4-2-3-1. At this one, there was a clear trend towards three attackers – either in 1-4-3-3 or in 1-3-4-3. Of the semi-finalists, Spain and Italy played 1-4-3-3; Denmark 1-3-4-3; and England alternated between the two. The main point here

Italy pressure map against Switzerland



### PRESSURE IN THE OPPOSING HALF (%)



### PASSES ALLOWED PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Spain	8.1
Poland	11.5
Austria	11.8
Netherlands	11.8
Turkey	11.9
Portugal	12.4
Denmark	12.9
Italy	13
Russia	13.6
Germany	13.9
North Macedonia	14.1
Czech Republic	14.2
Belgium	14.8
Scotland	15.4
Croatia	15.6
Switzerland	16.2
France	16.3
Ukraine	16.5
England	17.7
Finland	19.1
Sweden	19.1
Slovakia	19.6
Wales	20.2
Hungary	25.9

is that having three attackers makes it easier to press high, create more passes from the wings and score more goals."

After watching Italy in the group stage, Esteban Cambiasso reported: "OK, they have quality; they play good football; they attack; and they score goals. But, if I have to choose one key factor, it's the pressure on opponents in the attacking third. They press with a lot of players and there's a very short time between them losing the ball and winning it back. It means they don't give too many chances for the opposition to make quick offensive transitions." Five of Italy's regains in the attacking third led to goals.

The final four teams, triggered by their front three, were equipped for collective high pressing. Spain pursued ball-carriers relentlessly, converting 27 of their regains in the attacking third into goal attempts. England were more intermittent but defended with a high line and pressed efficiently when operating with a high line and pressed efficiently when operating with wing-backs against Germany and for the first half-hour against Italy. Denmark's front three were supported by the two nearest midfielders when they opted to press high – notably during their first half against Belgium. Among the other teams, the Netherlands – also counting on cooperation from advanced wing-backs – were efficient in regaining possession in opposition territory.

As a knock-on effect of high pressing, some teams developed a risk-management edginess about playing out from the back. England keeper Jordan Pickford, for instance, attempted 22 long passes in the semi-final against Denmark and 24 in the final when, as Packie Bonner remarked: "It became difficult for the wing-backs to get into attack mode, while Kane was losing the ball in the air instead of being able to drop deep to receive." Similarly, the Czechs short-circuited Dutch construction work by forcing Maarten Stekelenburg to play 31 long passes (out of 37) of which six reached team-mates. As Frans Hoek observed, "The Czechs were taking up in-between positions, ready to spring into the high press." "They took the Dutch out of their comfort zone," Dušan Fitzel reported. "Unable to build up, they were forced to play long and the Czechs were winning a lot of second ball. The Netherlands started 1-3-4-1-2 in that game and you could see it was easier for the Czechs to build from the back with only two strikers to disturb them."

By contrast, Spain keeper Unai Simón had remained unfazed by Italy's high press, making only 11 long passes in his total of 49 during a semi-final that could be used in coach education to illustrate the levels of technique required to play out of aggressive high pressing. "I remember the first time, as a coach, I encountered opponents with three pressing up front. I thought it would be easy to play through and get superiority in midfield," Aitor Karanka admitted. "But I soon realised that a well-organised front line of three could make it more or less impossible."

At EURO 2020, high pressing was not, of course, universal. Teams like France and Germany generally preferred to defend with a mid-block, giving themselves space for counterattacks. Hungary, drawn into a group with three former champions, were at the other end of the rainbow, relying on very deep, resolute defending and energetic counterattacking. Teams' overall defensive behaviour in terms of their ball-winning ambitions can be gauged by the PPDA (Passes allowed per defensive action in the opposition third and middle third of the pitch) table showing how many passes they permitted opponents before regaining possession.





## THE PLAYMAKER

### THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE NO10

"The No10 shirt is more about the history attached to it than its significance in the modern game." The comment by Peter Rudbæk sparked discussion on whether the time has come to stop identifying the "playmaker" with the No10 shirt – or position. "In the old days," he added, "No10 defined the type of player and his position. Now it's more about the ability to dictate tempo and make a pass towards the final third for another team-mate to supply the final pass."

"The playmaker is no longer the No10," Fabio Capello concurred. "It's the organiser in front of the back line." "I totally agree," said Willi Rutensteiner. "If we look at Jorginho [pictured], what he did was to balance and lead the midfield. He could find space where the team needed him and he was a leading figure. For example, when Italy were trying to find a way out of a high press, he would often make himself available and then quickly switch play to the other wing." As Capello pointed out, "Jorginho and Busquets, for example, didn't play many important attacking passes. It's completely different. Their role is all about balance and, mostly, short passes."

Packie Bonner, after watching Croatia in Glasgow, observed how Luka Modrić often dropped deep into the right-back area to find space to exercise his passing skills. Ginés Meléndez reflected "I saw two good examples when Spain played Switzerland: Sergio Busquets and Granit Xhaka. Different personalities, but they balance their teams. Spain can play a basically horizontal game but Busquets gives the team a different sense of how to play the game. Pierre-Emile Højbjerg was fundamental for Denmark in this role. Otherwise, in middle-to-front play we are talking about hardworking linking players rather than playmakers. In forward play, Pedri caught the eye – clearly the best young player in the tournament with a lot in common with Andrés Iniesta."

Germany's Toni Kroos, like Modrić, was prepared to drop close to his centre-backs to exercise his playmaking skills in terms of delivering telling passes. Over the tournament, short passes accounted for only 16% of his repertoire and, from the deeper position, he completed more line-breaking passes than any other player in the tournament with an average of 46.7 per 90 minutes.

### SUCCESSFUL LINE BREAKS PER 90 MINS

<b>Toni Kroos</b>	<b>Daley Blind</b>	<b>Marco Verratti</b>
<b>46.7</b>	<b>40.3</b>	<b>33.1</b>

## THE CREATIVE CENTRE-BACK

### DALEY BLIND SETS EXAMPLE FOR "CREATIVE DEFENDERS"

Significantly, second place behind Kroos in that particular ranking went to Daley Blind. In the match against the Czech Republic, the Netherlands centre-back was cited by Dušan Fitzel as a "creative defender" – an opinion borne out by the fact that he successfully delivered 15 passes to main striker Memphis Depay and some telling diagonals into the path of right wing-back Denzel Dumfries. Blind underlined the importance, in the centre-back's job description, of the ability to read the game, to step into midfield when appropriate and to launch attacks. Bonucci topped the ranking for centre-backs who attempted passes through two opposition lines with an average of 52 per 90 minutes, followed by Spain's Aymeric Laporte (44) and Belgium's Jan Vertonghen (30) – the former posting the highest number (41) of successful steps-ins (deliberate attempt to progress with the ball into space past an opponent). Harry Maguire, when he returned to the England line-up, made his presence felt with 27 line-breaking passes per 90 minutes.

### 2+ LINE BREAKS

#### Leonardo Bonucci


<b>52</b>	<b>29</b>
Attempted	Successful

#### Aymeric Laporte

<b>44</b>	<b>35</b>
Attempted	Successful

#### Jan Vertonghen

<b>30</b>	<b>20</b>
Attempted	Successful



Aymeric Laporte steps in and breaks the opposition lines with a forward pass



Harry Maguire breaks the opposition lines to create a chance for team-mate Harry Kane





## THE ELASTIC BAND

### FLEXIBILITY KEY AS CHANGING SITUATIONS DEMAND FRESH THINKING

From a coaching perspective, tactical flexibility was one of the salient features at EURO 2020 – not only from match to match but also within individual games. After watching the first 20 minutes of Wales v Denmark, with Gareth Bale and Aaron Ramsey running riot, few would have predicted a final score of 0-4. Then Kasper Hjulmand (pictured) shifted Andreas Christensen from centre-back to midfield, changing his initial 1-3-4-2-1 to a 1-4-3-3. Denmark wrested control from Wales – and kept it – switching to 1-3-5-2 to protect a 2-0 advantage.

The injury to centre-back Serhiy Kryvtsov after 35 minutes of Ukraine's quarter-final against England prompted Andriy Shevchenko to switch from 1-3-4-3 to 1-4-3-3 – a change which had a positive effect.

Against Switzerland, France started in 1-3-5-2 formation. After 36 minutes, Didier Deschamps switched to 1-4-4-2 with a midfield diamond; after the break it was a flat 1-4-4-2, paving the way for France's purple patch of three goals in 19 minutes. "Even though Griezmann moved out to the right instead of working behind the front two, I feel it was the best we saw of France during the tournament," said Corinne Diacre. "But it left spaces in defence and two goals were conceded using the same formation."

Willi Rutensteiner added: "Switzerland made great adaptations within games. During the game in Baku against Wales, the tactical flexibility was so high that you had real difficulty to say whether they were playing with three defenders or four. They displayed high tactical flexibility in different situations of the game and provided a very good example that it is not the system they're playing in defending or attacking, it's about the players and the tactical principles that the coach is giving."

"As a national team coach," Mixu Paatelainen commented, "you need time to work on the mechanisms of different formations – which you don't always have. So the players are the key. Do they play those formations at their clubs? If so, and the players are comfortable, it allows the coach to be flexible."

## CHANGING TIMES

### SUBSTITUTIONS ARE A BALANCING ACT THAT CAN MAKE ALL THE DIFFERENCE

The issue of tactical flexibility was interwoven with the option to make five substitutions – six in the eight games which went to extra time. "Coaches are to be given a lot of credit," said Packie Bonner, "for their ability to adapt and make changes." They did so in different ways. Roberto Mancini, for example, generally sent fresh legs into middle-to-front positions in preference to tinkering with his team structure. "The fresh legs brought the winning goals with them," Willi Rutensteiner said after the Italy v Austria game. "Austria were dominating at that stage of the game, looking fitter than Italy and pressing them hard. So Mancini was right to change and Franco Foda was right not to change. The coach has to be careful that the team does not lose momentum if you make changes."

Gareth Southgate, with riches on the England bench, sometimes made changes to alter the personality of his team rather than the shape. Aitor Karanka cited the game against Germany as an example. "Jack Grealish, when he came on for a winger, made a difference. He plays more in the middle, creating doubts between the wing-back and the central defender. It meant that Luke Shaw had more space to come forward – and that was how the first goal was created."

There was, however, a hard-luck story. Kasper Hjulmand, who used all 31 options in Denmark's six games, made his sixth change with 15 minutes of extra time remaining in the semi-final against England – only for an injury to Mathias Jensen to leave him a man short when chasing an adverse scoreline.

## EXPECTING EMOTIONS

### COACH EDUCATION SHOULD INCLUDE DEALING WITH THE PRESSURE

"We lived through some strong emotions," Frans Hoek mused. "Especially with what happened to Christian Eriksen. It makes you wonder if there should be space in coach education. To help coaches deal with unpredictable situations, as well as the predictable situations like dealing with pressures from outside, a penalty shoot-out or whatever." Mentioning the shoot-out is the cue for one of the tournament's odd statistics. Of the 55 penalties in shoot-outs and open play, 33 hit the net – meaning that 40% were not converted. This contrasted with stats from the Champions League, where a rise in the conversion rate had been linked with empty stadiums and reduced environmental pressures. But emotions play tricks – as illustrated by comparing Switzerland's two shoot-outs and the body language of the same penalty-takers. What can be done to bridge the gap between training-ground practice and a walk from the centre circle at Wembley? A penalty was the final kick of the ball at a tournament which had generated strong emotions from start to finish.



# ALL-STAR TEAM

## Eight players from the two finalists are prominent in EURO 2020's finest XI

In individual games, technical observers highlighted performances by almost 150 players. As such, it was no surprise that paring the list down to 11 was not done in the blink of an eye. The exception turned out to be one of the individual awards, with 18-year-old Spanish midfielder Pedro González López, better known as Pedri, unanimously acclaimed as the Young Player of the Tournament.

The Player of the Tournament award required a little more debate. Discussions were not based around the merits of Gianluigi Donnarumma but, rather, concern that naming a goalkeeper for the first time might give the impression that UEFA EURO 2020 had been a defence-minded tournament – which it most certainly wasn't.

There were also misgivings, of course, about the number of top-quality performers who had to be left out. Standards of goalkeeping, for example, were so high that applause was also directed at Sweden's Robin Olsen, Belgium's Thibaut Courtois, Denmark's Kasper Schmeichel and Switzerland's Yann Sommer, to name but four.

It was the same story in defence, where centre-backs such as Italy's Giorgio Chiellini, Denmark's Andreas Christensen and Simon Kjær, Czech Republic's Tomáš Kalas and Slovakia's Milan Škriniar all deserved more than a passing mention. The same can be said for full-backs and wing-backs such as Denmark's Joakim Mæhle, the Netherlands' Denzel Dumfries, the German pair of Robin Gosens and Joshua Kimmich, Spain's César Azpilicueta, Czech right-back Vladimír Coufal and Austria's versatile skipper David Alaba.

In midfield, the players who made the shortlist but ultimately missed out included the Spanish duo of Sergio Busquets and Koke, Switzerland's Granit Xhaka, Italy's Marco Verratti, Sweden's Emil Forsberg, France's Paul Pogba, Portugal's Renato Sanches and the Dutch pair of Frenkie de Jong and Georginio Wijnaldum. Meanwhile, up front, Czech striker Patrik Schick and Italy's Lorenzo Insigne also made an impact.

Even though team structures featuring three centre-backs made a major impact on the tournament, the technical observers opted for the 1-4-3-3 formation. It's what earned Italy the title and it was the default setting among the four semi-finalists. Perhaps the most unexpected outcome was that the 11 players selected were all making their first appearance in a UEFA EURO Team of the Tournament.

## TEAM OF THE TOURNAMENT



### DEFENDER

**HARRY MAGUIRE**  
ENGLAND



Displayed leadership and a good reading of the game, whether driving into midfield, passing through the lines or threatening at set plays.

**7 APPEARANCES**

**79.1% DUEL SUCCESS**





## GOALKEEPER

**GIANLUIGI  
DONNARUMMA**

ITALY



Excellent positional play, shot-stopping and passing accuracy, even under pressure; confidence-boosting composure.

**7 APPEARANCES****3 CLEAN SHEETS**

## DEFENDER

**LEONARDO  
SPINAZZOLA**

ITALY



Exuberant left-back who linked well with winger, made high-speed runs to byline and good passes, and was active in high press.

**4 APPEARANCES****18 TAKE-ONS**

(SECOND HIGHEST AMONG DEFENDERS)



## DEFENDER

**LEONARDO  
BONUCCI**

ITALY



Experienced all-round defender: tackles, blocks, headers and positional play, not to mention sensible building from back.

**7 APPEARANCES****12 INTERCEPTIONS**

(THIRD HIGHEST IN COMPETITION)



## DEFENDER

**KYLE  
WALKER**

ENGLAND



Powerful attacking runs and crosses, aerial power, good one-on-one defensive qualities and used pace to good effect.

**6 APPEARANCES****37 BALL RECOVERIES**

(THIRD HIGHEST AMONG DEFENDERS)





The technical observers opted for the 1-4-3-3 formation. It's what earned Italy the title and it was the default setting among the four semi-finalists

MIDFIELDER

**PIERRE-EMILE  
HØJBJERG**

DENMARK



Great leadership role in midfield: always looking for the ball, organising team play and making powerful upfield runs.

**6 APPEARANCES**

**3 ASSISTS**

(SECOND HIGHEST IN COMPETITION)



FORWARD

**FEDERICO  
CHIESA**

ITALY



High-intensity attacker with pace for counterattacks, good crossing ability and excellent finishing. A constant threat.

**7 APPEARANCES**

**17 SHOTS  
ATTEMPTED**

(FOURTH HIGHEST IN COMPETITION)





## MIDFIELDER

**JORGINHO**

ITALY



Controlling midfielder, team leader and key figure in build-up. Intelligent movement and passing; important interceptions.

**7 APPEARANCES****474 PASSES COMPLETED**

(SECOND HIGHEST IN COMPETITION)



## MIDFIELDER

**PEDRI**

SPAIN



Maturity and personality beyond his years. Outstanding technique, creative forward passing and a key element in middle-to-front play.

**6 APPEARANCES****177 PASSES COMPLETED IN ATTACKING THIRD**

(HIGHEST IN COMPETITION)



## FORWARD

**ROMELU LUKAKU**

BELGIUM



Excellent as a wide attacker or with back to goal as a target striker. Powerful, skilful and very dangerous in the box.

**5 APPEARANCES****111 MINUTES PER GOAL**

## FORWARD

**RAHEEM STERLING**

ENGLAND



Great positional play and ability to find space. Always a threat in one-on-one situations with his pace, solo skills and outstanding acceleration.

**7 APPEARANCES****38 TAKE-ONS**

(HIGHEST IN COMPETITION)





# FRESH AND FEARLESS

Individual honours went to a pair  
with youth very much on their side

## PLAYER OF THE TOURNAMENT

GIANLUIGI DONNARUMMA

Gianluigi Donnarumma is the subject of fine-line illustration in the goalkeeping section of this technical report. So to focus on the broader brushstrokes rather than reiterating his technical qualities, the salient feature is that the first goalkeeper to win the UEFA Player of the Tournament award did so at 22 – a figure regarded as a tender age among football's glove-wearing fraternity.

Donnarumma first appeared on UEFA's radar at the U17 EURO in 2015 and, within 15 months, he went into the record books as the youngest to represent Italy at U21 and senior levels – both at the age of 17. He had, by then, already broken into the first team at AC Milan. Significantly, he was applauded for the mental maturity and composure that allowed him to negotiate the pressures of such a meteoric rise – qualities that came to the fore at UEFA EURO 2020.

Presenting an individual award to Donnarumma might reinforce the traditional notion that goalkeeping is a solitary role. However, Donnarumma's citations highlight his integration into team play, his ability to launch attacks or counterattacks and his excellent relationship with two centre-backs whose ages were already into double figures when he was born. His contribution could be gauged from clips of him initiating the counter that allowed Federico Chiesa to put Italy ahead against Spain in the semi-finals or, as Packie Bonner reported during the Austria game, "good proactive play by Donnarumma when he intercepted the cross to quickly set up a counter with an incisive throw to a midfielder". The fact that he completed 87% of his attempted passes across the entire tournament provides another indicator of an impressive all-round performance.





## YOUNG PLAYER OF THE TOURNAMENT

PEDRI

A breath of fresh air was provided by the youngest player to ever represent Spain at a EURO. Two years before the tournament kicked-off, Pedri had yet to make his senior debut in club football. And it was not till 25 March 2021 that the Tenerife-born youngster, in his first season at FC Barcelona, won his first Spain cap. At UEFA EURO 2020 the Young Player of the Tournament award, open to players born on or after 1 January 1998, was presented to a midfielder born on 25 November 2002.

Pedri was ever-present in Luis Enrique's starting XI, operating from a left-of-centre position in Spain's midfield trio. Linking the team's approach work, Pedri made more solo runs into the attacking third than any other player at the tournament; half of his total 76km covered were with the ball at his feet. The accuracy of his passing averaged out at 92%, peaking at 97% during the semi-final against Italy. Bearing in mind that his passing was not built on safety-first principles, an accuracy of 89% in the attacking third illustrated his ability to combine creativity with precision. "Continuity in Spain's forward play was down to Pedri – a special player who has all the qualities," says Ginés Meléndez. "He was clearly the best young player in the tournament and has a lot in common with Andrés Iniesta."

Pedri was also a key component in Spain's high-pressing game. Aitor Karanka watched the semi-final against the eventual champions: "Pedri picked up Jorginho after possession was lost, marking him perfectly when Italy had the ball." Like Donnarumma, Pedri played with a maturity beyond his years. As Fabio Capello says, "He is so young, so strong. He has such quality; so much personality; and no fear. Pedri is something different."









# STAR OF THE MATCH

THERE WERE 45 AWARD WINNERS FROM THE 51 EURO 2020 GAMES, WITH LEONARDO BONUCCI TAKING THE HONOURS WHEN IT MATTERED MOST – IN THE FINAL

The Heineken Star of the Match award was given to the top performer in every EURO 2020 game. UEFA's Technical Observers decided who would take the prize and a trophy was presented to the winner at full-time of every match in recognition of decisive moments, exception skill, tactical maturity or playing with a positive attitude and fair play. Six players won the Star of the Match award on two occasions – Leonardo Spinazzola, Romelu Lukaku, Denzel Dumfries, Federico Chiesa, Sergio Busquets and Harry Kane.

## MATCHDAY 1

11 June	Turkey 0-3 <b>Italy</b>	<i>Leonardo Spinazzola</i>
12 June	Wales 1-1 <b>Switzerland</b>	<i>Breel Embolo</i>
12 June	<b>Denmark</b> 0-1 Finland	<i>Christian Eriksen</i>
12 June	<b>Belgium</b> 3-0 Russia	<i>Romelu Lukaku</i>
13 June	<b>Austria</b> 3-1 North Macedonia	<i>David Alaba</i>
13 June	<b>Netherlands</b> 3-2 Ukraine	<i>Denzel Dumfries</i>
13 June	<b>England</b> 1-0 Croatia	<i>Raheem Sterling</i>
14 June	Scotland 0-2 <b>Czech Republic</b>	<i>Patrik Schick</i>
14 June	Poland 1-2 <b>Slovakia</b>	<i>Milan Škriniar</i>
14 June	Spain 0-0 <b>Sweden</b>	<i>Victor Lindelöf</i>
15 June	Hungary 0-3 <b>Portugal</b>	<i>Cristiano Ronaldo</i>
15 June	<b>France</b> 1-0 Germany	<i>Paul Pogba</i>

## MATCHDAY 2

16 June	Turkey 0-2 <b>Wales</b>	<i>Gareth Bale</i>
16 June	<b>Italy</b> 3-0 Switzerland	<i>Manuel Locatelli</i>
16 June	Finland 0-1 <b>Russia</b>	<i>Aleksei Miranchuk</i>
17 June	Denmark 1-2 <b>Belgium</b>	<i>Romelu Lukaku</i>
17 June	<b>Ukraine</b> 2-1 N. Macedonia	<i>Andriy Yarmolenko</i>
17 June	<b>Netherlands</b> 2-0 Austria	<i>Denzel Dumfries</i>
18 June	<b>Croatia</b> 1-1 Czech Republic	<i>Luka Modrić</i>
18 June	England 0-0 <b>Scotland</b>	<i>Billy Gilmour</i>
18 June	<b>Sweden</b> 1-0 Slovakia	<i>Alexander Isak</i>
19 June	<b>Spain</b> 1-1 Poland	<i>Jordi Alba</i>
19 June	<b>Hungary</b> 1-1 France	<i>László Kleinheisler</i>
19 June	Portugal 2-4 <b>Germany</b>	<i>Robin Gosens</i>

## MATCHDAY 3

20 June	<b>Italy</b> 1-0 Wales	<i>Federico Chiesa</i>
20 June	<b>Switzerland</b> 3-1 Turkey	<i>Xherdan Shaqiri</i>
21 June	Finland 0-2 <b>Belgium</b>	<i>Kevin De Bruyne</i>
21 June	Russia 1-4 <b>Denmark</b>	<i>Andreas Christensen</i>
21 June	Ukraine 0-1 <b>Austria</b>	<i>Florian Grillitsch</i>

21 June	N. Macedonia 0-3 <b>Netherlands</b>	<i>Georginio Wijnaldum</i>
23 June	Czech Republic 0-1 <b>England</b>	<i>Bukayo Saka</i>
23 June	<b>Croatia</b> 3-1 Scotland	<i>Nikola Vlašić</i>
23 June	<b>Sweden</b> 3-2 Poland	<i>Emil Forsberg</i>
23 June	Slovakia 0-5 <b>Spain</b>	<i>Sergio Busquets</i>
23 June	<b>Germany</b> 2-2 Hungary	<i>Joshua Kimmich</i>
23 June	Portugal 2-2 <b>France</b>	<i>Karim Benzema</i>

## ROUND OF 16

26 June	Wales 0-4 <b>Denmark</b>	<i>Kasper Dolberg</i>
26 June	<b>Italy</b> 2-1 Austria (aet)	<i>Leonardo Spinazzola</i>
27 June	Netherlands 0-2 <b>Czech Republic</b>	<i>Tomáš Holeš</i>
27 June	<b>Belgium</b> 1-0 Portugal	<i>Thorgan Hazard</i>
28 June	Croatia 3-5 <b>Spain</b> (aet)	<i>Sergio Busquets</i>
28 June	France 3-3 <b>Switzerland</b> (aet, Switzerland win 5-4 on pens)	<i>Granit Xhaka</i>
29 June	<b>England</b> 2-0 Germany	<i>Harry Maguire</i>
29 June	Sweden 1-2 <b>Ukraine</b> (aet)	<i>Oleksandr Zinchenko</i>

## QUARTER-FINALS

2 July	Switzerland 1-1 <b>Spain</b> (aet, Spain win 3-1 on pens)	<i>Unai Simón</i>
2 July	Belgium 1-2 <b>Italy</b>	<i>Lorenzo Insigne</i>
3 July	Czech Republic 1-2 <b>Denmark</b>	<i>Thomas Delaney</i>
3 July	Ukraine 0-4 <b>England</b>	<i>Harry Kane</i>

## SEMI-FINALS

6 July	<b>Italy</b> 1-1 Spain (aet, Italy win 4-2 on pens)	<i>Federico Chiesa</i>
7 July	<b>England</b> 2-1 Denmark (aet)	<i>Harry Kane</i>

## FINAL

11 July	<b>Italy</b> 1-1 England (aet, Italy win 3-2 on pens)	<i>Leonardo Bonucci</i>
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# RONALDO DOES IT AGAIN

FEATURING IN HIS RECORD FIFTH EURO FINAL TOURNAMENT, CRISTIANO RONALDO BROKE SEVERAL RECORDS IN BECOMING THE TOP SCORER AT UEFA EURO 2020





In just 360 minutes on the field, Portugal's ubiquitous No7 found the back of the net five times, taking his overall tally at EURO final tournaments to a record 14 – five clear of Michel Platini's previous best mark. Including qualifying, the 36-year-old edged past Gianluigi Buffon onto 59 appearances – the most in the competition – with 25 of those coming across a record five final tournaments – the only player ever to have featured in so many editions. Three of his goals were penalties, with the other two coming from close range with his left foot, all from a total of 15 attempts on goal, half of which hit the target. Ronaldo's all-time tally for his country thus reads a staggering 109 goals, equalling the world-record mark set by former Iran forward Ali Daei.

Ronaldo was crowned Alipay Top Scorer thanks to the one assist against Germany, which separated him from Patrik Schick, who also found the back of the net five times. One of those – a sensational strike from near the halfway line against Scotland – was elected Goal of the Tournament, with all the Czech Republic forward's goals coming with just one touch, including one header and one penalty.

Belgium's Romelu Lukaku scored four goals in 444 minutes, from 13 attempts, earning a place on the Team of the Tournament ahead of Harry Kane. The England forward also scored four, but from 687 minutes on the pitch, while Sweden's Emil Forsberg was the most prolific midfielder with four goals from a left-wing starting position which he often drifted away from to be more influential in a central support role. Meanwhile, Karim Benzema made an impressive return to the France team after over five and a half years out of the national team fold, scoring four for Les Bleus in his typical predatory style.

Robert Lewandowski's hat-trick of finishes with his left foot, his right foot and with his head were not enough to get Poland out of the group stage, while Denmark's Kasper Dolberg averaged a goal every 77.6 minutes, making him the most effective goalscorer per minute, marginally beating the 78.4 minutes it took Ronaldo for each of his goals.

## EURO FINAL TOURNAMENT ALL-TIME TOP SCORERS

14	<b>CRISTIANO RONALDO</b> PORTUGAL	
9	<b>MICHEL PLATINI</b> FRANCE	
7	<b>ALAN SHEARER</b> ENGLAND	
7	<b>ANTOINE GRIEZMANN</b> FRANCE	
6	<b>RUUD VAN NISTELROOY</b> NETHERLANDS	
6	<b>PATRICK KLUIVERT</b> NETHERLANDS	
6	<b>WAYNE ROONEY</b> ENGLAND	
6	<b>THIERRY HENRY</b> FRANCE	
6	<b>ZLATAN IBRAHIMOVIĆ</b> SWEDEN	
6	<b>NUNO GOMES</b> PORTUGAL	

## UEFA EURO 2020 TOP SCORERS

GOALS	PLAYER	COUNTRY	MINUTES PLAYED	MINUTES PER GOAL
5	<b>CRISTIANO RONALDO</b>	Portugal	360	72
	<b>PATRIK SCHICK</b>	Czech Republic	417	83.4
4	<b>KARIM BENZEMA</b>	France	371	92.75
	<b>EMIL FORSBERG</b>	Sweden	389	97.25
	<b>ROMELU LUKAKU</b>	Belgium	444	111
	<b>HARRY KANE</b>	England	687	171.75
	<b>KASPER DOLBERG</b>	Denmark	233	77.66
3	<b>ROBERT LEWANDOWSKI</b>	Poland	290	96.66
	<b>XHERDAN SHAQIRI</b>	Switzerland	378	126
	<b>GEORGINIO WIJNALDUM</b>	Netherlands	386	128.66
	<b>HARIS SEFEROVIĆ</b>	Switzerland	394	131.33
	<b>ÁLVARO MORATA</b>	Spain	470	156.66
	<b>RAHEEM STERLING</b>	England	681	227



# GOALSCORING ANALYSIS



Spain scoring one of their 13 goals

## A RECORD 142 GOALS WERE SCORED AT UEFA EURO 2020, WITH FORWARDS AND WINGERS FILLING THEIR BOOTS AS THE TOURNAMENT PROGRESSED

The second 24-team EURO charted new territory in terms of goalscoring, with a record 142 goals at an average just shy of three per game. That mark was unforeseeable after a cagey start to the competition, which saw just 28 goals scored across the opening 12 fixtures. Only 27 followed in the second round of matches before inhibitions were shaken off for a bumper final group stage matchday, with an average of 3.25 goals per game.

A further 29 goals came across eight round of 16 matches, with 12 plundered in the four quarter-final ties. All told there was a 31.5% increase in goals compared to EURO 2016, with 14 scored in two round of 16 games played on the same day: 3-3 draws over 90 minutes between Spain and Croatia, then France and Switzerland. Spain scored twice more in extra time to make it the second-highest-scoring

game in EURO history, after Yugoslavia's 5-4 win over France in the 1960 semi-finals. The only single day at any EURO with more goals was the final day of this edition's group stage, when Spain again scored five against Slovakia, Sweden beat Poland 3-2 and the Portugal-France and Germany-Hungary fixtures both finished 2-2.

With central areas quite congested, width was exploited to the full as a key avenue to goal: 35% of all goals came after a cross or cut back. Getting in around the back and delivering a powerful, low cross was also noted as one of the reasons behind 11 own goals – two more than in the previous 15 editions combined. This productive route also contributed to 14 goals on the rebound, or from the second ball.

Dribbling was also back with a vengeance with confident incursions into the penalty area

leading to assists or goals. Italy's Lorenzo Insigne and England's Raheem Sterling caught the eye with their purposeful runs, both capping dizzying dribbles with a valuable end product. They contributed to both finalists leading that particular statistic thanks to 121 dribbles each.

There were 71 goals scored by forwards, with midfielders supplying 42 and defenders 17. With formations involving three forwards (such as 1-4-3-3 and 1-3-4-3) the most popular, teams were on the front foot. A high press was also used by the majority of teams, creating a perfect recipe for goals. "It leads to an increased number of goals, and goals coming from wings," explains technical observer Ginés Meléndez. "Who scored the most goals? Teams who play with three forwards." That was true of Italy (13 goals), Spain (13), Denmark (12) and England (11), the only nations to hit double digits.



# EARLY NERVES PUNISHED

## FORTUNE FAVOURED THE BRAVE


With only eight nations eliminated in the group stage, a win in the opening game usually stands you in good stead to progress. Yet what was observed at EURO 2020 indicated a greater level of caution in the first round of group fixtures than might ordinarily have been expected. "The mentality was, 'Try not to lose and then if we can win, it's better,'" notes Esteban Cambiasso. "Instead of being, 'We must win,' it became, 'It's important not to concede a goal.'"

This apparent caution carried the caveat that the prevalent mindset tended to be more on the negative than the positive side. Rather than playing a confident, attack-minded game – though Italy were singled out as one of the exceptions – the majority of teams adopted a more


prudent, wait-and-see mentality, being more pragmatic. This may have contributed to almost a fifth of the 28 goals in the opening round of matches coming from a defensive error, a trend that dissipated once the teams had got their first 90 minutes – and relevant experience – under their belts.

The final group games, conversely, almost inevitably saw the shackles removed: teams knew what was required to progress and had to go out and get a result. "The last game is when we always see more goals in the group stage for the simple reason that it's all or nothing, like a final," says Ginés Meléndez. There were 39 goals scored on Matchday 3, with more coming on the counter-attack than in any other rounds of matches. That's down to the fact that teams, be it through want or necessity, took more risks.


### MATCHDAY 1 (28 GOALS)




### MATCHDAY 2 (27 GOALS)



### MATCHDAY 3 (39 GOALS)



### GROUP STAGE AS A WHOLE (94 GOALS)



**↑ 31.5%**

Goals were up 31.5% on EURO 2016

**35%**

Crosses and cut-backs led to 35% of goals

**↓ 3.2%**

Headed goals dropped further from 22.2% in 2016

**2.78**

There were almost three goals per game on average

**11.3%**

Substitutes supplied 11.3% of all goals

**1**

Only one goal came from a direct free-kick: Mikkell Damsgaard's in the semi-final for Denmark against England

**11**

Own goals scored, compared to nine in the previous 15 editions combined

**S**

Penalties scored, with two more converted on the rebound



# HOW THE GOALS WERE SCORED

## HIGH PRESSES AND OPTIMAL DELIVERIES FORCED DEFENCES ONTO THE BACK FOOT

A record 142 goals were scored over 51 games, yet a goalkeeper was named Player of the Tournament. From the most vital statistics – and honours – it can easily be deduced that EURO 2020 was a predominantly attack-minded tournament, with champions Italy impressing at both ends of the field: putting the ball in the net the most and keeping them out diligently. With 13 goals scored, Italy and Spain – whose tallies included one and three own goals respectively – fired their way through to their semi-final meeting. Though the Iberian side proved slightly more effective, with their goals coming from 115 attempts compared to Italy's tournament-leading 127 – another statistic that proves how attack-minded and trigger-happy Roberto Mancini's team were, even if only 36 of those efforts hit the target.

By comparison, beaten finalists England took just 63 shots on goal, of which 28 hit the target and ten went in, with the addition of one own goal. Simon Kjær's deflected own goal, which brought England level in their semi-final with Denmark, was indicative of one of the most marked trends in terms of goalscoring: a low cross or cut-back being turned into his own goal by a defender. "When the cross is outside of the goalkeeper's reach, nine times out of ten it is a goal," says technical observer Frans Hoek. "At such a high speed, whoever touches that ball, it will go in." Bukayo Saka's cross was delivered too far away from Kasper Schmeichel's reach, leaving Kjær no option

but to lunge in ahead of Raheem Sterling and try, in vain, to turn the ball away.

England proved particularly effective from such an approach, scoring eight of their 11 goals (72.73%) from crosses or cut-backs. With such deliveries from wide areas, it is hardly surprising that they also scored the most headers of a single team with five, ahead of Switzerland's three. The majority of Italy's goals came from combinations (six), with as many dribbles leading to goals as crosses (three) thanks to the fancy footwork of Lorenzo Insigne and Federico Chiesa.

Combinations were once again the most common route to goal, with 34 passes leading up to Cristiano Ronaldo's stoppage-time strike against Hungary and 20 preceding Robin Gosens' goal, Germany's fourth, against Portugal. Kai Havertz's goal in the same game also featured in the top ten for number of passes leading to a goal. And there was one common denominator in all four of Germany's goals in that game: defender Antonio Rüdiger got at least one touch in the build-up, as Joachim Löw's men showed no fear in taking a step back to take two forward.

Although high presses were making it more complicated for teams to construct attacks from deep, Germany proved it was possible with five of their six goals coming from these combinations; Havertz's header from a free-kick against Hungary was the exception. That was one of 12 headed goals among the 40 goals scored from set plays, with 15 headers from open play for a total of 27 – 3.2% fewer than at EURO 2016.

## OVERALL SET-PLAY GOALS

**42%**

From a corner,  
17 goals

**28%**

Penalty,  
11 goals

**20%**

Following  
a free kick,  
8 goals

**8%**

Following a throw-in,  
3 goals

**2%**

Direct free kick,  
1 goal





## SET-PLAY GOALS

The proportion of goals scored from set plays (28.2%) was similar to EURO 2016 (29.6%), with corners proving to be the most common dead-ball route to goal. Italy's equaliser in the final was scrambled in following a corner, but it was the team they beat in the semi-finals – Spain – who enjoyed the most joy from corners, converting from four of them. Three of those came in their 5-0 win over Slovakia, with Ferran Torres and Aymeric Laporte converting from two, and an own goal from Juraj Kucka forced from the other. (It was also a game that equalled the biggest EURO win and saw Álvaro Morata miss an early penalty.) Another own goal came from a corner in their quarter-final win over Switzerland, with Denis Zakaria the unfortunate one on that occasion.

Four own goals came from dead-ball situations, including Mats Hummels' misfortunate finish following a French throw-in. It was one of three goals to be scored following a trained throw-in routine, with Marko Arnautović of Austria and Denmark's Joakim Mæhle also showing how dangerous attacking throw-ins can be as another way of unlocking the opposition's defence. Finally, the nine penalties and two goals scored on the rebound from a penalty came from a total of 17 penalties awarded at EURO 2020 – more than in any previous edition, with 13 coming in EURO 2000 and 12 in EURO 2016. Cristiano Ronaldo converted two of them in Portugal's 2-2 draw with France, the first EURO fixture ever to feature three penalties (Karim Benzema was on target from the spot for Les Bleus).

That figure does not, of course, include penalty shoot-outs, of which there were four at EURO 2020. Champions Italy featured in two of them, winning for the third and fourth time out of a record total of seven nerve-jangling EURO match deciders. England, on the other hand, were beaten for the record fourth time in a EURO penalty shoot-out. It was the second time they were knocked out on penalties by Italy, following their 2012 quarter-final elimination by the Azzurri.

## OPEN-PLAY GOALS

### CROSSES AND CUT-BACKS WERE A SUCCESSFUL ROUTE TO GOAL

Many goals came from crosses, with wing-backs and wingers proving to be a profitable source of assists. England's goal in the final was a prime example of how teams were finding plenty of success from wide areas. "Tactically, Gareth Southgate did a great job in thinking of a way of beating Italy," says technical observer and West Ham coach David Moyes, pointing out how one wing-back supplied the assist for the other wing-back to score, born out of Southgate's tactical approach. "England caught Italy out with that system." England were unable to impose this style for longer than the opening 15 to 20 minutes however; Italy eventually gained the upper hand, limiting their opponents to that one shot on target over the course of 120 minutes.

Not all the goals from crosses were like Shaw's in the final though. Indeed, there were many more scored from teasing, low and powerful crosses, plus cut-backs that were converted by a forward, turned in by a defender or deflected away only to be scored on the rebound.

## SET-PLAY GOALS

ACTION	GUIDELINES	GROUP STAGE	KNOCKOUT STAGE	TOTAL
Direct free-kicks	Direct from a free-kick	0	1	1
Corners	Direct from or following a corner	12	5	17
Penalties	Spot kick (or follow-up from a penalty)	9	2	11
Indirect free-kicks	Following a free-kick	5	3	8
Throw-ins	Following a throw-in	2	1	3
		28	12	40

## OPEN-PLAY GOALS

ACTION	GUIDELINES	GROUP STAGE	KNOCKOUT STAGE	TOTAL
Combinations	Build-up with passes and link-up play	39	22	61
Counterattacks	Immediate transition from breaking up opponent's attack	7	1	8
Defensive errors	Mistake by a defender or goalkeeper	8	5	13
Direct attacks	Quick attack with few passes, as a transition or from own defence	9	8	17
Others	Belonging to more than one category	3	0	3
		66	36	102
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>94</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>142</b>
<b>Goals per game</b>		<b>2.61</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>2.78</b>




# WHEN THE GOALS WERE SCORED

JUST OVER A THIRD OF THE GOALS FELL IN THE FIRST HALF, WITH THE 15-MINUTE PERIOD AFTER THE BREAK THE MOST PRODUCTIVE

It was not only on the opening matchday that teams were taking their time to settle into games, with the timing of the goals illustrating how this tendency to start cautiously expanded across the entire tournament. Just over a third of goals (36.6%) fell before the break, with 58.5% coming in the second half. Seven goals (4.9%) were scored in extra-time. It took an hour for the deadlock to be broken in eight games, two involving Italy in the winner-takes-all drama of the knockout stage, and both times with Federico Chiesa putting the Azzurri in front (against Austria and Spain). England also took the lead against Germany late on, with Raheem Sterling's 75th-minute strike breaking the deadlock in that game, while Tomáš Holeš gave the Czech Republic the lead against the Netherlands after the midway stage of the second half had passed. A total of 27 first goals were scored within the opening half-hour of matches, with 22 strikes to make it 1-0 coming after the first third of the game had been played.

There were notable exceptions, however, with Luke Shaw scoring the fastest goal in the history of a EURO final, and the fifth-fastest in EURO history, at one minute and 56 seconds; Emil Forsberg's strike for Sweden against Poland was the second-quickest in EURO history, timed at 1:22. His Leipzig team-mate Yussuf Poulsen's strike after 1:39 in Denmark's 2-1

defeat by Belgium was the third-quickest in EURO history, with all three goals coming in games with high stakes for the teams who scored, and consequently no room for caution. Teams were not necessarily sitting back in extra-time either, with seven goals coming in the additional periods, which were needed to determine the outcome of eight out of 15 knockout games. Only in Italy's round of 16 tie with Austria did the first goal come after regulation time, with England's all-British clash with Scotland, and Spain against Sweden, the only games to not produce a single goal.



The fastest ever goal in a EURO final





Kylian Mbappé with ball at feet

## THE LOST ART OF DRIBBLING

### PLAYERS RUNNING WITH THE BALL MADE A WELCOME RETURN

"This is the EURO of dribbling," proclaimed technical observer Fabio Capello. "Finally we can see young players going one-on-one, trying to dribble past their opponents to get to the goalline and cross dangerously." Dribblers have become something of a dying breed in recent years, but the likes of Federico Chiesa, Lorenzo Insigne and Raheem Sterling showed signs of resuscitating an element of the game that causes the greatest level of excitement among fans – and strikes the most fear into full-backs.

Italy full-backs Leonardo Spinazzola and Giovanni Di Lorenzo were also mentioned by Capello as prime examples of players who show no fear of getting forward and attempting to dribble their opponents. "In Italy, we are very lucky in this period to have these players," said Capello, who felt Sterling had also "made the difference" for England. "The movement is really important, but so too that they are taking a risk to dribble," added the former England manager.

This risk was not only leading to dangerous crosses teasing defenders and tempting forwards, but it also led to numerous individual goals, with Sterling and Chiesa leading the way. "He wants to create chaos," said former England defender Rio Ferdinand on the BBC about Sterling's intentions whenever he got the ball. The Manchester City forward did precisely that as he made 22 successful dribbles – seven more than Chiesa, who was second on that list. Nine of those came in the semi-final against Denmark and four in the final, where Chiesa made a third of his successful dribbles.

## SUCCESSFUL DRIBBLES

Raheem Sterling	England	22
Federico Chiesa	Italy	15
Martin Braithwaite	Denmark	13
Andriy Yarmolenko	Ukraine	11
Kylian Mbappé	France	10

## SOLO RUNS INTO ATTACKING THIRD

Pedri	Spain	27
Marco Verratti	Italy	25
Raheem Sterling	England	19
Marcos Llorente	Spain	18
Luke Shaw	England	17

Rather than letting the ball do all the work, players were keen to burst forward from deep to bring it into the final third. Spain's Pedri underlined how happy he was to be in possession by making a tournament-leading 27 such runs; that was two more than Italy's Marco Verratti, who made 13 said runs in the final alone. Sterling's willingness to drop deep to pick up the ball is also reflected in his 19 solo runs into the attacking third, while England full-back Luke Shaw was not afraid to get forward with 17 such runs. He timed one without the ball to perfection, for his first senior goal early on in the final.

## SOLO RUNS INTO PENALTY AREA

Lorenzo Insigne	Italy	16
Raheem Sterling	England	15
Kylian Mbappé	France	13
Joakim Mæhle	Denmark	12
Leonardo Spinazzola	Italy	11
Federico Chiesa	Italy	11

No player took the ball into the opposition penalty area as much as Insigne during EURO 2020, and the Italian's quarter-final goal against Belgium was a textbook example of the kind of unabashed risk-taking that so excited Capello. With every team except Sweden employing a three-man attack at some stage of the tournament, effective attacking wing play was consequently one of the most productive outlets for goals at EURO 2020.



# GAMBLING ON THE REBOUND

## LOW CROSSES AT PACE DELIVERED HIGH REWARDS

With the central areas largely blocked, the tactic of getting in around the back and delivering crosses at pace proved to be a productive route to goal, highlighted in part by the record number of own goals. “The early cross is incredibly difficult to defend against,” says technical observer Frans Hoek. “When a player from the attacking team is meeting it, it’s a big chance for a goal – and if the defender gets there first, it’s often an own goal.” While three of the record 11 own goals can be put down to goalkeeping errors, whenever a quick, low cross is whipped in and not within the goalkeeper’s reach, a goal is often the consequence. “There is so much pressure in front of goal that it’s very difficult to clear these away,” adds Frans Hoek. “If you look at all of these own goals you see that, basically, there is just one change of direction.”


When that change of direction was not towards the goal, it was often falling at the feet of an attacking player – indeed, 18 goals came from rebounds inside the penalty area. Leonardo Bonucci pounced on one to bring Italy level in the final, with Hoek’s observation being that clearing the ball in such a situation is a formidable task.

## GOAL TYPES

	OPEN-PLAY GOALS	TOTAL GOALS (INCLUDING SET PLAYS)
Cross	31	43
Other*	9	23
Rebound/second ball	14	18
Dribble/individual skill	12	16
Through ball	12	12
Lay off	11	11
Cut-back	7	9
Pass over the defence	4	4
One-two	3	3
Total	100	142

\*Goals not clearly attributable to just one category, such as own goals caused by a defensive mistake or long-range goals

## OPEN PLAY GOALS



# FINISHING

## ONE TOUCH IS ENOUGH

The art of finishing has certainly not been lost by the continent’s top strikers, who only needed a sniff of goal to strike. Over a third of the 142 goals at EURO 2020 were scored with a one-touch finish. Add in 27 headers and 11 own goals and the result is that over half of the goals were converted with just one touch by the goalscorer, rising to a total of 99 with the inclusion of penalties and the one direct free-kick. Curiously, Patrik Schick’s one-touch 45-metre effort, which was elected Goal of the Tournament, came from the same distance as Pedri’s own-goal for Spain against Croatia, both setting respective records for the longest-range goal and own goal in EURO history.

Even if this was the edition with the most headed goals in total, the proportion of headers from all goals scored was down once again. Just 15 came from open play, among a total of 19% of all goals – the lowest since EURO 2000. England were the best at converting crosses with headers, scoring five of their 11 goals in this manner, followed by Switzerland, who headed three of their eight goals – two courtesy of Haris Seferović. Breaking the headed goals down further, more than half came from open play (15) and just 12 came from set plays: eight from corners and four from free-kicks.

## HEADED GOALS PER EURO

	HEADED GOALS	TOTAL GOALS	PERCENTAGE
1996	11	64	17.2%
2000	15	85	17.6%
2004	17	77	22.1%
2008	15	77	19.5%
2012	22	76	28.9%
2016*	24	108	22.2%
2020*	27	142	19%

\*24-team tournaments







Xherdan Shaqiri's equaliser against Spain

## COME-FROM-BEHIND WINS

### ONLY FIVE MATCHES WERE WON BY THE TEAM CONCEDED FIRST

In 2016, England manager Gareth Southgate, working as a UEFA technical observer, pointed out that "apart from the huge psychological advantage of scoring first, there is a tactical advantage as well. You don't have to commit people forward; you can protect the lead and don't have to risk additional bodies."

True to his own words from five years ago, Southgate retreated his players significantly after they took the lead against Italy in the final – but this let the Azzurri back in. Rather than persisting with the attacking width provided by wing-backs Kieran Trippier and Luke Shaw, he tucked both in as part of a back five; Italy drew confidence from being allowed more of the ball in space to impose their own game plan.

"When you are winning the game you are scared more to concede than to score again," says technical observer Aitor Karanka. The three-time Champions League winner with Real Madrid suggested that while this tactical transformation made sense for Southgate to try to protect the lead, his players were not entirely ready for it.

"At the end of the day, Italy took the game in the way they wanted it," adds Karanka. "The game plan for Gareth, for sure, would have been the same. But if you don't have those players to do the game plan on the pitch, it's difficult. And it was difficult for England to manage that pressure."

Although Italy prevailed on penalties, that win was one of five comeback victories for sides who conceded the first goal. A further eight games were subsequently drawn by the team who opened the scoring, with Switzerland denied a comeback win against Spain only on penalties following Xherdan Shaqiri's equaliser.

## COMEBACK WINS

Portugal	2-4	Germany
Denmark	1-2	Belgium
Croatia	3-5	Spain (aet)
England	2-1	Denmark (aet)
Italy	1-1	England (3-2 pens)

## POWER OF THE BENCH

### THE IMPACT OF SUBS COULD BE FELT IN MUCH MORE THAN GOALS

Despite being allowed to make five substitutions – and a sixth in the event of extra-time – the total proportion of goals scored by substitutes actually dropped from 17.6% in 2016 to just 11.3%. Given the demanding nature of a tournament coming so soon off the back of a condensed domestic and European season – caused by the COVID-19 pandemic – many of the changes that coaches were making were in areas where players were covering more distance and performing more sprints, and not necessarily to replace proven goalscorers. The first-choice forwards were, therefore, supplying the majority of the goals, with substitutes brought on more frequently to defend a lead or provide more energy in midfield or on the wings.


Counter to the drop in goals from substitutes, it is nevertheless acknowledged that the bench players had a crucial role to play in their team's progress. "Having five subs is a big thing," says technical observer Peter Rudbæk. "It's now a case of, 'Why talk about the starting XI?' The most important players are the 11 who finish the match."

In this regard, Rudbæk has praise for Denmark coach Kasper Hjulmand for the way he managed his team's resources throughout a physically and emotionally draining campaign, which ended just one step short of the final. "He could change from match to match – and within each match," says Rudbæk. "He didn't like to change much a few years ago, but now he's adapted and makes use of the five subs. Why have 26 players if you can't use most of them? He can bring in young players and still believe in them."

## RONALDO AND JUVENTUS LEAD THE WAY

Forwards were on the front foot at EURO 2020, with 71 goals coming from forwards and wingers – exactly half of the total. Midfielders supplied 42 and 17 were scored by defenders, including both final goals: Luke Shaw's first for his country and Leonardo Bonucci's valuable equaliser. Meanwhile, Cristiano Ronaldo's five goals contributed to Juventus being the club whose players supplied the most at EURO 2020, with 12. Three from Álvaro Morata, two from Federico Chiesa and one each from Bonucci and Aaron Ramsey completed the tally, with other Serie A clubs also ranking highly: eight goals were scored by players from Inter Milan (the same number as Liverpool), with Atalanta BC supplying seven. Not only did Italy lift the trophy, but Italian clubs led the way in supplying the most goals.





## SCHICK GOES THE DISTANCE

THE CZECH STAR'S INCREDIBLE LONG-RANGE EFFORT AGAINST SCOTLAND TOPPED A LIST OF GOALS THAT WERE STRIKING FOR THEIR DIVERSITY

One of the UEFA Technical Observers' enjoyable tasks was to select the top ten goals from the 142 scored during the final tournament. The diversity of the strikes that they selected reflects some of the tendencies that they and their colleagues had highlighted during the 51 matches.

The list features some spectacular strikes from long range which underline the fact that, with defensive blocks quick to drop deep, spaces for goal attempts are frequently to be found in the environs of the penalty area rather than within it. Or even further afield, with Patrik Schick earning top spot in the list from an area much closer to the halfway line than the Scotland box.





Combination play produced spectacular goals – among them Cristiano Ronaldo's goal against Hungary and Belgium's winner against Denmark, when Romelu Lukaku showcased his ball skills as a change-footed right-winger to set up Kevin Bruyne's run from his false nine position. Andriy Yarmolenko's goal was another example of infield running by a left-footed right winger; Federico Chiesa's goal against Spain was a classic box-to-box counter initiated by the Italy goalkeeper; and Mikkel Damsgaard injected one set play goal into the list with his strike in the semi-final against England that provided the only direct free-kick success of the tournament.

## UEFA EURO 2020 TOP TEN GOALS

1

**PATRIK SCHICK***Scotland 0-2 Czech Republic  
Group D*

Latching on to a rebound, the Czech striker shows awareness and technical mastery to score from almost 50 metres.

2

**PAUL POGBA***France 3-3 Switzerland  
Round of 16 (aet; Switzerland win 5-4 on penalties)*

Alone, just outside the box, Pogba executes a curling right-footed shot with effortless ease.

3

**LUKA MODRIĆ***Croatia 3-1 Scotland  
Group D*

Teed-up on the edge of the box, Modrić strikes superbly with the outside of his right foot.

4

**LORENZO INSIGNE***Belgium 1-2 Italy  
Quarter-finals*

Receiving in midfield, Insigne finishes a solo run from the left with an impeccable right-foot shot.

5

**KEVIN DE BRUYNE***Denmark 1-2 Belgium  
Group B*

Great skill by Romelu Lukaku on the right and neat passes across the box for the onrushing De Bruyne to score.

6

**CRISTIANO RONALDO***Hungary 0-3 Portugal  
Group F*

Brilliant double wall-pass with Rafa Silva allows Ronaldo to side-step the keeper and score.

7

**ÁLVARO MORATA***Italy 1-1 Spain  
Semi-finals (aet; Italy win 4-2 on pens)*

Millimetric through pass by Dani Olmo from his false nine position and a cool left-foot finish.

8

**MIKKEL DAMSGAARD***England 2-1 Denmark  
Semi-finals (aet)*

The England wall ticks all the boxes but Damsgaard gets the elevation-plus-dip equation just right.

9

**ANDRIY YARMOLENKO***Netherlands 3-2 Ukraine  
Group C*

Yarmolenko dummies outside, then cuts in from the right to bend a superb left-footer into the far corner.

10

**FEDERICO CHIESA***Italy 1-1 Spain  
Semi-finals (aet; Italy win 4-2 on penalties)*

Gianluigi Donnarumma rolls the ball out to launch a counter, finished with a great right-foot shot by Chiesa.



Pedri covered the most distance with the ball



# POSSESSION

## CONTROL OF THE BALL DID NOT ALWAYS MEAN CONTROL OF MATCHES AS TEAMS USED THEIR POSSESSION WISELY

Before facing Spain in the semi-finals, Italy firmly belonged to the camp that craved custody of the ball. The high press performed by Roberto Mancini's men was more a counter-press, geared towards winning the ball back as quickly as possible whenever they lost it in advanced areas, while the confidence of their goalkeeper Gianluigi Donnarumma and defenders Giorgio Chiellini and Leonardo Bonucci ensured they were in no rush at all to put their press back in action. Heading into that semi-final tie, Italy were ranked second for average possession with 55.8%. Only against Switzerland did the Azzurri have less of the ball than their opponents (49%), though that was before they met the Iberians.

Spain have built a reputation on ball ownership and circulation down the years. At EURO 2016, only Germany had more possession (63%) than Spain (61%), who had led this statistic in 2012 (59%) and 2008 (54%) and who dominated once again

at EURO 2020 with an extraordinary two-thirds of all their games spent in possession. However, as was observed five years ago, "ball possession and the amount of passing during the game does not guarantee success", as Willi Rutensteiner noted, even if it helped Spain win the titles in 2008 and 2012. Times are constantly changing and what worked in the past no longer carries the same weight of influence. "One of Spain's major strategies may no longer be a key to success," said technical observer Ginés Meléndez. "What is important is that you have tactical order and discipline, which is why Denmark and Sweden surprised me a lot as they are tactically very strong."

Indeed, Sweden built their campaign on a ruthlessly effective counter-attacking style, seeking to exploit the pace of Alexander Isak and Marcus Berg out of an organised, structured defensive system which almost encouraged their opponents to keep the ball until they made a mistake. In



their opening game against Spain, they at one stage had just 16% of the ball, yet they emerged with a point from a goalless draw. Denmark, meanwhile, had substantially more possession than their Scandinavian neighbours, but adopted a similar counter-attacking approach with Pierre-Emile Højbjerg linking defence and attack. They triumphed in their quarter-final clash with the Czech Republic, despite having 45% possession.

Having the ball, essentially, is not the be all and end all, it is more about what you do when you have it. "Of course, I'm from the country of possession, but you know, it's always about winning," said Frans Hoek. "That's number one and winning you do by scoring goals. The result of possession should be how many goals do you score out of it? How many chances do you create out of it? It's about game management. What is the outcome?"

In Spain's round of 16 tie with Croatia, for example, the outcome for Luis Enrique's side was an xG of 3.89 from 67% possession compared to Croatia's xG of 4.4, underlining how much more danger Croatia created with less of the ball, although their finishing ultimately cost them a place in the quarter-finals.

There were only six victories in the knockout stages by teams with less possession, as a trend observed in 2016 of teams with less of the ball winning frequently appeared to slow. Only 15 of the 51 matches in France were won by the team with the most possession, whereas at UEFA EURO 2020, this rose to 26, so marginally more than half. In the group stage, there were 17 victories by teams who had more of the ball, with a further nine in the knockout stages.

Greater possession therefore did translate into a greater chance of victory, but only marginally so.

For Italy, it was a marked change from 2016, when they averaged only 45% en route to their quarter-final elimination at the hands of Germany. Only four nations had less of the ball than the Italians who, as technical observer Peter Rudbæk put it, "certainly weren't concerned about possession" and were "quite happy to focus on counterattacking". The excellent defending and high pressing that caught the eye under Antonio Conte back then were still very important characteristics with Mancini calling the shots. And the transformation to being more possession focused may well have been the missing piece in the jigsaw that saw them complete the puzzle to perfection in London, where they had 61% of the possession overall against England, including 65% in the second half. Instead of having only three teams with less possession than them in 2016, Italy only had three teams with more possession than them in 2021.

## AVERAGE POSSESSION PER 90 MINS

Spain	71.9%
Germany	61.8%
Netherlands	55%
Portugal	54.2%
Belgium	54.1%
Italy	53.7%
Austria	52.9%
Denmark	52.3%
France	52.3%
England	50.5%
Ukraine	48.9%
Turkey	48.5%
Croatia	48.4%
Poland	48.4%
Czech Republic	48.1%
Switzerland	46.1%
Slovakia	45.1%
Scotland	43.3%
Russia	43%
North Macedonia	42.3%
Wales	37.9%
Finland	37.4%
Sweden	35.3%
Hungary	29.9%

## DISTANCE COVERED IN POSSESSION DURING THE EURO

Pedri	Spain	38.23km
Jorginho	Italy	33.12km
Koke	Spain	31.21km
Kalvin Phillips	England	30.98km
Aymeric Laporte	Spain	30.91km

The statistics reflect that Spain were the greatest exponents of possession-based football at EURO 2020, with three La Roja players in the top five for covering the most distance in possession despite featuring in one game less than England and Italy. Jorginho, meanwhile, covered a staggering 7.73km more than the next Italian player on the list – 11th-placed Lorenzo Insigne.





Mikkel Damsgaard with the tournament's sole free-kick success

# SET PLAYS

GOALS FROM SET PIECES WERE A PRECIOUS COMMODITY AT UEFA EURO 2020, WITH INNOVATIVE TACTICS EMPLOYED TO SECURE THEM

Spain set out their stall for victory over Slovakia as much in the days leading up to their final group stage encounter as they did over the 90 minutes of their record-equalling 5-0 victory. Three of their five goals from set plays at UEFA EURO 2020, including two own goals following corners, came in that fixture alone, with the training-ground endeavours of Luis Enrique particularly evident in Ferran Torres' delightful back-heeled finish.

Just behind Spain on four goals from set plays were Portugal, including three Cristiano Ronaldo penalties. They and Wales were the only sides to score more from set pieces than from open play.


Champions Italy had one of the lowest proportions of set-play goals: two from their total of 13. It was, though, the only way to break down England: both the goals that Gareth Southgate's side conceded in the tournament were from set plays. Italy's other set-play goal came from a crossed free-kick, Matteo Pessina nipping in for the only goal of

the game against Wales – only England and Ukraine scored from a similar avenue.

The Netherlands scored one penalty but there were no other set plays among the eight goals they registered in the tournament, even if Frank de Boer's men

created the highest xG without scoring from a set piece (1.73). That was inflated by two near misses against Austria: Stefan de Vrij's header was saved instinctively by Daniel Bachmann before Matthijs de Ligt's effort on the rebound was cleared off the line.

## GOALS SCORED





## PROMINENT PENALTIES

With a total of 11 penalties converted, two on the rebound, UEFA EURO 2020 had its fair share of spot-kick drama even before you consider the nail-biting shoot-outs that decided four of the knockout matches, final included.

Over 51 matches, a total of 17 penalties were taken with nine converted. That's a conversion rate of just 53%, which rises to 65% when the two penalties finished off on the rebound are included. Across the four penalty shoot-outs there were a further 38 penalties, of which 24 were scored – a success rate of 63%. That underlines how much it was a tournament for goalkeepers to shine – and few more so than Gianluigi Donnarumma.

Donnarumma repelled three efforts across the shoot-outs in the semi-finals and final, equalling the record for most EURO penalties saved. He joins Iker Casillas, Unai Simón and Gianluigi Buffon, the man he has succeeded between the Italy posts. Two further spot kicks that Donnarumma faced were missed, meaning he was beaten only 44.4% of the time.

While England's Jordan Pickford went to great lengths to distract his opponent by constantly moving, Donnarumma's imposing presence was enough for a similar marginal gain. "Donnarumma maybe made more of an impression by just standing still on his line," says Frans Hoek. "He was the boss of the situation; the situation was not the boss of him."

## MOST EURO SHOOT-OUTS

- Italy
- Spain
- England
- Netherlands
- Czech Republic\*, France, Germany\*, Portugal, Switzerland
- Denmark, Poland
- Croatia, Sweden, Turkey

\*Including as Czechoslovakia/West Germany

The success of Roberto Mancini's men in holding their nerve also means that the Azzurri have now won more of the total 22 EURO shoot-outs than any other nation aside from Spain, with both tied on four victories. England – whose solitary shoot-out success to date also came at Wembley, against Spain at EURO '96 – know what it feels like to be on the wrong end of shoot-out defeat. The loss in the final was their fourth, one more than Italy and the Netherlands, and two more than France, Spain and Switzerland, a trio whose participation at UEFA EURO 2020 was ended with spot kicks.


## MOST EURO SHOOT-OUT WINS

- Italy, Spain
- Czech Republic
- Germany, Portugal
- Denmark, England, France, Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey

## MOST EURO SHOOT-OUTS LOST

- England
- Italy, Netherlands
- France, Spain, Switzerland
- Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Sweden

## GOALS CONCEDED





## WHEN ARE EURO SHOOT-OUTS MORE COMMON?

	GAMES	SHOOT-OUTS	%
Round of 16	14	2	14
Quarter-finals	28	10	36
Semi-finals	30	7	23
Third-place play-offs	6	1	17
Finals	16	2	13

Italy became the first team to win two penalty shoot-outs at a EURO. It was the seventh time the champions have needed to come through at least one, including the past four editions. With an increased probability of shoot-outs being required, planning for this eventuality is a fundamental part of a team's preparations. Winning the coin toss can be a substantial step towards victory too, since statistics show that the side that takes the first penalty has an almost 60% chance of triumphing.

When the time comes to take spot kicks, players need to be confident according to Ginés Meléndez, who has been through the drama more than once as coach of one of Spain's youth selections. "When this moment arrives, it's the players who need to take this decision," he says. "They must take responsibility for themselves." England's penalty takers had doubtless been chosen ahead of the final, with Gareth Southgate bringing on two of them – Marcus Rashford and Jadon Sancho – right at the end of extra time. The move was debated by the technical observers. "As a player, you need to be on for five to ten minutes to get the heart rate up," says Robbie Keane. "It's difficult to be on for just 30 seconds and to get in the moment."

A player might have good statistics from their previous penalties, and the courage and confidence to assume the responsibility. But stepping up to the spot in front of an expectant home crowd, with a first major trophy in 55 years at stake, is a quite different situation to any these England players had experienced before, even if such drama is something we may have to get used to. "Eight matches went to extra time, unprecedented for a tournament like this," observes Meléndez.

## EVENTUAL CHAMPIONS INVOLVED IN PENALTY SHOOT-OUTS EN ROUTE TO GLORY:

1976	Czechoslovakia v Germany (final)
1992	Denmark v Netherlands (semi-final)
1996	Germany v England (semi-final)
2008	Spain v Italy (quarter-final)
2012	Spain v Portugal (semi-final)
2016	Portugal v Poland (quarter-final)
2020	Italy v Spain (semi-final) Italy v England (final)

## A HANDS-ON APPROACH TO SET PLAYS

It is no secret that a significant amount of time is dedicated to practising set plays, and dedicated coaches work with some of the teams. Italy's Gianni Vio has almost 5,000 different routines in his playbook, named Più 30 per cento (30% More) to reflect the tendency for 30% of goals to be scored from set plays. That was almost the exact percentage of set-play goals for the Azzurri at UEFA EURO 2020, including one notable effort against Wales, where Matteo Pessina ghosted in to divert Marco Verratti's low free-kick just inside the post.

Several of Vio's routines were evident as Italy sought ways to maximise scoring chances from dead-ball situations. For the aforementioned free-kick, tall central defenders Alessandro Bastoni and Leonardo Bonucci were positioned behind the Wales defensive line, luring them into expecting a lofted cross from Federico Bernardeschi before Verratti instead delivered a low ball. Later in the same game, three players stood in front of the Wales wall to block their view for a direct Bernardeschi effort.

Denmark provided the tournament's only goal from a direct free-kick, and a lot of work went into Mikkel Damsgaard's dipping effort against England. It was not just the excellent execution of the shot, but also the positioning of his team-mates alongside the England wall, moving in a way that obstructed Jordan Pickford's view of the ball until it was already clearing his wall. Set-play coach Mads Buttgerit was the brainchild of that particular effort, and he helped the Danes create ten chances from set pieces, contributing to an overall xG of 10.31 – the fourth highest in the tournament.

Throw-ins are also being exploited more frequently as a route to goal. Like with all set plays, the positioning and movement of players can be refined on the training ground to produce situations that can catch opponents by surprise. England had clearly dedicated time to throw-in routines, as David Moyes noted in their opening fixture with Croatia. Their first big chance came from a Kieran Trippier throw-in from inside his own half. Raheem Sterling turned quickly away from his marker to race onto Trippier's long throw with space ahead of him, then penetrated the Croatia half before feeding Phil Foden for a curling effort that hit the post. England were not alone in dedicating time to such routines: France's only goal in their 1-0 victory over Germany, Austria's third against North Macedonia and Denmark's third in the 4-0 win versus Wales all stemmed from throw-in routines.



## CUTTING CORNERS


Denmark's focus on set pieces also included their approach to corners. Packie Bonner noticed how, from one against England, they "all bunched up" on the line and crowded the six-yard box. England, deploying a mix of man-to-man and zonal marking in this instance, protected Pickford, who was able to punch the ball away.

Denmark managed a shot on goal from ten of their 39 corners, scoring one of them against the Czech Republic. The Czechs' man-marking approach failed when two players followed one Denmark attacker, leaving Thomas Delaney unmarked near the penalty spot to head in Jen Stryger Larsen's corner. Dušan Fitzel observed how, for outswinging corners, Denmark would help each other in trying to create a block that would leave one of them in space.

Wales were the most effective team from corners, scoring two from 13 and getting in a shot from every 1.6. One of those goals came against Switzerland, with Willi Ruttensteiner observing the clever movement of Kieffer Moore to meet an inswinging cross after Daniel James and Joe Allen moved a short corner back to Joe Morrell. "It was an excellent header and a great example of attacking the ball," says Ruttensteiner.

Half of the 24 teams did not score from a corner. In all, there was a goal every 29 corners, including Ivan Perišić's unlikely attempt against Scotland, which carried an xG of 0.07. "It was all about the precision of the delivery from Luka Modrić and the movement, timing and execution of Perišić," says Bonner. "Two Croatian players, Domagoj Vida and Andrej Kramarić, blocked their markers to keep the space vacant at the near post. Perišić went and checked, and went again, to lose his marker and exploit the near-post space." Even when the odds were stacked against him, Perišić prevailed from a routine refined in training.


Debate over the best approach to marking when defending set pieces could be answered by Savvas Constantinou's analysis of Turkey's approach in the opening match against



Italy: it largely depends on the situation. After initially going man-to-man to face an Italy corner, which necessitated an excellent Mert Günok save to deny Giorgio Chiellini after he slipped his marker, they adapted. "How can we better organise the defence to minimise the huge free space?" would have been the question they were asking themselves, suggests Constantinou. The answer came just ten minutes later. "They kept a third player in the penalty box to mark the free space that had been created in the first corner."


A variety of man-to-man, zonal and mixed marking methods were used across the tournament, but the ability to adapt to each set-piece situation was the key to providing a strong response to the increasingly innovative attacking approaches. Set-play coaches had their work cut out trying to find those marginal gains that, in a tournament environment, so often make all the difference.

### Numbers of corners to manufacture a shot



### Number of corners to manufacture a goal

11 teams did not score from a corner





# PRESSING

A HIGH PRESS WAS IN WIDESPREAD OPERATION, ALTHOUGH DEEP BLOCKS GAVE GROUNDS FOR GOOD TRANSITIONS

Italy set out their stall right from the start of EURO 2020. The hosts got the ball rolling in the tournament's opening fixture in Rome, and it was clear from the early exchanges with Turkey that Roberto Mancini's men were out to (im)press. "Whenever they lost the ball, they pressed very quickly with all of the players in the vicinity," said technical observer Esteban Cambiasso in his report of that fixture at the Olimpico. Already, Cambiasso was noticing a trend that would be confirmed the further Italy progressed in the tournament. "When we are speaking of the importance of transitions in

modern football, a key point of Italy is their pressure after losing the ball," said Cambiasso, who was a key member of the Inter Milan side which won a Serie A, Coppa Italia and Champions League treble in 2010. "One thing about this Italy is the pressure they give after losing the ball in the opponents' half – they attack with many players and the time between losing and winning the ball back is very short. It's difficult to concede a goal when you are losing the ball only two or three times. They prevent all the [opposition's offensive] transitions and they have the quality to win games."




Italy's high press led to high-quality football



## ITALY'S COUNTER-PRESSURE AGAINST AUSTRIA




Italy actively pressed quickly and high up the field



Heat map of Italy's counter-pressing


## AVERAGE COUNTER-PRESSURES PER GAME BY TEAM



The scale of Italy's counter-press can be seen in this table, which shows the average number of pressures they exerted within five seconds of losing the ball per game. Mancini's men ranked fourth on this list, among teams such as Spain and Austria who, thanks to their greater share of average possession, found more opportunities to make swift counter-presses. As the following table illustrates, Italy were among the leading teams to counter-press more often in the opposition's half, confirming the perception that they actively pressed high up the field. "I saw very high pressing of Italy and also Belgium and we know it is very important where you win the ball, and the percentage of scoring goals when you win the ball in the final third is high," said Willi Ruttensteiner, who also observed numerous occasions of teams defending higher. "Out of this, they are coming to more goalscoring opportunities and scoring goals," he added.



## PRESSURE IN THE OPPOSING HALF (%)



Italy were not alone in pressing high, and one of the common features of the sides who made the most pressures could be seen in their formation, including in the positioning of their full-backs. Most operated with a five-man defence, but with their full-backs expressing offensive intentions. "Of the top five teams for high pressing, many play with five at the back," said Cambiasso. "So maybe the mentality of the coach is to be confident in his three centre-backs to be able to press high."

As David Moyes highlighted, teams who were playing with a three-man forward line – be it a 1-4-3-3 or 1-5-2-3 – were making it "much harder for their opponents to play out from the back," and consequently having much more joy with their high press. The risk of such a strategy is not so high either, as Peter Rudbæk said. "Many teams are pressing high in the first phase with three players, but is that a risk?" he asked. "It isn't really since you still have seven outfield players and a goalkeeper behind the ball, and if they don't regain the ball there [with the press], they can drop quickly into a defensive block."

A high press was not the all-important element with Sweden, who languished also in the possession stakes, providing a prime example of how sitting a

little deeper was not at all a negative approach. They had enough confidence in their own ability not only to allow their opponents to have most of the ball, but to invite them forward and press them only when necessary from a defensive point of view, or if their opponents had over-committed and left gaps to exploit. Technical observer Mixu Paatelainen saw their two group victories over Slovakia and Poland in St Petersburg and observed how they systematically sat that little bit deeper in a "semi-high press" around the halfway line with more of a pronounced tendency to drop deeper than push higher. "This gave Sweden the chance to have their transition," Paatelainen said. "They have Alexander Isak with a lot of running power behind him and their transitions have been a key to their wins."

Against Poland, Sweden met a side with a similar mindset, with Paatelainen seeing several occasions when they "countered a counter of Sweden", with both sides focusing on the transition. "Poland did not go through, but they played a fantastic transition," Paatelainen said. "Teams have been using less of a high press because they want to have a chance for that counterattack or offensive transition from the halfway line."






## THE LOW BLOCK

While Paatelainen was keen to point out that Sweden and Poland were not necessarily employing a low block, this was nevertheless observed at times in their games and on several other occasions. A variety of reasons were suggested to explain a trend which was in stark contrast with the high pressing seen in both the Champions League and Europa League in recent seasons.

"They are playing every four days, some needing to travel, and it is the end of a very long season with the impact of Covid and games every three days," said technical observer Cosmin Contra. "We also have heat up to 37-38 degrees at times. The teams are adapting and the coaches are adapting to the conditions of this EURO. We are seeing something different from the Champions League because teams are staying in low blocks and trying to make a counterattack."

Even defending world champions France adopted a low block for the majority of the time, with technical observers Hans Leitert and Corinne Diacre both noting the lack of full-backs pushing forward and Antoine Griezmann not receiving significant support in trying to press high. With the quality of Paul Pogba's deliveries from deep, however, a more vertical approach was a very effective approach, and it saw them beat Germany and draw with defending European champions Portugal en route to topping Group F. Cosmin Contra felt Les Bleus might have benefitted from pressing higher on occasions since "they have the players for it", but the success Didier Deschamps has had with such an approach – not least in lifting the last World Cup – vindicates his selection.





# GOALKEEPING

FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE HISTORY OF THE EURO, A GOALKEEPER WAS ELECTED PLAYER OF THE TOURNAMENT. HERE'S WHY...

"The goalkeeper is a part of the team, not apart from the team," says former Republic of Ireland goalkeeper and UEFA Technical Observer Packie Bonner. Rarely has this been more evident than at UEFA EURO 2020, where Italy's Gianluigi Donnarumma not only stood out as the best goalkeeper of the tournament, but as the best player overall. It was the first time a goalkeeper had picked up such an accolade and while this could imply a defensive tournament, that could not be further from the truth.

Donnarumma stood out not so much for the classic goalkeeping attributes, such as shot-stopping and reflexes, but for his modern interpretation of a role that has undergone quite the revolution over the past decade.

Bonner led a team of goalkeeping experts analysing the performances of the men between the posts in the finest detail ever for a UEFA competition, highlighting how multi-faceted the role has become. Their findings will be used for the education of goalkeeping coaches. "It's not only the visible part of Donnarumma – making the saves, passing in the build-up and stopping penalties – but the invisible part for many: how he had a big influence throughout the whole tournament," explains technical observer Frans Hoek.

## DEFENSIVE LINK

Donnarumma's 719 minutes of action were more than any other player: 14 more than team-mate Jorginho and a good half-hour more than England goalkeeper Jordan Pickford. It would have been over 720 minutes had Italy coach Roberto Mancini not substituted him late in their final group game against Wales to give his understudy Salvatore Sirigu some action.

So with the most minutes on the field of any player at EURO 2020, Donnarumma saw plenty of the ball, especially with his propensity to link up play with central defenders Giorgio Chiellini and Leonardo Bonucci. "Mancini had a lot of trust in the qualities of Donnarumma, Chiellini and Bonucci," notes Hoek. "He was confident they could manage things with short passes. A goalkeeper is more than just saving or not saving: it's about construction of the whole team through the units, and Donnarumma could do what he does because the team gave him options."

A good gauge of the overall involvement of goalkeepers can be the average number of passes they receive per 90 minutes. This data showed that Germany's Manuel Neuer received the most passes, followed by an integral figure in Spain's passing game: Unai Simón.

A defender's confidence in their goalkeeper's ability not just with the ball at his feet, but also in his positioning – being able to make himself available, and find and create

## PASSES RECEIVED PER 90 MINUTES

GOALKEEPER	AVERAGE PASSES RECEIVED	PASS COMPLETION %	PRESSURED PASSES	COMPLETION UNDER PRESSURE %
Manuel Neuer	23.8	83%	5%	71%
Unai Simón	23.7	91%	7%	87%
Daniel Bachmann	22.8	77%	12%	37%
Martin Dúbravka	20.3	63%	11%	46%
Maarten Stekelenburg	20	62%	2%	0%
Jordan Pickford	19.9	61%	9%	43%
David Marshall	19	52%	8%	56%
Gianluigi Donnarumma	18.7	81%	11%	67%
Dominik Livaković	16.3	68%	5%	71%
Péter Gulácsi	15.3	77%	6%	67%
Tibaut Courtois	14.6	81%	5%	63%
Stole Dimitrievski	14.3	72%	4%	100%
Yann Sommer	14.2	76%	7%	62%
Tomáš Vaclík	14.2	55%	10%	67%
Lukáš Hrádecký	13.7	54%	10%	50%
Georgiy Bushchan	13.2	67%	8%	58%
Rui Patrício	12.5	77%	2%	100%
Uğurcan Çakır	12	56%	5%	40%
Kasper Schmeichel	11.7	63%	3%	75%
Hugo Lloris	10.5	75%	4%	75%
Danny Ward	9	54%	1%	0%
Robin Olsen	9	40%	3%	25%
Matvei Safonov	9	70%	2%	100%
Wojciech Szczęśny	7.3	57%	5%	67%

options to develop the play – can influence his decision to play a pass back. With many teams operating a high press, this can be a risky strategy that invites even more pressure – yet Donnarumma appeared to thrive in such situations.

The above table shows the percentage of passes that each goalkeeper received in moments of pressure from an opponent. While Donnarumma and Austria's Daniel Bachmann received a similar percentage of passes in pressure situations, the Italian's completion rate suffered only marginally as a result, dropping by just 16%. Bachmann's, on the other hand, fell by 42%, suggesting a lower level of composure. Additional data confirms that Bachmann made more long clearances under pressure, which are more likely to be intercepted. Indeed, his average pass length increased by 20 metres when under pressure, whereas Donnarumma was still able to play a short pass to a team-mate. Denmark's Kasper Schmeichel actually reduced his range of passing when under pressure – 12 metres shorter on average – showing confidence in his ability to play around the press.



## INFLUENCE ON THE TEAM

FC Bayern München goalkeeper Neuer is considered one of the pioneers of this new breed of goalkeeper. This can be measured in more ways than just their involvement in building up from the back: a goalkeeper's positioning and – crucially – ability to read the game can set them apart.

Neuer has been refining this role and inspiring a generation of goalkeepers, so much so that some are going even further in their auxiliary defender duties. Neuer ranks only eighth in the following classification of aggressive distance, recording how far from their goal a goalkeeper is coming to perform defensive actions (including clearances, interceptions, tackles and ball recoveries).

This trend of goalkeepers standing further off their lines and closer to the action, ready to return to their goal as soon as required, has been observed with predominantly positive feedback. But a key aspect of this modern take on positioning lies in the goalkeeper's understanding, intelligence and management. For example, Scotland goalkeeper David Marshall's advanced positioning was not lost on Patrik Schick, who took aim from near the halfway line to lob him in the Czech Republic's 2-0 win at Hampden Park. But Marshall was not alone in misjudging a situation: Neuer and France's Hugo Lloris also provided moments for discussion on match management.

Neuer made an ill-judged decision in standing so far off his line late on in Germany's 2-2 draw with Hungary. When they were defending a result which was enough to take them through to the knockout stage, Neuer's advanced position to meet a Hungary clearance left him little alternative but to send the ball back into Hungary territory and, consequently, give the ball back to them after his team-mates had spent the best part of two minutes running the clock down in the corner as the game entered stoppage time. "It was an automatic response to certain triggers and cues," says Hans Leitert.

Neuer's ability to sweep up behind his defenders has seen him set new benchmarks, but this situation called for a different interpretation. "Neuer receives a lot of praise because he takes responsibility in clearing the situation," adds Leitert. "It shows composure, dominance and proactive behaviour. But is he adapting to the situation?" Had Neuer remained closer to his goal on this occasion, defender Mats Hummels would have had the option to pass the ball back to him in space, taking more seconds off the clock as Hungary chased the ball in Germany's half. With an 87% pass completion rate throughout the entire 2019/20 UEFA Champions League campaign, Neuer's strength in ball distribution could have been an important asset in defending this draw.

Lloris, a world champion with France in 2018, unusually altered his distribution late in his side's round of 16 tie with Switzerland, which might have helped the Swiss recover to force extra time and penalties. "When they were leading 3-1, all the balls back to him were just hit long," says Savvas Constantinou. "This led to a transition moment under pressure and France stopped trying to control the game in a meaningful way." A look at Lloris's average pass distance over the course of that knockout fixture confirms that he was hitting the ball longer in the final 15 minutes, after France had taken a 3-1 lead.

There is no one-size-fits-all solution of course, and this is where match management is important: whether to go long or short,



Manuel Neuer has paved the way for a new era in the art of goalkeeping

whether to stay on your line, when to advance and when to adjust the tempo of the game. For example, Pickford appeared to try to slow play down whenever he got a goal kick in England's opening win over Croatia. UEFA's technical observer at that fixture, David Moyes, felt that this took some of the momentum out of England's game at a time when they were on top of proceedings and may have benefitted from keeping the tempo high.

Conversely, Donnarumma was praised for slowing things down in Italy's semi-final win over Spain, thus helping his team break up their opponents' momentum. Hoek says he was "taking the sting out of the game" and the statistics show that he played more longer balls in that fixture, averaging 28.7 metres, than in any other.

### AGGRESSIVE DISTANCE

GOALKEEPER	DISTANCE (METRES)
Wojciech Szczesny	30.2
David Marshall	23
Unai Simón	22.7
Martin Dúbravka	22.3
Robin Olsen	20.8
Gianluigi Donnarumma	20.2
Maarten Stekelenburg	20.1
Manuel Neuer	20
Rui Patrício	19.6
Hugo Lloris	19.6
Kasper Schmeichel	19
Stole Dimitrievski	19
Jordan Pickford	17.7

### HUGO LLORIS' AVERAGE PASS DISTANCE AGAINST SWITZERLAND

TIME	PASS DISTANCE (METRES)
0:00 to <15:00	30.6
15:00 to <30:00	22.7
30:00 to 45:00+	28.1
45:00 to <60:00	23.5
60:00 to <75:00	29.3
75:00 to 90:00+	44.3



# GOAL KICKS: THE LONG AND THE SHORT OF IT

Given the choice, Donnarumma did not send the ball out of his own penalty area from goal kicks often, with only Portugal's Rui Patrício outdoing him within his own 18-yard box. This was the first UEFA EURO since the 2019 rule change and it led to 35% of all goal kicks being taken short. This was normally to a team-mate inside the penalty area, though sometimes they were taken by a defender to his goalkeeper in a more central area, thus avoiding a potential immediate press from the left or right and also opening up the option of building through the centre. This follows a trend observed in the UEFA Champions League, where 36% of all goal kicks were taken short in the second season since the rule change, an increase on 24% in 2019/20.

## PERCENTAGE OF GOAL KICKS RECEIVED INSIDE THE BOX

TEAM	PERCENTAGE
Portugal	82.6%
Italy	67.9%
Hungary	66.7%
Spain	56%
Austria	48.4%
Croatia	47.1%
Belgium	46.5%
Finland	40%
Ukraine	40%
Germany	33.3%
Netherlands	30.8%
Turkey	30.3%
Switzerland	30.2%
Slovakia	28.6%
France	24.1%
Wales	23.7%
England	23.4%
North Macedonia	21.7%
Denmark	21.2%
Poland	18.8%
Czech Republic	17.2%
Russia	10.5%
Sweden	5.3%
Scotland	4.3%

# STAY ON THE LINE: MIND THE GAP

There was further praise for Donnarumma for his positioning when facing attacks and set pieces. "The way he defends that area, in addition to his goal, has a big impact on the way the defensive execution is set up," says Bonner. "Donnarumma was very high, even from corners, and he was totally in charge of the space; his influence was distinct."

The knock-on effect is that Donnarumma's defenders can also take a step further forward. Compare this with the positioning of Croatia goalkeeper Dominik Livaković, for example, who preferred to stay on his line: this either creates a greater gap between the goalkeeper and his defenders, or the defenders need to tuck in more to reduce it. "If the goalkeeper shows good positioning, he already takes away a lot of danger," says Hoek. "If he stays on his line, there is a large gap to the defenders and this makes space; if he is off his line, there is a smaller space and it is more difficult for the opponents."

There is, of course, a calculated risk to Donnarumma's positioning. But it's one he can take due to the confidence he and his defenders share in each other; together with Bonucci and Chiellini, all bases were covered. "He had his defenders helping him," says Hoek. "They were blocking the attackers so they couldn't come in the front. It's not just the saves he makes, it's the whole thing around it."

Donnarumma's positioning was unorthodox in terms of goalkeeping traditions. "A lot of goalkeepers have a near-post bias," says Leitert. "They grew up as kids being told not to be beaten at your near post and to avoid that bias. They need to be more offensive, take risks and be more in control of certain situations. If you do that in a team context, players are aware as a unit of the risks they might take, then they can resolve situations."

The Danish goalkeeper even went so far as to have one hand on his near post, to ensure he was always within reach in case Sterling tried to thread a shot inside it. "Schmeichel had a fantastic game against England, but on the [Saka] cut-back, he was extremely narrow to his near post, whereas Donnarumma is taking more risks," says Leitert. Saka's cut back was turned into his own goal by Simon Kjær – something that could have been avoided if Schmeichel had assumed



Kasper Schmeichel's positioning for Simon Kjær's own goal during the semi-final against England





Robin Olsen stays on his line to save Gerard Moreno's header



Olsen punches clear from a Spain cross

a similar position to the Italian goalkeeper. "Donnarumma identifies his chances of dealing with situations and puts that in a team context," adds Leitert. Put simply, he knows when his defenders are there covering the space in front of him, and he knows when he needs to step up and cover the angles.

A goalkeeper staying on his line is not a uniquely negative approach, however. Switzerland's Yann Sommer tended to stay on or near to his but his shot-stopping quality – his 21 saves was the highest in the tournament, ahead of Schmeichel, Danny Ward and Uğurcan Çakır on 18 – made it clear that this was part of a broader defensive strategy. "Good goalkeeping is also about, 'Do I get involved?'" says Leitert. "In the example of Sommer, there is a clear plan that he will probably not get involved. There was very little doubt over who was in charge of what task: Sommer was not so involved in going out for crosses – that was more for the centre backs."

By training for situations such as crosses from open play or set plays, lines are established. Sommer was able to focus on ensuring he was in the best possible position to deal with what could come after a cross or cut-backs. "He was not actively in charge of the box, but he knew who was and he was preparing in case something came on target," says Leitert. "He was able to make some really decent saves out of a really good position. Even if you don't dominate your area, you are in charge of the follow-up."

Swedish goalkeeper Robin Olsen conceded four goals in four games, including two clean sheets, and made three punches.

He assessed each situation and the necessity to assume responsibility over his central defenders – or allow them to deal with the danger and prepare himself for a potential shot on goal. Several moments during his team's fixture with Spain reinforce this strategy. In the first example, he judged the trajectory of the ball and the positioning of his defenders and decided to stay on his line, making one of his 12 tournament saves from Dani Olmo's header. Later in the same game he highlighted how fine the line can be between deciding to come out for the ball or staying on the line. He opted for the latter to deny Gerard Moreno's glancing header and the former in punching clear a cross that his central defenders were unable to reach, as UEFA technical observer Jan Erik Stinnesen noted.

## MOST CLEAN SHEETS

Jordan Pickford England	Thibaut Courtois Belgium	Gianluigi Donnarumma Italy
5	3	3

England became the first team to keep clean sheets in the first five games of a EURO. The first goal that Pickford conceded was also the first EURO 2020 goal scored from a direct free-kick: Mikkel Damsgaard's opener for Denmark in the semi-final at Wembley.

## MOST SAVES

Yann Sommer Switzerland	Uğurcan Çakır Turkey	Kasper Schmeichel Denmark	Danny Ward Wales
21	18	18	18

The number of saves a goalkeeper makes obviously reflects the number of shots that opponents have on goal, so inevitably sides under the cosh defensively have busier keepers. Sommer was seemingly the busiest of all at EURO 2020, but his 21 saves came over the course of five games; Çakır's 18 stops were condensed into only three matches.

## FEWEST GOALS CONCEDED

Jordan Pickford England	Thibaut Courtois Belgium	Lukas Hradecky Finland	Anton Shunin Russia
2	3	3	3

Again, the raw statistics are not a direct measure of a goalkeeper's ability, but Pickford's record of 16 saves to two goals conceded looks good on paper, with five of those stops coming in the final. Conversely, the two custodians who conceded the most at this tournament – Ukraine's Georgiy Bushchan with ten and Sommer with nine – were both regarded as having put in excellent performances at EURO 2020.



# SPEED

ON AND OFF THE BALL, PACE WAS A VIRTUE WITH WIDE PLAYERS MAKING FULL USE OF THE SPACE IN FRONT OF THEM

## DRIBBLING AT SPEED

Combining speed with excellent close control was a hallmark of an attacking approach which had shown signs of life endangerment over recent years before making a welcome return in 2021. With much of the central areas congested, the full width of the field was being exploited and this is evidenced by the classification of the quickest players at EURO 2020. Starting with Italy's Leonardo Spinazzola, whose frequent forays forward from his left full-back berth drew widespread acclaim and earned him a place in the team of the tournament, a common trend can be identified among those who were clocked at the quickest speeds: the wing was their fertile ground.

France's Kingsley Coman likes nothing more than to have the ball at his feet with space to run in to, while England's Raheem Sterling and Italy's Federico Chiesa also caught the eye with their dazzling dribbling qualities – most commonly cutting in from wide and delivering a shot on goal after bursting away from their marker. Meanwhile, Denzel Dumfries did on the right for the Dutch what Spinazzola had delivered so successfully on Italy's left, using his pace to get forward in support of attacks.

Hungary's Loïc Négo was particularly inspired against his native France, matching Spinazzola's top speed of 33.77 km/h, while the Netherlands were full of energy in their 3-0 win over North Macedonia.

"They controlled the tempo of the game and took full advantage of their quick transitions," noted technical observer Aitor Karanka, who highlighted their effective use of speed in their counter-attacks, exemplified by Cody Gakpo, Dumfries and Patrick van Aanholt all posting top-20 speeds in that one fixture.

In all, there were 13 players who clocked a speed greater than 33km/h across the tournament. Italy's Chiesa (31.7km/h) and England's Kyle Walker (31.3km/h) were the top two performers in the final.

## TOP 20 SPEEDS

PLAYER	TOP SPEED km/h	GAME
Leonardo Spinazzola	33.77	Italy v Turkey
Loïc Négo	33.77	Hungary v France
Kingsley Coman	33.66	France v Portugal
Cody Gakpo	33.59	Netherlands v North Macedonia
Daniel James	33.52	Wales v Switzerland
Marcus Rashford	33.52	England v Ukraine
Teemu Pukki	33.3	Finland v Belgium
Andreas Christensen	33.3	Denmark v Belgium
Marcos Llorente	33.3	Spain v Poland
Joško Gvardiol	33.3	Croatia v Scotland
Tomáš Kalas	33.08	Czech Republic v England
Raheem Sterling	33.08	England v Croatia
Federico Chiesa	33.08	Italy v Austria
Kyle Walker	32.83	England v Czech Republic
Rafa Silva	32.83	Portugal v Germany
Connor Roberts	32.83	Wales v Turkey
Denzel Dumfries	32.83	Netherlands v North Macedonia
Breel Embolo	32.76	Switzerland v Italy
Jan Vertonghen	32.62	Belgium v Portugal
Patrick van Aanholt	32.62	Netherlands v North Macedonia





## PACE PACKS A PUNCH

Spinazzola not only hit the highest speed at EURO 2020, he was also running at pace with regularity, averaging almost 50 sprints per game. Although a left full-back, he was not afraid to take on his opponent, attempting 18 dribbles – the ninth highest across the tournament – and carrying the ball on average seven metres after receiving a pass, ranking him 20th in this particular statistic. These numbers confirm the impression of the technical observers, that Spinazzola was a thorn in the side of Italy's opponents. "He was always trying to attack down the left wing and pressing as soon as his team lost possession," noted Esteban Cambiasso.

The Italian full-back did not lead the way in terms of sprints per game, however, with Russian midfielder Aleksandr Golovin in a league of his own in this particular area with an average of 66 per game – 14 more than his nearest rival, France's Benjamin Pavard. The right-footer played predominantly as an inverted winger in a Russian side who managed to score just two goals. The 25-year-old was not far behind Spinazzola in his average carry distance of 6.3 metres, though his work-rate out of possession meant he applied 188 pressures to opponents, a third more than his next closest team-mate.

Sprinting was not just a domain for full-backs and wingers, with a trio of centre forwards also showing frequent bursts of pace. Italy's Ciro Immobile did anything but justice to his name with an average of 42.3 sprints per game, the same as the Netherlands' Memphis Depay, while Finland's Teemu Pukki also features in the top 20.

Overall, England's Raheem Sterling made the most sprints, and of those 298, 63 came in the semi-finals – the highest total of any player in the final-four games – and 50 in the decider. In the showpiece itself, Italy's Emerson led the way with 65 sprints, 13 more than the Three Lions' Mason Mount.



## MOST SPRINTS

298	Raheem Sterling	England
277	Joakim Mæhle	Denmark
276	Giovanni Di Lorenzo	Italy
266	Kalvin Phillips	England
254	Ciro Immobile	Italy

## AVERAGE SPRINTS PER GAME

PLAYER	TEAM	AVE SPRINTS
Aleksandr Golovin	Russia	66
Benjamin Pavard	France	52.3
Ezgjani Alioski	North Macedonia	52
Vladimír Coufal	Czech Republic	49.2
Leonardo Spinazzola	Italy	49
Stephen O'Donnell	Scotland	47.7
Vitaliy Mykolenko	Ukraine	46.8
Joakim Mæhle	Denmark	46.2
Thorgan Hazard	Belgium	45.5
Giovanni Di Lorenzo	Italy	45.3
Denzel Dumfries	Netherlands	45.3
Stefan Lainer	Austria	44.8
Aaron Ramsey	Wales	44
Nélson Semedo	Portugal	43.3
Andy Robertson	Scotland	42.7
Ciro Immobile	Italy	42.3
Memphis Depay	Netherlands	42.3
Konrad Laimer	Austria	42.3
Raheem Sterling	England	42
Teemu Pukki	Finland	42

Minimum 3 games played



# DISTANCE

## ITALY WERE WILLING TO GO THE EXTRA MILE TO CLINCH UEFA EURO 2020 GLORY

One of the many aspects that struck UEFA's technical observers about Italy's game was the impression that they were running with and for each other, as a team. This is backed up by the statistics, which put them third on average kilometres covered per game, behind the Czech Republic and Russia – who certainly could not be faulted for their work rate, despite being eliminated in the group stage. In their 1-0 victory over Finland – their only win of EURO 2020 – Stanislav Cherchesov's side collectively covered a huge 119.36km, urged on by a partisan home crowd in Saint Petersburg.

Champions Italy covered even more ground as they battled through to the quarter-finals with a 2-1 triumph over Austria, pushing themselves almost past the 150km mark. Including the 30 minutes of extra time, Roberto Mancini's men racked up 149.39km – a distance they nearly matched in the semi-finals when they covered 145.65km, largely chasing a ball that opponents Spain, with overall possession of 69%, held on to for large swathes. Luis Enrique's men covered 142.02km in the process.

Italy had to go the full distance in three knockout matches, while Spain and Switzerland twice needed extra time. England's players covered the most ground of their tournament in their final defeat by Italy, when they hit 143.31km – almost 4.5km more than their semi-final with Denmark, which also required an additional 30 minutes. Overall, Gareth Southgate's men ranked in the lower half of this particular classification, preferring to let the ball do most of the movement – their total of 3,825 passes was the third most behind Spain and Italy.

At the lower end of the spectrum, Wales were the only team whose players averaged under 10km per match, covering almost a full kilometre less, per game, than next lowest Croatia. However, with Switzerland, France and Denmark completing the bottom five for distance covered, this aspect did not have a particularly negative impact: they all made the knockout stages.

### AVERAGE DISTANCE COVERED PER GAME

TEAM	AVERAGE DISTANCE (KM)
Czech Republic	113.97
Russia	112.48
Italy	111.28
Sweden	110.98
Austria	109.63
Spain	108.97
Hungary	108.81
Belgium	107.92
Germany	107.88
Scotland	107.57
Poland	106.68
N. Macedonia	106.22
Finland	106.12
Ukraine	105.85
Slovakia	105.3
England	104.8
Netherlands	104.55
Portugal	104.49
Turkey	103.99
Denmark	103.89
France	103.11
Switzerland	102.69
Croatia	100.28
Wales	99.30

Excluding extra time



Russia covered almost 120km in their win against Finland



## PEDRI AND PLAYMAKERS' PEDIGREE

With his tournament-leading average of 12.69km per match, opportunities were plentiful for Pedri to showcase his talents. The 18-year-old, who was named Young Player of the Tournament, only missed the last minute of La Roja's quarter-final clash with Switzerland and was otherwise an ever-present. It was not hard to see why Luis Enrique relied so heavily on a player who had only picked up four caps prior to UEFA EURO 2020.

"For somebody still so young he has so much personality and no fear – he's fantastic," says Fabio Capello. "He is something different." Of his total 76.14km covered, just over half – 38.23km – was with the ball at his feet. With a pass completion of 92.26%, bolstered by an impressive 65 of his 67 passes finding their man over 120 minutes of an epic semi-final against Italy, no wonder Spain were keen to get the FC Barcelona talent on the ball so often. "He's going to be a genius of a midfielder," adds Capello. "Pedri is completely different to other players."

Only three players averaged more than 12km per match, including Italy midfielder Jorginho – another player who stood out in an increasingly important deep midfield role that does not always receive the appreciation it warrants. While eating up the turf, Jorginho was perfecting a role

previously reserved for a player further up the field or a No10 – namely, the playmaker. "What Jorginho did against Belgium to lead and balance the midfield and also be in this space where the team needs him – important in build-up, in balance, in front of the last line – is nothing to do with what we understood of the playmaker we knew years ago," says technical observer Willi Ruttensteiner.

One of the main reasons that Jorginho covered the most distance at UEFA EURO 2020 (86.61km) was the demands of this modern playmaker role, which made him an essential part of the Italy team in both a defensive and attacking sense. "In the old days the playmaker was a No10 in the No10 position," says Peter Rudbæk "Now you have players who can dictate the game and put other players in a position to assist. Nowadays, the assist is coming up front from the position of a full-back or a midfielder. It is important to define what a playmaker can be in modern terms. Wearing the No10 is more about the history [of a playmaker]."

Unsurprisingly, the majority of players who covered the most ground on average played in or close to that holding midfield position: Spain's Sergio Busquets, France's N'Golo Kanté, Switzerland's Granit Xhaka and England's Calvin Phillips. "Jorginho and Busquets are fundamental players in their teams, likewise Denmark's Pierre-Emile Højbjerg, as they give balance to the side in every meaning of the word," says Ginés Meléndez. "Spain's continuity comes through Pedri. He's a completely different player to what we've seen before. Even though he's 18, he ticks all the boxes and seems to have everything."

### AVERAGE DISTANCE COVERED PER GAME

PLAYER	TEAM	AVERAGE DISTANCE (KM)
Pedri	Spain	12.69
Jorginho	Italy	12.35
Marcel Sabitzer	Austria	12.19
Aleksandr Golovin	Russia	11.99
Calvin Phillips	England	11.84
Albin Ekdal	Sweden	11.8
Sergio Busquets	Spain	11.7
Ádám Nagy	Hungary	11.59
Tomáš Souček	Czech Republic	11.57
N'Golo Kanté	France	11.55
Benjamin Pavard	France	11.52
Stefan Lainer	Austria	11.23
Remo Freuler	Switzerland	11.22
Granit Xhaka	Switzerland	11.22
Vladimír Coufal	Czech Republic	11.17
Joshua Kimmich	Germany	11.16
Thorgan Hazard	Belgium	11.12
Sebastian Larsson	Sweden	11.11
Joakim Mæhle	Denmark	11.11
Piotr Zieliński	Poland	11

Minimum three games played



**GROUP C**

<b>MKD</b> W 3-1	<b>NED</b> L 2-0	<b>UKR</b> W 1-0	<b>ITA</b> L 2-1 After extra time
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**ROUND OF 16**
**QUARTER-FINALS**
**SEMI-FINALS**
**FINAL**
**SQUAD**

App Min G A

**GOALKEEPERS**

1 Alexander Schlager			
12 Pavao Pervan			
13 Daniel Bachmann	4	390	

**DEFENDERS**

2 Andreas Ulmer	2	180	
3 Aleksandar Dragović	4	339	
4 Martin Hinteregger	4	390	
5 Stefan Posch			
8 David Alaba	4	390	2
15 Philipp Lienhart	2	51	
21 Stefan Lainer	4	384	1
26 Marco Friedl			

**MIDFIELDERS**

6 Stefan Ilsanker	3	25	
9 Marcel Sabitzer	4	390	1
10 Florian Grillitsch	3	224	
14 Julian Baumgartlinger	1	1	
16 Christopher Trimmel	1	6	
17 Louis Schaub	1	15	1
18 Alessandro Schöpf	2	88	
19 Christoph Baumgartner	4	250	1
20 Karim Onisiwo	1	6	
22 Valentino Lazaro	1	20	
23 Xaver Schlager	4	368	
24 Konrad Laimer	4	336	1

**FORWARDS**

7 Marko Arnautović	3	217	1
11 Michael Gregoritsch	3	108	1
25 Sasa Kalajdzic	4	112	1

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

**AVERAGE AGE**  
27.4


**CARDS**

6 0

**SHAPE**

Example: v Ukraine (GS)

In possession Out of possession


**PLAYER STATISTICS**

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

**GOALS**

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Marko Arnautović	1	8	3	1.0
2 Sasa Kalajdzic	1	6	2	0.7
3 Michael Gregoritsch	1	3	2	0.6

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

**CHANCE CREATION**

	A	KP	xA
1 David Alaba	2	8	1.0
2 Marcel Sabitzer	1	4	1.5
3 Konrad Laimer	1	3	0.3

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

**COACH | FRANCO FODA**

**BORN:** 23/04/1966,  
Mainz (GER)  
**NATIONALITY:** German  
**HEAD COACH:** Since 01/01/2018

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
<b>UEFA EURO matches</b> (Final tournament)	4	2	0	2	50%
<b>UEFA EURO matches</b> (including qualifying)	14	8	1	5	57%

**AVERAGES**
**POSSESSION**

53%

Max. 62% v N. Macedonia (GS)  
Min. 49% v Italy (R16)  
Rank: 7

**POSSESSION POSITION**

First third	28%
Middle third	52%
Attacking third	20%

499

**PASSES ATTEMPTED**

Max. 556 v N. Macedonia (GS)  
Min. 455 v Ukraine (GS)  
Rank: 9

82%

**PASS ACCURACY**

Max. 84% v N. Macedonia (GS)  
Min. 80% v Ukraine (GS)  
Rank: 14=

**PASS DISTANCE**

Long	48 (10% of total)	Rank: 7=
Medium	195 (39%)	Rank: 8
Short	257 (51%)	Rank: 10=

**PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION**

Average Rank  
11.8 3


**RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD**

Average Rank  
4.8 8

**DISTANCE COVERED**

118.6 km

Max. 145.3 km v Italy (R16)  
Min. 107.0 km v Ukraine (GS)  
Rank: 4

**ATTEMPTS**


5

**GOALS**

1.25 per match; Rank: 13=

5.1

**EXPECTED GOALS (xG)**

1.3 per match; Rank: 12=

53

**ATTEMPTS**

13.3 per match; Rank: 7=

14

**ON TARGET**

3.5 per match; Rank: 16

GOALS	9%
SAVED	17%
BLOCKED	26%
WOODWORK	0%
OFF TARGET	47%

**KEY FEATURES**

- 1-5-3-2 in first two games; then 1-4-2-3-1 with two screening midfielders
- Emphasis on building through thirds with purposeful possession play
- Alaba a versatile leader, dictating tempo from defence or midfield
- Full-backs very active when possession secured; penetrating runs, crosses
- Sabitzer a key link in middle-to-front play; runs, crosses, diligent defensively
- Aggressive collective pressing, forcing opponents to play long or back
- Strong, compact back line ably protected by balancing midfielder Grillitsch
- Well-organised, athletic unit with defensive discipline, work ethic and team spirit





# BELGIUM

## GROUP B

RUS	DEN	FIN	POR	ITA	SEMI-FINALS	FINAL
W 3-0	W 2-1	W 2-0	W 1-0	L 2-1		

## ROUND OF 16

## QUARTER-FINALS

## SEMI-FINALS

## FINAL

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1	Thibaut Courtois	5	450		
12	Thomas Kaminski*				
12	Simon Mignolet*				
13	Matz Sels				

### DEFENDERS

2	Toby Alderweireld	4	360		
3	Thomas Vermaelen	5	284	1	
4	Dedryck Boyata	2	180		
5	Jan Vertonghen	4	347		
15	Thomas Meunier	5	327	1	2
18	Jason Denayer	2	180		
21	Timothy Castagne	1	27		

### MIDFIELDERS

6	Axel Witsel	4	301		
7	Kevin De Bruyne	4	272	1	2
8	Youri Tielemans	4	339		
10	Eden Hazard	4	226	1	
11	Yannick Carrasco	3	139		
16	Thorgan Hazard	4	358	2	
17	Hans Vanaken	1	1		
19	Leander Dendoncker	3	150		
22	Nacer Chadli	2	94		
26	Dennis Praet	2	30		

### FORWARDS

9	Romelu Lukaku	5	444	4	
14	Dries Mertens	4	180	1	
20	Christian Benteke	1	6		
23	Michy Batshuayi	1	15		
24	Leandro Trossard	1	75		
25	Jeremy Doku	2	165		

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

\*Simon Mignolet withdrew injured and was replaced by Thomas Kaminski on 28 June

**AVERAGE AGE**  
28.8


### CARDS

4 0

## SHAPE

Example: v Italy (QF)

3 In possession 3 Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Romelu Lukaku	4	13	7	2.9
2 Thorgan Hazard	2	4	3	0.7
3 Kevin De Bruyne	1	5	3	0.2

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Kevin De Bruyne	2	11	2.0
2 Thomas Meunier	2	1	0.3
3 Eden Hazard	1	1	0.5

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH | ROBERTO MARTÍNEZ



**BORN:** 13/07/1973,  
Balaguer (ESP)  
**NATIONALITY:** Spanish  
**HEAD COACH:** Since 03/08/2016

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	5	4	0	1	80%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	15	14	0	1	93%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

54%

Max. 66% v Russia (GS)  
Min. 43% v Portugal (R16)  
Rank: 4=

### POSSESSION POSITION

First third	26%
Middle third	56%
Attacking third	18%

574

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 721 v Russia (GS)  
Min. 448 v Italy (QF)  
Rank: 3

87%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 90% v Finland (GS)  
Min. 83% v Portugal (R16)  
Rank: 5=

### PASS DISTANCE

Long	43 (8% of total)	Rank: 19=
Medium	221 (38%)	Rank: 4
Short	310 (54%)	Rank: 3

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average Rank  
14.8 13

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD


Average Rank  
3.2 14

### DISTANCE COVERED

107.9 km

Max. 111.0 km v Russia (GS)  
Min. 105.1 km v Finland (GS)  
Rank: 14=

## ATTEMPTS



9

**GOALS** (1 own goal)  
1.8 per match; Rank: 5

5.9

**EXPECTED GOALS (xG)**  
1.2 per match; Rank: 17=

48

**ATTEMPTS**  
9.6 per match; Rank: 19

21

**ON TARGET**  
4.2 per match; Rank: 10

GOALS	16%
SAVED	27%
BLOCKED	22%
WOODWORK	2%
OFF TARGET	33%

## KEY FEATURES

- Variations on 1-3-4-2-1 with Lukaku the reference striker in centre or on right
- Emphasis on high-tempo combination play; strong running, positional interchanges
- Wing-backs Meunier, T. Hazard overlapping, running inside to scoring positions
- High back line of five; vertical transitions after ball-winning; centre-backs pushing up
- Witsel the controlling midfielder, organising and directing approach play
- De Bruyne the free spirit in attack; skill, runs, passes, shots; a constant threat
- Centre-backs with physical presence, aerial power; able keeping by Courtois
- Compact unit with variety of attacking options, motivation, winning mentality





CROATIA

## GROUP D

## ROUND OF 16

## QUARTER-FINALS

## SEMI-FINALS

## FINAL

ENG  
L 1-0CZE  
D 1-1SCO  
W 3-1ESP  
L 5-3

After extra time

## SQUAD

App Min G A

## GOALKEEPERS

1	Dominik Livaković	4	390
12	Lovre Kalinić		
23	Simon Sluga		

## DEFENDERS

2	Šime Vrsaljko	2	180
3	Borna Barišić	1	20
5	Duje Čaleta-Car	2	210
6	Dejan Lovren	2	180
16	Mile Škorić		
21	Domagoj Vida	4	390
22	Josip Juranović	2	163
24	Domagoj Bradarić		
25	Joško Gvardiol	4	370

## MIDFIELDERS

4	Ivan Perišić	3	261	2	1
8	Mateo Kovačić	4	341		1
10	Luka Modrić	4	384	1	1
11	Marcelo Brozović	4	283		
13	Nikola Vlašić	4	203	1	
15	Mario Pašalić	2	46	1	
18	Mislav Oršić	1	53	1	1
19	Milan Badelj				
26	Luka Ivanušec	3	65		

## FORWARDS

7	Josip Brekalo	3	112		
9	Andrej Kramarić	4	227		1
14	Ante Budimir	1	41		
17	Ante Rebić	4	199		
20	Bruno Petković	4	172		

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

AVERAGE  
AGE  
27.4


## CARDS

7 0

## SHAPE

Example: v Spain (R16)

In possession Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

## GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Ivan Perišić	2	7	3	0.3
2 Luka Modrić	1	3	2	0.1
3 Mario Pašalić	1	3	1	1.1

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

## CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Luka Modrić	1	6	1.0
2 Ivan Perišić	1	3	0.3
3 Mateo Kovačić	1	3	0.2

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH | ZLATKO DALIĆ



**BORN:** 26/10/1966,  
Livno (BIH)  
**NATIONALITY:** Croatian  
**HEAD COACH:** Since 07/10/2017

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	4	1	1	2	25%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	12	6	3	3	50%

## AVERAGES

## POSSESSION

48%

Max. 66% v Scotland (GS)  
Min. 34% v Spain (R16)  
Rank: 13=

POSSESSION  
POSITION

First third	31%
Middle third	52%
Attacking third	17%

451

## PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 642 v Scotland (GS)  
Min. 320 v Spain (R16)  
Rank: 13

85%

## PASS ACCURACY

Max. 88% v Scotland (GS)  
Min. 82% v Czech Rep. (GS)  
Rank: 9

## PASS DISTANCE\*

Long	44 (10% of total)	Rank: 15=
Medium	138 (31%)	Rank: 21
Short	269 (60%)	Rank: 8

PASSES PER  
DEFENSIVE ACTIONAverage Rank  
15.6 15RECOVERIES IN  
ATTACKING THIRDAverage Rank  
2.3 17=


## DISTANCE COVERED

109.8 km

Max. 136.5 km v Spain (R16)  
Min. 96.6 km v England (GS)  
Rank: 12

\*Decimal points account for the extra 1%

## ATTEMPTS



7

**GOALS** (1 own goal)  
1.75 per match; Rank: 6=

6.8

**EXPECTED GOALS (xG)**  
1.7 per match; Rank: 7=

42

**ATTEMPTS**  
10.5 per match; Rank: 15

17

**ON TARGET**  
4.3 per match; Rank: 9

GOALS		14%
SAVED		26%
BLOCKED		14%
WOODWORK		0%
OFF TARGET		45%

## KEY FEATURES

- Variations on 1-4-3-3 with transitions to 1-4-4-2 or 1-4-5-1 defending
- Short-passing game, building through thirds, using wingers and full-backs
- Midfield trio Brozović, Modrić, Kovačić the driving force in team mechanisms
- Playmaker Modrić dropping to centre-backs or to right-back to dictate build-up
- Flexibility and rotation among middle-to-front players; interchanging wingers
- Occasional high press; otherwise, rapid retreat into compact midfield block
- Prepared to hold high defensive line with goalkeeper remaining deep
- Experienced well-prepared team with outstanding mental strength, motivation





# CZECH REPUBLIC

GROUP D			ROUND OF 16	QUARTER-FINALS	SEMI-FINALS	FINAL
SCO W 2-0	CRO D 1-1	ENG L 1-0	NED W 2-0	DEN L 2-1		

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1 Tomáš Vaclík	5	450		
16 Aleš Mandouš				
23 Tomáš Koubek				

### DEFENDERS

2 Pavel Kadeřábek	1	90		
3 Ondřej Čelůstka	5	425		
4 Jakub Brabec	1	25		
5 Vladimír Coufal	5	450	2	
6 Tomáš Kalas	5	450	1	
17 David Zima				
18 Jan Bořil	4	360		
22 Aleš Matějů				

### MIDFIELDERS

7 Antonín Barák	3	182		
8 Vladimír Darida	4	249		
9 Tomáš Holeš	5	300	1	1
12 Lukáš Masopust	5	323		
13 Petr Ševčík	5	228		
14 Jakub Jankto	5	247		
15 Tomáš Souček	5	450		
21 Alex Král	4	125		
25 Jakub Pešek				
26 Michal Sadílek	1	1		

### FORWARDS

10 Patrik Schick	5	404	5	
11 Michael Krmenčík	4	65		
19 Adam Hložek	4	76		
20 Matěj Vydra	3	35		
24 Tomáš Pekhart	1	15		

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

AVERAGE  
AGE  
27.1


### CARDS

7 0

## SHAPE

Example: v England (GS)

☑ 3 In possession ■ 3 Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Patrik Schick	5	16	9	2.4
2 Tomáš Holeš	1	6	4	1.1
3 Tomáš Souček	0	11	1	0.8

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Vladimír Coufal	2	5	1.1
2 Tomáš Holeš	1	1	0.3
3 Tomáš Kalas	1	0	0.4

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH | JAROSLAV ŠILHAVÝ



BORN: 03/11/1961,  
Plzeň (CZE)  
NATIONALITY: Czech  
HEAD COACH: Since 18/09/2018

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	5	2	1	2	40%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	13	7	1	5	54%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

48%

Max. 55% v Denmark (QF)  
Min. 43% v Scotland (GS)  
Rank: 13=

### POSSESSION POSITION\*

First third	30%
Middle third	50%
Attacking third	21%

411

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 452 v Denmark (QF)  
Min. 348 v Scotland (GS)  
Rank: 16

76%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 80% v Denmark (QF)  
Min. 69% v Scotland (GS)  
Rank: 22=

### PASS DISTANCE

Long	49 (12% of total)	Rank: 5=
Medium	147 (36%)	Rank: 17=
Short	215 (52%)	Rank: 16

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average Rank  
14.2 12

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD

Average Rank  
4 11=


### DISTANCE COVERED

114 km

Max. 116.9 km v Scotland (GS)  
Min. 109.5 km v Netherlands (R16)  
Rank: 7

\*Decimal points account for the extra 1%

## ATTEMPTS



6

### GOALS

1.2 per match; Rank: 15=

6.2

### EXPECTED GOALS (xG)

1.2 per match; Rank: 17=

56

### ATTEMPTS

11.2 per match; Rank: 13

19

### ON TARGET

3.8 per match; Rank: 14

GOALS		11%
SAVED		23%
BLOCKED		23%
WOODWORK		0%
OFF TARGET		43%

## KEY FEATURES

- 1-4-2-3-1, switching to 1-4-4-2 when trailing Denmark in quarter-final
- High-energy game with intense press on ball-carrier for high regains
- Hard-working midfield; Holeš, Souček supporting attacks from holding positions
- Strong wing play; Masopust on right, Ševčík making infield runs from left
- Full-backs energetically supporting attacks, notably Coufal on right
- Schick a mobile free-scoring striker, leading line, bringing team-mates into play
- Vaclík assured behind strong back line led by Kalas; 1v1 abilities, aerial power
- Well-organised team hard to break down; strong work ethic, collective spirit





# DENMARK

## GROUP B

FIN	BEL	RUS	WAL	CZE	ENG	FINAL
L 1-0	L 2-1	W 4-1	W 4-0	W 2-1	L 2-1 After extra time	

## ROUND OF 16

## QUARTER-FINALS

## SEMI-FINALS

## FINAL

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1 Kasper Schmeichel	6	570		
16 Jonas Lössl				
22 Frederik Rønnow				

### DEFENDERS

2 Joachim Andersen	3	63		
3 Jannik Vestergaard	6	485		
4 Simon Kjær	6	530		
5 Joakim Mæhle	6	570	2	1
6 Andreas Christensen	6	520	1	
13 Mathias Jørgensen				
17 Jens Stryger	6	287	1	
26 Nicolai Boilesen	1	13		

### MIDFIELDERS

7 Robert Skov				
8 Thomas Delaney	6	462	1	
10 Christian Eriksen	1	43		
15 Christian Nørgaard	5	161		
18 Daniel Wass	5	270		
23 Pierre-Emile Højbjerg	6	570	3	
24 Mathias Jensen	6	142	1	
25 Anders Christiansen				

### FORWARDS

9 Martin Braithwaite	6	565	1	
11 Andreas Olsen	2	33		
12 Kasper Dolberg	4	225	3	
14 Mikkel Damsgaard	5	330	2	1
19 Jonas Wind	2	79		
20 Yussuf Poulsen	5	295	2	
21 Andreas Cornelius	4	58	1	

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

AVERAGE  
AGE  
27.4


### CARDS

5 0

## SHAPE

Example: v England (SF)

3 In possession 3 Out of possession



## COACH | KASPER HJULMAND



BORN: 09/04/1972,  
Aalborg (DEN)  
NATIONALITY: Danish  
HEAD COACH: Since 01/08/2020

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	6	3	0	3	50%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	6	3	0	3	50%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

52%

Max. 69% v Finland (GS)  
Min. 42% v England (SF)  
Rank: 8=

### POSSESSION POSITION

First third	24%
Middle third	55%
Attacking third	21%

468

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 633 v Finland (GS)  
Min. 376 v Czech Rep. (QF)  
Rank: 11

82%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 85% v Finland (GS)  
Min. 76% v Czech Rep. (QF)  
Rank: 14=

### PASS DISTANCE

Long	48 (10% of total)	Rank: 7=
Medium	165 (35%)	Rank: 15
Short	255 (55%)	Rank: 12

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average	Rank
12.9	7

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD

Average	Rank
5.5	6

### DISTANCE COVERED

110.5 km

Max. 137.2 km v England (SF)  
Min. 100.8 km v Wales (R16)  
Rank: 11

## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Kasper Dolberg	3	7	5	1.7
2 Joakim Mæhle	2	10	7	1.8
3 Mikkel Damsgaard	2	9	4	0.6

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### PASSES

	A	S%	PF%
1 Pierre-Emile Højbjerg	400	84	37
2 Andreas Christensen	292	89	36
3 Joakim Mæhle	278	86	37

A = Attempted; S = Succ; PF = Pass Forward

### CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Pierre-Emile Højbjerg	3	8	0.8
2 Joakim Mæhle	1	6	0.9
3 Jens Stryger	1	6	0.7


A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

### DEFENDING

	BR	TW	I
1 Pierre-Emile Højbjerg	51	8	7
2 Joakim Mæhle	41	5	8
3 Andreas Christensen	30	3	8

BR = Balls recovered; TW = Tackles won; I = Interceptions

## ATTEMPTS



12

### GOALS

2 per match; Rank: 2=

10.3

### EXPECTED GOALS (xG)

1.7 per match; Rank: 7=

92

### ATTEMPTS

15.3 per match; Rank: 3

39

### ON TARGET

6.5 per match; Rank: 2

GOALS	13%
SAVED	29%
BLOCKED	26%
WOODWORK	2%
OFF TARGET	31%

## KEY FEATURES

- 1-3-4-2-1 with variations (1-3-5-2, 1-4-3-3) according to game situations
- High-tempo combination play; neat triangles to play out from the back
- Two interchanging wingers (Damsgaard, Braithwaite) supporting target striker
- Wing-backs running into scoring positions, notably right-footed Mæhle on left
- Central midfielders Højbjerg, Delaney building attacks, defending key spaces
- Three strong centre-backs with aerial power; Kjær the team leader
- Shot-stopping, distribution, composure by influential goalkeeper Schmeichel
- Well-organised unit with tactical flexibility, pace, discipline, great mental resilience





# ENGLAND

GROUP D				ROUND OF 16	QUARTER-FINALS	SEMI-FINALS	FINAL
CRO W 1-0	SCO D 0-0	CZE W 1-0	GER W 2-0	UKR W 4-0	DEN W 2-1 After extra time	ITA D 1-1 ITA win 3-2 on pens	

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1	Jordan Pickford	7	690		
13	Dean Henderson*				
13	Aaron Ramsdale*				
23	Sam Johnstone				

### DEFENDERS

2	Kyle Walker	6	599		
3	Luke Shaw	6	575	1	3
5	John Stones	7	679		
6	Harry Maguire	5	510	1	
12	Kieran Trippier	5	290	1	
15	Tyrone Mings	3	191		
16	Conor Coady				
21	Ben Chilwell				
22	Ben White				
24	Reece James	1	90		

### MIDFIELDERS

4	Declan Rice	7	538		
7	Jack Grealish	5	172	2	
8	Jordan Henderson	5	151	1	
14	Kalvin Phillips	7	665	1	
17	Jadon Sancho	3	97		
19	Mason Mount	5	464	1	
20	Phil Foden	3	159		
25	Bukayo Saka	4	272	1	
26	Jude Bellingham	3	56		

### FORWARDS

9	Harry Kane	7	649	4	
10	Raheem Sterling	7	641	3	1
11	Marcus Rashford	5	84		
18	Dominic Calvert-Lewin	2	18		

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

\*Dean Henderson withdrew injured and was replaced by Aaron Ramsdale on 15 June

**AVERAGE AGE**  
24.9


### CARDS

6 0

## SHAPE

Example: v Denmark (SF)

3 In possession 3 Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

GOALS		G	S	OT	xG
1	Harry Kane	4	14	8	4.4
2	Raheem Sterling	3	14	8	3.8
3	Harry Maguire	1	8	4	0.7
G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals					

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

CHANCE CREATION		A	KP	xA
1	Luke Shaw	3	7	2.0
2	Jack Grealish	2	1	0.9
3	Mason Mount	1	7	1.6

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH | GARETH SOUTHGATE



**BORN:** 03/09/1970,  
Watford (ENG)  
**NATIONALITY:** English  
**HEAD COACH:** Since 27/09/2016

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	7	5	2	0	71%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	15	12	2	1	80%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

51%

Max. 60% v Scotland (GS)  
Min. 35% v Italy (F)  
Rank: 10

### POSSESSION POSITION

First third	25%
Middle third	57%
Attacking third	18%

491

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 622 v Ukraine (QF)  
Min. 320 v Italy (F)  
Rank: 10

86%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 92% v Ukraine (QF)  
Min. 75% v Italy (F)  
Rank: 7=

### PASS DISTANCE

Long	47 (10% of total)	Rank: 11
Medium	187 (38%)	Rank: 10
Short	257 (52%)	Rank: 10=

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average Rank  
17.7 19

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD


Average Rank  
4 11=

### DISTANCE COVERED

115.3 km

Max. 143.3 km v Italy (F)  
Min. 100.0 km v Croatia (GS)  
Rank: 6

## ATTEMPTS



11

**GOALS** (1 own goal)  
1.57 per match; Rank: 10

11.5

**EXPECTED GOALS (xG)**  
1.6 per match; Rank: 9=

63

**ATTEMPTS**  
9 per match; Rank: 20

28

**ON TARGET**  
4 per match; Rank: 11=

GOALS	16%
SAVED	28%
BLOCKED	17%
WOODWORK	2%
OFF TARGET	38%

## KEY FEATURES

- 1-4-3-3 or 1-4-2-3-1 with switches to 1-3-4-3; all with two holding midfielders
- Emphasis on building through thirds; but long-passing response to high press
- Dangerous attacks through wide areas, using pace, 1v1 skills of Sterling, Saka
- Compact aggressive midfield; tackles, interceptions, work-rate by Phillips, Rice
- Solid high or mid-block defence with aerial power; difficult to penetrate central area
- Incisive high runs by wing-backs; fewer runs ahead of ball by full-backs in back four
- Striker Kane often dropping deep to receive, participate in approach play as false 9
- Squad with tactical options; game management skills; mental resilience





FINLAND

## GROUP B

ROUND OF 16

QUARTER-FINALS

SEMI-FINALS

FINAL

DEN  
W 1-0RUS  
L 1-0BEL  
L 2-0

## SQUAD

App Min G A

## GOALKEEPERS

1	Lukas Hradecky	3	270
12	Jesse Joronen		
23	Anssi Jaakkola		

## DEFENDERS

2	Paulus Arajuuri	3	270
3	Daniel O'Shaughnessy	3	270
4	Joona Toivio	3	265
5	Leo Väisänen	1	1
15	Nicholas Hämäläinen		
16	Thomas Lam		
18	Jere Uronen	3	250
22	Jukka Raitala	3	254
25	Robert Ivanov		

## MIDFIELDERS

6	Glen Kamara	3	270
7	Robert Taylor		
8	Robin Lod	3	269
9	Fredrik Jensen	2	6
11	Rasmus Schüller	3	112
13	Pyy Soiri	1	15
14	Tim Sparv	2	135
17	Nikolai Alho	1	20
19	Joni Kauko	3	57
24	Onni Valakari		

## FORWARDS

10	Teemu Pukki	3	240
20	Joel Pohjanpalo	3	244
21	Lassi Lappalainen	1	15
26	Marcus Forss	2	7

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

AVERAGE  
AGE  
27.5


## CARDS

4 0

## SHAPE

Example: v Denmark (GS)

In possession Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

## GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Joel Pohjanpalo	1	7	1	0.8
2 Teemu Pukki	0	4	1	0.3
3= Robin Lod	0	2	0	0.1
3= Joni Kauko	0	2	0	0.1

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

## CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Jere Uronen	1	3	0.3
2 Robin Lod	0	3	0.9
3 Daniel O'Shaughnessy	0	3	0.4

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH | MARKKU KANERVA



BORN: 24/05/1964,  
Helsinki (FIN)  
NATIONALITY: Finnish  
HEAD COACH: Since 12/12/2016

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	3	1	0	2	33%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	17	9	2	6	53%

## AVERAGES

## POSSESSION

37%

Max. 41% v Russia (GS)  
Min. 31% v Denmark (GS)  
Rank: 22

POSSESSION  
POSITION\*

First third	40%
Middle third	45%
Attacking third	16%

308

## PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 451 v Belgium (GS)  
Min. 283 v Denmark (GS)  
Rank: 20=

79%

## PASS ACCURACY

Max. 84% v Belgium (GS)  
Min. 68% v Denmark (GS)  
Rank: 17=

## PASS DISTANCE\*\*

Long	52 (14% of total)	Rank: 4
Medium	147 (39%)	Rank: 17=
Short	182 (48%)	Rank: 20

PASSES PER  
DEFENSIVE ACTIONAverage Rank  
19.1 20=RECOVERIES IN  
ATTACKING THIRDAverage Rank  
2.3 17=

## DISTANCE COVERED


106.1 km

Max. 111.1 v Russia (GS)  
Min. 101.7 v Denmark (GS)  
Rank: 19

\*Decimal points account for the extra 1%

\*\*Decimal points account for the extra number and extra 1%

## ATTEMPTS



1

## GOALS

0.33 per match; Rank: 22=

1.5

## EXPECTED GOALS (xG)

0.5 per match; Rank: 22=

19

## ATTEMPTS

6.3 per match; Rank: 23=

3

## ON TARGET

1 per match; Rank: 23

GOALS	5%
SAVED	11%
BLOCKED	58%
WOODWORK	0%
OFF TARGET	26%

## KEY FEATURES

- Deep, compact 1-5-3-2 defending with back line mostly at edge of box
- Centre-backs low at all times; wing-backs forward to supply crosses and passes
- Two midfielders staying deep; one pushing up to support counterattacks
- Good striking partnership; one coming short, the other running in the deep
- Fast attack-to-defence transitions to narrow back line; midfield close to defence
- More patient defence-to-attack play, building from back into midfield
- Hradecky an influential goalkeeper; shot-stopping, good distribution
- Well-organised unit with athleticism, spirit, strong work ethic and collective virtues





FRANCE

## GROUP F

GER W 1-0	HUN D 1-1	POR D 2-2	SUI D 3-3 SUI win 5-4 on pens
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## ROUND OF 16

## QUARTER-FINALS

## SEMI-FINALS

## FINAL

## SQUAD

App Min G A

## GOALKEEPERS

1	Hugo Lloris	4	390		
16	Steve Mandanda				
23	Mike Maignan				

## DEFENDERS

2	Benjamin Pavard	3	300		
3	Presnel Kimpembe	4	390		
4	Raphaël Varane	4	390		
5	Clément Lenglet	1	45		
15	Kurt Zouma				
18	Lucas Digne	2	97		
21	Lucas Hernández	2	135	1	
24	Léo Dubois				
25	Jules Koundé	1	90		

## MIDFIELDERS

6	Paul Pogba	4	376	1	1
8	Thomas Lemar	1	3		
12	Corentin Tolisso	3	81		
13	N'Golo Kanté	4	390		
14	Adrien Rabiot	4	304		
17	Moussa Sissoko	2	35		
20	Kingsley Coman	2	90		

## FORWARDS

7	Antoine Griezmann	4	355	1	1
9	Olivier Giroud	2	40		
10	Kylian Mbappé	4	390	1	
11	Ousmane Dembélé	2	31		
19	Karim Benzema	4	349	4	
22	Wissam Ben Yedder				
26	Marcus Thuram	1	9		

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

AVERAGE  
AGE  
27.4


## CARDS

8 0

## SHAPE

Example: v Germany (GS)

In possession Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

## GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Karim Benzema	4	11	5	3.2
2 Paul Pogba	1	8	2	0.4
3 Antoine Griezmann	1	7	3	1.3

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

## CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Antoine Griezmann	1	10	0.9
2 Paul Pogba	1	7	1.3
3 Kylian Mbappé	1	6	0.7

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH | DIDIER DESCHAMPS



**BORN:** 15/10/1968,  
Bayonne (FRA)  
**NATIONALITY:** French  
**HEAD COACH:** Since 08/07/2012

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	11	6	4	1	55%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	21	14	5	2	67%

## AVERAGES

## POSSESSION

52%

Max. 66% v Hungary (GS)  
Min. 39% v Germany (GS)  
Rank: 8=

POSSESSION  
POSITION\*

First third	22%
Middle third	59%
Attacking third	20%

531

## PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 650 v Hungary (GS)  
Min. 434 v Germany (GS)  
Rank: 6

89%

## PASS ACCURACY

Max. 94% v Portugal (GS)  
Min. 83% v Germany (GS)  
Rank: 2=

## PASS DISTANCE\*\*

Long	44 (8% of total)	Rank: 15=
Medium	220 (41%)	Rank: 5
Short	267 (50%)	Rank: 9

PASSES PER  
DEFENSIVE ACTIONAverage Rank  
16.4 17RECOVERIES IN  
ATTACKING THIRDAverage Rank  
4.3 9=

## DISTANCE COVERED


110.6 km

Max. 134.0 km v Switzerland (R16)  
Min. 99.3 km v Portugal (GS)  
Rank: 10

\*Decimal points account for the extra 1%

\*\*Decimal points account for the missing 1%

## ATTEMPTS



7

**GOALS** (1 own goal)  
1.75 per match; Rank: 6=

8

**EXPECTED GOALS (xG)**  
2 per match; Rank: 3=

56

**ATTEMPTS**  
14 per match; Rank: 4

18

**ON TARGET**  
4.5 per match; Rank: 4=

GOALS	10%
SAVED	20%
BLOCKED	15%
WOODWORK	5%
OFF TARGET	49%

## KEY FEATURES

- Variations on 1-4-3-3 with switches to four attackers when chasing result
- Flexible structure e.g. 1-3-5-2; 1-4-4-2 with diamond then flat 1-4-4-2 v Swiss
- Transitions to defence in midfield or own half, leaving space to launch quick counters
- Kanté, Pogba shielding back line, initiating attacks from controlling roles in midfield
- Full-backs prepared to push forward but not often seen ahead of the ball
- Inspired through passes by Pogba; pace, runs from deep, decisive passes by Mbappé
- Skilful combinations through centre; Benzema the striker, Griezmann supporting
- Occasional use of wingers (Dembélé/Coman) to increase tempo, use 1v1 skills



## GROUP F

<b>FRA</b> L 1-0	<b>POR</b> W 4-2	<b>HUN</b> D 2-2	<b>ENG</b> L 2-0
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## ROUND OF 16

## QUARTER-FINALS

## SEMI-FINALS

## FINAL

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1	Manuel Neuer	4	360		
12	Bernd Leno				
22	Kevin Trapp				

### DEFENDERS

2	Antonio Rüdiger	4	360		
3	Marcel Halstenberg	1	28		
4	Matthias Ginter	4	347		
5	Mats Hummels	4	332	1	
6	Joshua Kimmich	4	360	2	
15	Niklas Süle	1	17		
16	Lukas Klostermann				
20	Robin Gosens	4	319	1	2
24	Robin Koch				
26	Christian Günter				

### MIDFIELDERS

8	Toni Kroos	4	360		
10	Serge Gnabry	4	249		
13	Jonas Hofmann				
14	Jamal Musiala	2	9		
17	Florian Neuhaus				
18	Leon Goretzka	3	139	1	
19	Leroy Sané	4	112		
21	İlkay Gündoğan	3	221		
23	Emre Can	3	33		

### FORWARDS

7	Kai Havertz	4	304	2	
9	Kevin Volland	2	10		
11	Timo Werner	3	108		
25	Thomas Müller	4	292		

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

**AVERAGE AGE**  
27.1


### CARDS

7 0

## SHAPE

Example: v France (GS)

☑ 3 In possession ■ 3 Out of possession



## COACH | JOACHIM LÖW



**BORN:** 03/02/1960, Schöna im Schwarzwald (GER)  
**NATIONALITY:** German  
**HEAD COACH:** 12/07/2006 to 31/07/2021

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
<b>UEFA EURO matches</b> (Final tournament)	20	11	3	6	55%
<b>UEFA EURO matches</b> (including qualifying)	58	41	7	10	71%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

62%

Max. 75% v Hungary (GS)  
Min. 54% v England (R16)  
Rank: 2

### POSSESSION POSITION\*

First third	23%
Middle third	57%
Attacking third	21%

631

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 721 v Hungary (GS)  
Min. 528 v England (R16)  
Rank: 2

89%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 91% v Hungary (GS)  
Min. 84% v England (R16)  
Rank: 2=

### PASS DISTANCE\*

Long	48 (8% of total)	Rank: 7=
Medium	251 (40%)	Rank: 2
Short	332 (53%)	Rank: 2

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average Rank  
13.9 10

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD

Average Rank  
5 7

### DISTANCE COVERED

107.9 km

Max. 113.6 km v France (GS)  
Min. 105.4 km v England (R16)  
Rank: 14=

\*Decimal points account for the extra 1%

## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Kai Havertz	2	11	5	2.8
2 Robin Gosens	1	5	4	0.9
3 Leon Goretzka	1	5	2	0.3

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### PASSES

	A	S%	PF%
1 Toni Kroos	372	93	29
2 Mats Hummels	314	93	24
3 Antonio Rüdiger	297	93	32

A = Attempted; S = Succ; PF = Pass Forward

### CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Joshua Kimmich	2	6	1.7
2 Robin Gosens	2	4	1.1
3 Mats Hummels	1	2	0.3


A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

### DEFENDING

	BR	TW	I
1 Joshua Kimmich	26	3	1
2 Antonio Rüdiger	22	1	1
3 Matthias Ginter	18	6	3

BR = Balls recovered; TW = Tackles won; I = Interceptions

## ATTEMPTS



6

**GOALS** (2 own goals)  
1.5 per match; Rank: 11

7.2

**EXPECTED GOALS (xG)**  
1.8 per match; Rank: 6

49

**ATTEMPTS**  
12.3 per match; Rank: 12

18

**ON TARGET**  
4.5 per match; Rank: 4=

GOALS	8%
SAVED	27%
BLOCKED	24%
WOODWORK	4%
OFF TARGET	37%

## KEY FEATURES

- 1-5-2-3 the default setting with Müller, Havertz supporting a central striker
- Very high wing-backs delivering crosses, interior runs into scoring positions
- Possession play through thirds, building from goalkeeper or centre-backs
- Two organising midfielders; Kroos distributing, Gündoğan pushing forward
- Well-organised collective high press by 5-6 players; rapid, vertical counters
- Good off-ball movement, positional interchanging by middle-to-front players
- Combinations on flanks despite wingerless formation; excellent switches of play
- Compact, organised team with athleticism, attitude and mental resilience





# HUNGARY

## GROUP F

POR	FRA	GER	ROUND OF 16	QUARTER-FINALS	SEMI-FINALS	FINAL
L 3-0	D 1-1	D 2-2				

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1 Péter Gulácsi	3	270		
12 Dénes Dibusz				
22 Ádám Bogdán				

### DEFENDERS

2 Ádám Lang				
3 Ákos Kecskés				
4 Attila Szalai	3	270		
5 Attila Fiola	3	266	1	
6 Willi Orbán	3	270		
7 Loïc Négo	3	205		
14 Gergő Lovrencsics	3	98		
21 Endre Botka	3	270		
26 Bendegúz Bolla				

### MIDFIELDERS

8 Ádám Nagy	3	268		
10 Tamás Cseri	1	15		
13 András Schäfer	3	230	1	
15 László Kleinheisler	3	250		
16 Dániel Gazdag				
17 Roland Varga	1	2		
18 Dávid Sigér	1	12		
19 Kevin Varga	2	10		

### FORWARDS

9 Ádám Szalai	3	198	1	1
11 Filip Holender				
20 Roland Sallai	3	242	2	
23 Nemanja Nikolić	2	66		
24 Szabolcs Schön	2	28		
25 János Hahn				

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

AVERAGE  
AGE  
27.7


### CARDS

6 0

## SHAPE

Example: v Portugal (GS)

☑ 3 In possession 3 Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Ádám Szalai	1	5	4	0.4
2= Attila Fiola	1	2	1	0.3
2= András Schäfer	1	2	1	0.3

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Roland Sallai	2	2	0.1
2 Ádám Szalai	1	0	0.4
3 András Schäfer	0	3	0.0

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH | MARCO ROSSI



BORN: 09/09/1964,  
Druento (ITA)  
NATIONALITY: Italian  
HEAD COACH: Since 19/06/2018

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	3	0	2	1	0%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	11	4	2	5	36%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

30%

Max. 34% v France (GS)  
Min. 25% v Germany (GS)  
Rank: 24

### POSSESSION POSITION

First third	52%
Middle third	41%
Attacking third	7%

286

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 330 v France (GS)  
Min. 236 v Germany (GS)  
Rank: 24

76%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 81% v France (GS)  
Min. 71% v Germany (GS)  
Rank: 22=

### PASS DISTANCE\*

Long	41 (14% of total)	Rank: 23
Medium	104 (36%)	Rank: 24
Short	141 (49%)	Rank: 24

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average Rank  
25.9 24

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD

Average Rank  
1.3 24


### DISTANCE COVERED

108.8 km

Max. 110.3 km v Germany (GS)  
Min. 107.1 km v France (GS)  
Rank: 13

\*Decimal points account for the missing 1%

## ATTEMPTS



3

### GOALS

1 per match; Rank: 17

1.5

### EXPECTED GOALS (xG)

0.5 per match; Rank: 22=

19

### ATTEMPTS

6.3 per match; Rank: 23=

10

### ON TARGET

3.3 per match; Rank: 17

GOALS	15%
SAVED	35%
BLOCKED	10%
WOODWORK	5%
OFF TARGET	35%

## KEY FEATURES

- Style based on the art of defending; compact, low 1-5-3-2 with 1v1 skills, aerial power
- Aggressive press on ball-carrier; effective ball-winning by three midfielders
- Fast transitions in both directions; direct counters often via main striker Szalai
- Regains also the cue for rapid switch to opposing flank for onrushing wing-back
- Gulácsi an influential keeper, staying low, making decisive saves, launching counters
- Varied attacking; direct supply to strikers or build-up with short or medium passes
- Style typified by midfielder Kleinheisler; pressing, fighting for regains, driving forward
- High-energy game; athletic condition, tactical discipline, endeavour and team ethic





# ITALY

## GROUP A

TUR	SUI	WAL	AUT	BEL	ESP	ENG
W 3-0	W 3-0	W 1-0	W 2-1 After extra time	W 2-1	D 1-1 ITA win 4-2 on pens	D 1-1 ITA win 3-2 on pens

## ROUND OF 16

## QUARTER-FINALS

## SEMI-FINALS

## FINAL

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1 Salvatore Sirigu	1	1		
21 Gianluigi Donnarumma	7	719		
26 Alex Meret				

### DEFENDERS

2 Giovanni Di Lorenzo	6	585		
3 Giorgio Chiellini	5	444		
4 Leonardo Spinazzola	4	379	2	
13 Emerson	4	292		
15 Francesco Acerbi	3	231	1	
19 Leonardo Bonucci	7	675	1	
23 Alessandro Bastoni	1	90		
24 Alessandro Florenzi	2	47		
25 Rafael Tolói	4	158	1	

### MIDFIELDERS

5 Manuel Locatelli	5	272	2	
6 Marco Verratti	5	400	3	
7 Gaetano Castrovilli	1	3		
8 Jorginho	7	705		
12 Matteo Pessina	4	191	2	
14 Federico Chiesa	7	438	2	
16 Bryan Cristante	6	129		
18 Nicolò Barella	6	472	1	1
20 Federico Bernardeschi	4	127		

### FORWARDS

9 Andrea Belotti	6	216		
10 Lorenzo Insigne	6	512	2	
11 Domenico Berardi	6	375	2	
17 Ciro Immobile	6	444	2	1
22 Giacomo Raspadori	1	15		

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

AVERAGE  
AGE  
27.3


### CARDS

12 0

## SHAPE

Example: v Turkey (GS)

3 In possession 3 Out of possession



## COACH | ROBERTO MANCINI



BORN: 27/11/1964,  
Jesi (ITA)  
NATIONALITY: Italian  
HEAD COACH: Since 15/05/2018

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	7	5	2	0	71%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	17	15	2	0	88%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

54%

Max. 69% v Wales (GS)  
Min. 31% v Spain (SF)  
Rank: 4=

### POSSESSION POSITION

First third	24%
Middle third	53%
Attacking third	23%

518

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 616 v Turkey (GS)  
Min. 290 v Spain (SF)  
Rank: 7

87%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 92% v Wales (GS)  
Min. 74% v Spain (SF)  
Rank: 5=

### PASS DISTANCE

Long	42 (8% of total)	Rank: 21=
Medium	196 (38%)	Rank: 7
Short	280 (54%)	Rank: 5

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average	Rank
13	8

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD

Average	Rank
6.4	4

### DISTANCE COVERED

125.3 km

Max. 149.4 km v Austria (R16)  
Min. 101.2 km v Wales (GS)  
Rank: 2

## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Lorenzo Insigne	2	19	7	1.2
2 Ciro Immobile	2	18	3	2.4
3 Federico Chiesa	2	17	6	1.2

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Marco Verratti	3	12	0.6
2 Domenico Berardi	2	8	1.3
3 Leonardo Spinazzola	2	7	0.5

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

### PASSES

	A	S%	PF%
1 Jorginho	519	93	28
2 Leonardo Bonucci	476	88	32
3 Marco Verratti	417	93	23


A = Attempted; S = Succ; PF = Pass Forward

### DEFENDING

	BR	TW	I
1 Jorginho	48	4	25
2 Marco Verratti	37	9	6
3 Nicolò Barella	29	2	2

BR = Balls recovered; TW = Tackles won; I = Interceptions

## ATTEMPTS



13

GOALS (1 own goal)  
1.86 per match; Rank: 4

13.5

EXPECTED GOALS (xG)  
1.9 per match; Rank: 5

127

ATTEMPTS  
18.1 per match; Rank: 2

36

ON TARGET  
5.1 per match; Rank: 3

GOALS	9%
SAVED	18%
BLOCKED	25%
WOODWORK	2%
OFF TARGET	45%

## KEY FEATURES

- 1-4-3-3 with Jorginho as influential organising midfielder in front of back four
- Excellent one- or two-touch positional attacking, diagonal switches of play
- Partnerships on wings, notably left-back Spinazzola combining with Insigne
- Winger Chiesa a constant threat; dribbling, inside runs, strong finishing
- Aggressive high collective pressing earning regains in attacking third
- Bonucci, Chiellini streetwise centre-backs; composed goalkeeping by Donnarumma
- Powerful midfield with Verratti, Barella working hard to support attacks
- Well-organised unit; sustained high-tempo play; very strong team ethic





# NETHERLANDS

## GROUP C

UKR W 3-2	AUT W 2-0	MKD W 3-0	CZE L 2-0	QUARTER-FINALS	SEMI-FINALS	FINAL
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## ROUND OF 16

## QUARTER-FINALS

## SEMI-FINALS

## FINAL

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1 Maarten Stekelenburg	4	360		
13 Tim Krul				
23 Marco Bizot				

### DEFENDERS

2 Joël Veltman	1	2		
3 Matthijs de Ligt	3	232		
4 Nathan Aké	2	52	1	
5 Owen Wijndal	2	52		
6 Stefan de Vrij	4	315		
12 Patrick van Aanholt	4	299		
17 Daley Blind	4	299		
22 Denzel Dumfries	4	315	2	

### MIDFIELDERS

8 Georginio Wijnaldum	4	360	3	
11 Quincy Promes	2	57		
14 Davy Klaassen				
15 Marten de Roon	3	237		
16 Ryan Gravenberch	2	106		
20 Donny van de Beek*				
21 Frenkie de Jong	4	348		
24 Teun Koopmeiners				
25 Jurriën Timber	3	142		

### FORWARDS

7 Steven Berghuis	2	54		
9 Luuk de Jong	2	10		
10 Memphis Depay	4	327	2	2
18 Donyell Malen	4	150	2	
19 Wout Weghorst	4	193	1	
26 Cody Gakpo	1	12		

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

\*Donny van de Beek withdrew injured pre-tournament

**AVERAGE AGE**  
26.8


### CARDS

3 1 Sent off:  
De Ligt v Czech Republic (R16)

## SHAPE

Example: v Ukraine (GS)

3 In possession 3 Out of possession



## COACH | FRANK DE BOER



**BORN:** 15/05/1970, Hoorn (NED)  
**NATIONALITY:** Dutch  
**HEAD COACH:** 23/09/2020 to 29/06/2021

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	4	3	0	1	75%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	4	3	0	1	75%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

55%

Max. 62% v Ukraine (GS)  
Min. 47% v Austria (GS)  
Rank: 3

### POSSESSION POSITION

First third	25%
Middle third	52%
Attacking third	23%

540

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 661 v Ukraine (GS)  
Min. 417 v Czech Rep. (R16)  
Rank: 5

83%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 90% v Ukraine (GS)  
Min. 71% v Czech Rep. (R16)  
Rank: 12=

### PASS DISTANCE

Long	46 (9% of total)	Rank: 12=
Medium	197 (36%)	Rank: 6
Short	297 (55%)	Rank: 4

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average Rank  
11.9 4=

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD

Average Rank  
8.8 1

### DISTANCE COVERED

104.6 km

Max. 112.0 km v Austria (GS)  
Min. 97.4 km v Czech Rep. (R16)  
Rank: 21

## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Georginio Wijnaldum	3	10	4	1.9
2 Memphis Depay	2	12	4	2.6
3 Denzel Dumfries	2	6	4	1.9

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### PASSES

	A	S%	PF%
1 Daley Blind	306	88	57
2 Frenkie de Jong	269	86	25
3 Stefan de Vrij	199	86	30

A = Attempted; S = Succ; PF = Pass Forward

### CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Memphis Depay	2	5	1.6
2 Donyell Malen	2	3	1.3
3 Nathan Aké	1	0	0.1


A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

### DEFENDING

	BR	TW	I
1 Frenkie de Jong	32	5	7
2 Daley Blind	30	7	4
3 Stefan de Vrij	28	3	3

BR = Balls recovered; TW = Tackles won; I = Interceptions

## ATTEMPTS



8

### GOALS

2 per match; Rank: 2=

9.2

### EXPECTED GOALS (xG)

2.3 per match; Rank: 2

52

### ATTEMPTS

13 per match; Rank: 10

18

### ON TARGET

4.5 per match; Rank: 4=

GOALS	15%
SAVED	19%
BLOCKED	25%
WOODWORK	2%
OFF TARGET	40%

## KEY FEATURES

- 1-3-5-2 with transitions to 1-5-3-2 defence in midfield with high back line
- Games controlled, scoring chances created by mix of combination play, direct attacking
- Wing-backs powering upfield, cutting into scoring areas – notably Dumfries on right
- Balanced midfield; De Jong controlling tempo; Wijnaldum making forward runs
- Centre-back De Vrij reading game, building from back; good diagonal switches by Blind
- Rapid response to ball loss; high regains + fast direct counterattacks
- Varied attacking options; strikers Depay, Malen on offside line to stretch defence
- Team with attacking vocation, clear strategy, tactical awareness, physical presence





# NORTH MACEDONIA

## GROUP C

AUT  
L 3-1

UKR  
L 2-1

NED  
L 3-0

## ROUND OF 16

## QUARTER-FINALS

## SEMI-FINALS

## FINAL

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1 Stole Dimitrievski	3	270
12 Risto Jankov		
22 Damjan Siskovski		

### DEFENDERS

2 Egzon Bejtulai	1	27
3 Gjoko Zajkov		
4 Kire Risteovski	1	5
6 Visar Musliu	3	266
13 Stefan Ristovski	3	270
14 Darko Velkoski	3	265

### MIDFIELDERS

5	Arijan Ademi	3	253	
8	Ezgjan Alioski	3	270	1
11	Ferhan Hasani	1	22	
15	Tihomir Kostadinov	2	49	
16	Boban Nikolov	3	120	
17	Enis Bardi	3	237	
20	Stefan Spirovski	1	45	
21	Eljif Elmas	3	270	
25	Darko Churlinov	2	79	

### FORWARDS

7	Ivan Tričkovski	3	69	
9	Aleksandar Trajkovski	3	176	
10	Goran Pandev	3	248	1
18	Vlatko Stojanovski	1	12	
19	Krste Velkoski			
23	Marjan Radeski			
24	Daniel Avramovski	1	13	
26	Milan Ristovski	1	4	

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

AVERAGE  
AGE  
27.2


### CARDS

8 0

## SHAPE

Example: v Austria (GS)

3 In possession 3 Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Ezgjan Alioski	1	3	2	1.2
2 Goran Pandev	1	2	1	0.3
3 Aleksandar Trajkovski	0	6	2	0.2

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Enis Bardi	0	5	0.4
2 Ezgjan Alioski	0	3	0.5
3 Aleksandar Trajkovski	0	3	0.2

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH | IGOR ANGELOVSKI



BORN: 02/06/1976, Skopje (MKD)

NATIONALITY: Macedonian

HEAD COACH: 12/11/2015 to 21/06/2021

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	3	0	0	3	0%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	15	6	2	7	40%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

42%

Max. 48% v Ukraine (GS)  
Min. 38% v Austria (GS)  
Rank: 20

### POSSESSION POSITION

First third	36%
Middle third	49%
Attacking third	15%

380

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 408 v Netherlands (GS)  
Min. 333 v Austria (GS)  
Rank: 20=

81%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 85% v Ukraine (GS)  
Min. 72% v Austria (GS)  
Rank: 16

### PASS DISTANCE

Long	49 (13% of total)	Rank: 5=
Medium	141 (37%)	Rank: 20
Short	190 (50%)	Rank: 19

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average	Rank
14.1	11

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD


Average	Rank
2	21

### DISTANCE COVERED

106.2 km

Max. 109.3 km v Netherlands (GS)  
Min. 103.2 km v Ukraine (GS)  
Rank: 18

## ATTEMPTS



2

### GOALS

0.67 per match; Rank: 19=

3.4

### EXPECTED GOALS (xG)

1.1 per match; Rank: 19

33

### ATTEMPTS

11 per match; Rank: 14

8

### ON TARGET

2.7 per match; Rank: 21

GOALS	6%
SAVED	18%
BLOCKED	26%
WOODWORK	3%
OFF TARGET	47%

## KEY FEATURES

- 1-5-3-2 (1-4-2-3-1 in second half v Ukraine; 1-4-4-2 final minutes v Austria)
- Emphasis on defending in own half, looking for quick counterattacks
- Strong upfield support by wing-backs, especially on Alioski on left flank
- Single screening midfielder (Ademi) staying close to centre-backs
- Quality in midfield; Bardhi and Elmas supporting attacks, defending well
- Pandev the attacking reference and team leader; movement, solo skills
- Rapid attack-to-defence transitions with aggressive pressure on ball-carrier
- Tactical flexibility, commitment, mental resilience on big-tournament debut





# POLAND

## GROUP E

SVK L 2-1	ESP D 1-1	SWE L 3-2	ROUND OF 16	QUARTER-FINALS	SEMI-FINALS	FINAL
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## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1 Wojciech Szczęsny	3	270		
12 Łukasz Skorupski				
22 Łukasz Fabiański				

### DEFENDERS

2 Kamil Piątkowski				
4 Tomasz Kędziora				
5 Jan Bednarek	3	265		
13 Maciej Rybus	1	74	1	
15 Kamil Glik	3	270		
18 Bartosz Bereszyński	3	270		
25 Michał Helik				
26 Tymoteusz Puchacz	3	151		

### MIDFIELDERS

3 Paweł Dawidowicz	1	5		
6 Kacper Kozłowski	2	52		
8 Karol Linetty	2	79	1	
10 Grzegorz Krychowiak	2	140		
14 Mateusz Klich	3	213		
16 Jakub Moder	2	90		
17 Przemysław Płacheta	1	12		
19 Przemysław Frankowski	3	83	1	
20 Piotr Zieliński	3	265	1	
21 Kamil Józwiak	3	241	1	

### FORWARDS

9 Robert Lewandowski	3	270	3	
11 Karol Świerkowski	3	163		
23 Dawid Kownacki				
24 Jakub Świerczok	1	29		

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

**AVERAGE AGE**  
26.8

### CARDS


8 1

Sent off:  
Krychowiak v Slovakia (GS)

## SHAPE

Example: v Spain (GS)

☑ 3 In possession ■ 3 Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Robert Lewandowski	3	12	4	2.4
2 Karol Linetty	1	3	2	0.7
3 Piotr Zieliński	0	7	2	0.2

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Piotr Zieliński	1	6	0.6
2 Kamil Józwiak	1	5	0.3
3 Przemysław Frankowski	1	4	0.5

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH PAULO SOUSA



**BORN:** 30/08/1970,  
Viseu (POR)  
**NATIONALITY:** Portuguese  
**HEAD COACH:** Since 21/01/2021

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	3	0	1	2	0%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	3	0	1	2	0%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

48%

Max. 66% v Sweden (GS)  
Min. 24% v Spain (GS)  
Rank: 13=

### POSSESSION POSITION\*

First third	22%
Middle third	54%
Attacking third	23%

410

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 532 v Slovakia (GS)  
Min. 217 v Spain (GS)  
Rank: 17

79%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 86% v Slovakia (GS)  
Min. 59% v Spain (GS)  
Rank: 17=

### PASS DISTANCE\*\*

Long	42 (10% of total)	Rank: 21=
Medium	169 (41%)	Rank: 13=
Short	199 (48%)	Rank: 18

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average Rank  
11.6 2

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD

Average Rank  
7 2=

### DISTANCE COVERED


106.7 km

Max. 108.4 km v Spain (GS)  
Min. 104.8 km v Slovakia (GS)  
Rank: 17

\*Decimal points account for the missing 1%

\*\*Decimal points account for the missing 1%

## ATTEMPTS



4

### GOALS

1.33 per match; Rank: 12

4.9

### EXPECTED GOALS (xG)

1.6 per match; Rank: 9=

40

### ATTEMPTS

13.3 per match; Rank: 7=

11

### ON TARGET

3.7 per match; Rank: 15

GOALS	9%
SAVED	16%
BLOCKED	23%
WOODWORK	9%
OFF TARGET	43%

## KEY FEATURES

- Variations on 1-5-3-2 after starting with 1-4-3-3 against Slovakia
- Wing-backs quick to push forward; strong centre-backs with aerial power
- Lewandowski the team leader; pivotal in attacks and counterattacks
- Central midfielder Zieliński quick to support strikers in fast transitions
- Good use of wide areas with centre-backs delivering diagonal passes
- Goalkeeper launching counters with long deliveries to Lewandowski
- High pressing to prevent opposing goalkeeper/defenders from playing out
- Fast, athletic players; good technique; strong team spirit and mental resilience





# PORTUGAL

## GROUP F

HUN	GER	FRA	BEL
W 3-0	L 4-2	D 2-2	L 1-0

## ROUND OF 16

## QUARTER-FINALS

## SEMI-FINALS

## FINAL

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1	Rui Patrício	4	360
12	Anthony Lopes		
22	Rui Silva		

### DEFENDERS

2	Nélson Semedo	3	259
3	Pepe	4	360
4	Rúben Dias	4	360
5	Raphaël Guerreiro	4	360 1
6	José Fonte		
20	Diogo Dalot	2	101
25	Nuno Mendes		

### MIDFIELDERS

8	João Moutinho	4	154
10	Bernardo Silva	4	243
11	Bruno Fernandes	4	206
13	Daniilo	4	237
14	William Carvalho	2	139
16	Renato Sanches	4	220
17	Gonçalo Guedes		
18	Rúben Neves	1	18
19	Pedro Gonçalves		
24	Sérgio Oliveira	2	14
26	João Palhinha	2	123

### FORWARDS

7	Cristiano Ronaldo	4	360	5	1
9	André Silva	3	36		
15	Rafa Silva	2	51	2	
21	Diogo Jota	4	324	1	1
23	João Félix	1	35		

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

AVERAGE  
AGE  
27.3


### CARDS

4 0

## SHAPE

Example: v Hungary (GS)

3 In possession 3 Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Cristiano Ronaldo	5	15	7	4.9
2 Diogo Jota	1	8	3	1.6
3 Raphaël Guerreiro	1	3	1	0.1

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Rafa Silva	2	0	0.1
2 Cristiano Ronaldo	1	4	1.0
3 Diogo Jota	1	4	0.9

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH | FERNANDO SANTOS



BORN: 10/10/1954,  
Lisbon (POR)  
NATIONALITY: Portuguese  
HEAD COACH: Since 24/09/2014

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	15	5	6	4	33%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	38	22	11	5	58%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

54%

Max. 70% v Hungary (GS)  
Min. 43% v Germany (GS)  
Rank: 4=

### POSSESSION POSITION

First third	25%
Middle third	53%
Attacking third	22%

557

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 671 v Hungary (GS)  
Min. 420 v Germany (GS)  
Rank: 4

89%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 91% v France (GS)  
Min. 86% v Germany (GS)  
Rank: 2=

### PASS DISTANCE\*

Long	57 (10% of total)	Rank: 2
Medium	223 (40%)	Rank: 3
Short	278 (50%)	Rank: 6

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average	Rank
12.4	6

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD

Average	Rank
7	2=


### DISTANCE COVERED

104.5 km

Max. 107.1 km v Belgium (R16)  
Min. 102.3 km v France (GS)  
Rank: 22

\*Decimal points account for the extra number

## ATTEMPTS



7

### GOALS

1.75 per match; Rank: 6=

8.1

### EXPECTED GOALS (xG)

2 per match; Rank: 3=

51

### ATTEMPTS

12.8 per match; Rank: 11

18

### ON TARGET

4.5 per match; Rank: 4=

GOALS	13%
SAVED	21%
BLOCKED	13%
WOODWORK	4%
OFF TARGET	49%

## KEY FEATURES

- Variations on 1-4-3-3 with wingers and Ronaldo operating as roaming false nine
- Possession play, building through thirds with neat technique, combinations
- Dynamic middle-to-front progression with Renato Sanches as key catalyst
- Full-backs ready to push high, cut into box when attack is on other wing
- Strong street-wise centre-backs Pepe, Dias; anticipation, aerial dominance
- Fast transitions to 1-4-5-1 mid-block with fierce pressure on ball carrier
- Frequent regains in attacking third leading to immediate goal attempt
- Well-organised unit with all-round technique, mental resilience, team spirit





# RUSSIA

## GROUP B

BEL	FIN	DEN			
L 3-0	W 1-0	L 4-1			

## ROUND OF 16

## QUARTER-FINALS

## SEMI-FINALS

## FINAL

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1 Anton Shunin	1	90		
12 Yuri Dyupin				
16 Matvei Safonov	2	180		

### DEFENDERS

2 Mário Fernandes	3	206		
3 Igor Diveev	3	225		
4 Vyacheslav Karavaev	3	134		
5 Andrei Semenov	1	90		
13 Fedor Kudryashov	1	67		
14 Georgi Dzhikiya	3	270		
18 Yuri Zhirkov	1	43		
24 Roman Evgenyev				

### MIDFIELDERS

6 Denis Cheryshev	1	34		
7 Magomed Ozdov	3	212		
8 Dmitri Barinov	2	135		
11 Roman Zobnin	3	243		
15 Aleksei Miranchuk	3	173	1	
17 Aleksandr Golovin	3	270		
19 Rifat Zhemaltdinov	2	58		
20 Aleksei Ionov				
21 Daniil Fomin				

23 Daler Kuzyaev	3	186		
25 Denis Makarov				
26 Maksim Mukhin	3	55		

### FORWARDS

9 Aleksandr Sobolev	2	35		
10 Anton Zabolotny				
22 Artem Dzyuba	3	265	1	1

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

AVERAGE  
AGE  
27.4


### CARDS

5 0

## SHAPE

Example: v Denmark (GS)

3 In possession 3 Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

GOALS	G	S	OT	xG
1 Artem Dzyuba	1	5	2	1.1
2 Aleksei Miranchuk	1	2	1	0.1
3 Aleksandr Golovin	0	5	1	0.3

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

CHANCE CREATION	A	KP	xA
1 Artem Dzyuba	1	4	0.4
2 Aleksei Miranchuk	0	4	0.5
3 Aleksandr Golovin	0	3	0.7

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH | STANISLAV CHERCHESOV



BORN: 02/09/1963,  
Alagir (RUS)  
NATIONALITY: Russian  
HEAD COACH: Since 11/08/2016

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	3	1	0	2	33%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	13	9	0	4	69%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

43%

Max. 59% v Finland (GS)  
Min. 34% v Belgium (GS)  
Rank: 18=

### POSSESSION POSITION\*

First third 23%

Middle third 56%

Attacking third 22%

404

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 581 v Finland (GS)  
Min. 277 v Denmark (GS)  
Rank: 18

77%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 83% v Finland (GS)  
Min. 67% v Denmark (GS)  
Rank: 21

### PASS DISTANCE

Long	54 (13% of total)	Rank: 3
Medium	145 (36%)	Rank: 19
Short	205 (51%)	Rank: 17

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average Rank  
13.7 9

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD

Average Rank  
2.3 17=


### DISTANCE COVERED

112.5 km

Max. 119.4 km v Finland (GS)  
Min. 102.9 km v Denmark (GS)  
Rank: 8

\*Decimal points account for the extra 1%

## ATTEMPTS



2

### GOALS

0.67 per match; Rank: 19=

2.3

### EXPECTED GOALS (xG)

0.8 per match; Rank: 21

25

### ATTEMPTS

8.3 per match; Rank: 21

6

### ON TARGET

2 per match; Rank: 22

GOALS		8%
SAVED		16%
BLOCKED		20%
WOODWORK		0%
OFF TARGET		56%

## KEY FEATURES

- 1-3-4-2-1 (1-4-4-2 in first half v Belgium and when chasing result v Denmark)
- Full-backs very high in both defence and attack, ready to receive, supply crosses
- Ready to press high; if unsuccessful, retreat into low block with lines of five
- Dzyuba the strong target striker – a preferred option for the two goalkeepers
- Dangerous middle-to-front play with positional rotation behind main striker
- Miranchuk operating cleverly between lines; Golovin providing creative spark
- High-tempo ball circulation by centre-backs when opting to play through thirds
- Dangerous counterattacks, set plays; good tactical flexibility, collective spirit





# SCOTLAND

## GROUP D

CZE L 2-0	ENG D 0-0	CRO L 3-1	ROUND OF 16	QUARTER-FINALS	SEMI-FINALS	FINAL
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## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1 David Marshall	3	270	
12 Craig Gordon			
21 Jon McLaughlin			

### DEFENDERS

2 Stephen O'Donnell	3	253	
3 Andy Robertson	3	270	
5 Grant Hanley	3	213	
6 Kieran Tierney	2	180	
13 Greg Taylor			
15 Declan Gallagher			
16 Liam Cooper	1	90	
22 Nathan Patterson	1	6	
24 Jack Hendry	1	67	
26 Scott McKenna	1	57	

### MIDFIELDERS

4 Scott McTominay	3	270	
7 John McGinn	3	270	
8 Callum McGregor	3	203	1
11 Ryan Christie	1	45	
14 John Fleck			
17 Stuart Armstrong	3	151	
18 David Turnbull			
20 Ryan Fraser	2	43	
23 Billy Gilmour	1	76	
25 James Forrest	1	11	

### FORWARDS

9 Lyndon Dykes	3	259	
10 Ché Adams	3	215	
19 Kevin Nisbet	3	21	

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

AVERAGE  
AGE  
26.9


### CARDS

3 0

## SHAPE

Example: v Czech Republic (GS)

3 In possession 3 Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Callum McGregor	1	2	1	0.1
2 John McGinn	0	7	1	0.8
3 Ché Adams	0	7	1	0.4

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Andy Robertson	0	9	1.1
2 John McGinn	0	3	0.4
3 Lyndon Dykes	0	3	0.2

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH | STEVE CLARKE



BORN: 29/08/1963,  
Saltcoats (SCO)  
NATIONALITY: Scottish  
HEAD COACH: Since 20/05/2019

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	3	0	1	2	0%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	13	4	3	6	31%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

43%

Max. 57% v Czech Republic (GS)  
Min. 34% v Croatia (GS)  
Rank: 18=

### POSSESSION POSITION\*

First third	30%
Middle third	53%
Attacking third	17%

382

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 471 v Czech Republic (GS)  
Min. 308 v Croatia (GS)  
Rank: 19

78%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 82% v England (GS)  
Min. 76% v Czech Republic (GS)  
Rank: 20

### PASS DISTANCE\*\*

Long	59 (15% of total)	Rank: 1
Medium	158 (41%)	Rank: 16
Short	165 (43%)	Rank: 22

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average	Rank
15.4	14

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD

Average	Rank
3	15

### DISTANCE COVERED


107.6 km

Max. 109.6 km v Czech Republic (GS)  
Min. 105.2 km v England (GS)  
Rank: 16

\*Decimal points account for the extra 1%

\*\*Decimal points account for the missing 1%

## ATTEMPTS



1

### GOALS

0.33 per match; Rank: 22=

4.0

### EXPECTED GOALS (xG)

1.3 per match; Rank: 12=

41

### ATTEMPTS

13.7 per match; Rank: 5

9

### ON TARGET

3 per match; Rank: 18=

GOALS	2%
SAVED	19%
BLOCKED	45%
WOODWORK	2%
OFF TARGET	31%

## KEY FEATURES

- 1-5-3-2 with permutations between single and twin screening midfielders
- Emphasis on direct attacking; centre-backs hitting diagonals to wide areas
- Goalkeeper often playing long to strikers, looking for second ball success
- Quick defence-to-attack transitions with wing-backs bursting forward
- Compact, narrow defending with strong, flat back line of five
- Midfielders active in second-ball winning, supporting attacks, defending high
- Dykes, Adams staying close to provide a main reference point in attack
- Disciplined, well-organised unit working hard to press and win the ball





# SLOVAKIA

## GROUP E

POL	SWE	ESP	ROUND OF 16	QUARTER-FINALS	SEMI-FINALS	FINAL
W 2-1	L 1-0	L 5-0				

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1	Martin Dúbravka	3	270
12	Dušan Kuciak		
23	Marek Rodák		

### DEFENDERS

2	Peter Pekarík	3	233
3	Denís Vavro		
4	Martin Valjent		
5	Ľubomír Šatka	3	270
14	Milan Škriniar	3	270 1
15	Tomáš Hubočan	3	264
16	Dávid Hancko	1	6
24	Martin Koscelník	2	101

### MIDFIELDERS

6	Ján Greguš	1	1
7	Vladimír Weiss	2	34
8	Ondrej Duda	3	224
10	Tomáš Suslov	2	24
11	László Bénes	2	14
13	Patrik Hrošovský	2	95
17	Marek Hamšík	3	256 1
18	Lukáš Haraslin	3	182
19	Juraj Kucka	3	270
22	Stanislav Lobotka	1	45
25	Jakub Hromada	2	124

### FORWARDS

9	Róbert Boženík		
20	Róbert Mak	3	233 1
21	Michal Ďuriš	3	54
26	Ivan Schranz		

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

AVERAGE  
AGE  
27.8


### CARDS

6 0

## SHAPE

Example: v Poland (GS)

☑ 3 In possession ■ 3 Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Milan Škriniar	1	1	1	0.1
2 Juraj Kucka	0	5	1	0.2
3 Marek Hamšík	0	4	0	0.1

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Marek Hamšík	1	2	0.2
2 Tomáš Hubočan	0	4	0.3
3 Róbert Mak	0	1	0.0

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH ŠTEFAN TARKOVIČ



BORN: 18/02/1973,  
Prešov (SVK)  
NATIONALITY: Slovakian  
HEAD COACH: Since 20/10/2020

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	3	1	0	2	33%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	4	2	0	2	50%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

45%

Max. 58% v Sweden (GS)  
Min. 35% v Spain (GS)  
Rank: 17

### POSSESSION POSITION

First third	39%
Middle third	52%
Attacking third	9%

455

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 609 v Sweden (GS)  
Min. 345 v Spain (GS)  
Rank: 12

84%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 88% v Sweden (GS)  
Min. 79% v Spain (GS)  
Rank: 10=

### PASS DISTANCE

Long	46 (10% of total)	Rank: 12=
Medium	177 (39%)	Rank: 11
Short	232 (51%)	Rank: 13

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average Rank  
19.6 22

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD


Average Rank  
1.7 22

### DISTANCE COVERED

105.3 km

Max. 109.4 km v Poland (GS)  
Min. 100.7 km v Spain (GS)  
Rank: 20

## ATTEMPTS



2

GOALS (1 own goal)  
0.67 per match; Rank: 19=

1.1

EXPECTED GOALS (xG)  
0.4 per match; Rank: 24

24

ATTEMPTS  
8 per match; Rank: 22

2

ON TARGET  
0.7 per match; Rank: 24

GOALS		4%
SAVED		4%
BLOCKED		46%
WOODWORK		0%
OFF TARGET		46%

## KEY FEATURES

- 1-4-2-3-1; Hamšík forward beside Duda in front line of 1-4-4-2 defending
- Composed possession play, setting out to build patiently through thirds
- Compact, narrow defence marshalled by Škriniar; determined tackling, blocking
- Good use of between-lines pockets during build-up; neat passing in approach play
- Accurate diagonals to wingers with strong 1v1 abilities, runs into inside channels
- Free-moving Hamšík the key linking element in middle-to-front play
- Excellent shot-stopping by goalkeeper Dúbravka
- Skilful, well-organised team; neat passing game unrewarded in final third









# SWEDEN

## GROUP E

<b>ESP</b> D 0-0	<b>SVK</b> W 1-0	<b>POL</b> W 3-2	<b>UKR</b> L 2-1 After extra time
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## ROUND OF 16

## QUARTER-FINALS

## SEMI-FINALS

## FINAL

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1 Robin Olsen	4	390
12 Karl-Johan Johnsson		
23 Kristoffer Nordfeldt		

### DEFENDERS

2 Mikael Lustig	4	316
3 Victor Lindelöf	4	390
4 Andreas Granqvist		
5 Pierre Bengtsson	3	45
6 Ludwig Augustinsson	4	351
14 Filip Helander	1	19
16 Emil Krafth	4	75
18 Pontus Jansson		
24 Marcus Danielson	4	368

### MIDFIELDERS

7	Sebastian Larsson	4	367	
8	Albin Ekdal	4	388	
10	Emil Forsberg	4	371	4
13	Gustav Svensson	1	2	
15	Ken Sema			
17	Viktor Claesson	4	82	1
19	Mattias Svanberg			
20	Kristoffer Olsson	4	339	
21	Dejan Kulusevski	2	132	2
22	Robin Quaison	4	125	
26	Jens-Lys Cajuste	1	6	

### FORWARDS

9	Marcus Berg	4	178	
11	Alexander Isak	4	324	1
25	Jordan Larsson			

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

**AVERAGE AGE**  
**28.7**

### CARDS


**5** **1**

Sent off:  
Danielson v Ukraine (R16)

## SHAPE

Example: v Poland (GS)

☒ 3 In possession ☐ 3 Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Emil Forsberg	4	14	4	1.8
2 Viktor Claesson	1	2	1	0.5
3 Alexander Isak	0	8	2	1.2

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Dejan Kulusevski	2	3	0.4
2 Alexander Isak	1	4	1.6
3 Emil Forsberg	0	5	0.5

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH | JANNE ANDERSSON



**BORN:** 29/09/1962,  
Halmstad (SWE)  
**NATIONALITY:** Swedish  
**HEAD COACH:** Since 23/06/2016

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
<b>UEFA EURO matches</b> (Final tournament)	4	2	1	1	50%
<b>UEFA EURO matches</b> (including qualifying)	14	8	4	2	57%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

**35%**

Max. 46% v Ukraine (R16)  
Min. 16% v Spain (GS)  
Rank: 23

### POSSESSION POSITION\*

First third	26%
Middle third	54%
Attacking third	21%

**343**

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 479 v Ukraine (R16)  
Min. 162 v Spain (GS)  
Rank: 22

**76%**

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 84% v Ukraine (R16), Slovakia (GS)  
Min. 55% v Spain (GS)  
Rank: 22=

### PASS DISTANCE

Long	44 (13% of total)	Rank: 15=
Medium	121 (35%)	Rank: 22
Short	178 (52%)	Rank: 21

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

**Average** **Rank**  
19.1 20=

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD

**Average** **Rank**  
4.3 9=


### DISTANCE COVERED

**119.1 km**

Max. 144.2 km v Ukraine (R16)  
Min. 109.0 km v Slovakia (GS)  
Rank: 3

\*Decimal points account for the extra 1%

## ATTEMPTS



**5**

### GOALS

1.25 per match; Rank: 13=

**5.2**

### EXPECTED GOALS (xG)

1.3 per match; Rank: 12=

**41**

### ATTEMPTS

10.3 per match; Rank: 16

**12**

### ON TARGET

3 per match; Rank: 18=

GOALS		12%
SAVED		16%
BLOCKED		26%
WOODWORK		5%
OFF TARGET		42%

## KEY FEATURES

- 1-4-4-2; compact defensive block; Lindelöf leading back line some 30m from goal
- Wide players moving inside to create spaces for advancing full-backs
- Attacks with one striker moving towards ball; the other running behind defence
- Strikers directing opponents to one side; then synchronised pressing by whole team
- Central midfielders supporting attacks, but rarely ahead of the ball
- Forsberg a major threat; penetrating runs from positions between lines
- Olsen an influential keeper; excellent shot-stopping, intelligent, accurate distribution
- Disciplined, athletic, hard-working players with team ethic, winning mentality



GROUP A			ROUND OF 16	QUARTER-FINALS	SEMI-FINALS	FINAL
WAL D 1-1	ITA L 3-0	TUR W 3-1	FRA D 3-3 SUI win 5-4 on pens	ESP D 1-1 ESP win 3-1 on pens		

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1	Yann Sommer	5	510
12	Yvon Mvogo		
21	Jonas Omlin*		
21	Gregor Kobel*		

### DEFENDERS

2	Kevin Mbabu	5	216	1
4	Nico Elvedi	5	510	
5	Manuel Akanji	5	510	
13	Ricardo Rodríguez	5	477	
17	Loris Benito	1	5	
22	Fabian Schär	4	190	
24	Becir Omeragic			
25	Eray Cömert			
26	Jordan Lotomba			

### MIDFIELDERS

3	Silvan Widmer	4	294	
6	Denis Zakaria	2	124	
8	Remo Freuler	5	461	1
10	Granit Xhaka	4	390	1
11	Ruben Vargas	4	167	
14	Steven Zuber	4	286	4
15	Djibril Sow	2	45	
16	Christian Fassnacht	2	72	
20	Edimilson Fernandes			
23	Xherdan Shaqiri	5	371	3

### FORWARDS

7	Breel Embolo	5	367	1
9	Haris Seferović	5	382	3
18	Admir Mehmedi	2	38	
19	Mario Gavranović	5	152	1

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

\*Jonas Omlin withdrew injured and was replaced by Gregor Kobel on 13 June

**AVERAGE AGE**  
**26.7**

### CARDS

**11** **1**

Sent off:  
Freuler v Spain (QF)

## SHAPE

Example: v Italy (GS)

☒ 3 In possession ☐ 3 Out of possession



## COACH | VLADIMIR PETKOVIĆ



**BORN:** 15/08/1963,  
Sarajevo (BIH)  
**NATIONALITY:** Swiss  
**HEAD COACH:** Since 01/07/2014

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
<b>UEFA EURO matches</b> (Final tournament)	9	2	6	1	22%
<b>UEFA EURO matches</b> (including qualifying)	27	14	8	5	52%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

**46%**

Max. 64% v Wales (GS)  
Min. 28% v Spain (QF)  
Rank: 16

### POSSESSION POSITION

First third	28%
Middle third	56%
Attacking third	16%

**432**

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 543 v Italy (GS)  
Min. 277 v Spain (QF)  
Rank: 15

**84%**

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 88% v Wales (GS)  
Min. 71% v Spain (QF)  
Rank: 10=

### PASS DISTANCE

Long	43 (10% of total)	Rank: 19=
Medium	169 (39%)	Rank: 13=
Short	220 (51%)	Rank: 14=

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

**Average** **Rank**  
16.2 16

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD

**Average** **Rank**  
3.6 13

### DISTANCE COVERED

**115.9 km**

Max. 140.4 km v Spain (QF)  
Min. 87.3 km v Wales (GS)  
Rank: 5

## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

1	Haris Seferović	3	13	5	1.3
2	Xherdan Shaqiri	3	11	5	1.6
3	Breel Embolo	1	11	4	1.4

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### PASSES

1	Granit Xhaka	311	91	31
2	Manuel Akanji	286	92	34
3	Nico Elvedi	251	89	38

A = Attempted; S = Succ; PF = Pass Forward

### CHANCE CREATION

1	Steven Zuber	4	2	0.5
2	Xherdan Shaqiri	1	9	0.8
3	Remo Freuler	1	4	1.0


A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

### DEFENDING

1	Manuel Akanji	28	6	8
2	Nico Elvedi	26	5	8
3	Ricardo Rodríguez	25	4	5

BR = Balls recovered; TW = Tackles won; I = Interceptions

## ATTEMPTS



**8**

### GOALS

1.6 per match; Rank: 9

**7.3**

### EXPECTED GOALS (xG)

1.5 per match; Rank: 11

**67**

### ATTEMPTS

13.4 per match; Rank: 6

**22**

### ON TARGET

4.4 per match; Rank: 8

GOALS		12%
SAVED		21%
BLOCKED		29%
WOODWORK		1%
OFF TARGET		37%

## KEY FEATURES

- 1-3-4-1-2; 1-5-2-3 or 1-4-4-1-1 defence, one or two wing-backs into back line
- Emphasis on building from back with neat passes, diagonal switches of play
- Athletic wing-backs, wide midfielders combining to create overloads on flanks
- Shaqiri the creative middle-to-front link, deeper than strikers Seferović, Embolo
- Xhaka a box-to-box midfielder, team leader; forward passes, shots at goal
- Mid/high press after ball loss or retreat into deep block and fast counters
- Sommer an influential keeper; big saves, composed building from back; leadership
- Compact, well-synchronised attacking, defensive mechanisms; great mental strength





# TURKEY

## GROUP A

ITA	WAL	SUI	ROUND OF 16	QUARTER-FINALS	SEMI-FINALS	FINAL
L 3-0	L 2-0	L 3-1				

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1 Mert Günok			
12 Altay Bayındır			
23 Uğurcan Çakır	3	270	

### DEFENDERS

2 Zeki Çelik	3	270	
3 Merih Demiral	3	225	
4 Çağlar Söyüncü	3	270	
13 Umut Meraş	2	162	
15 Ozan Kabak			
18 Rıdvan Yılmaz			
22 Kaan Ayhan	3	179	
25 Mert Müldür	2	108	

### MIDFIELDERS

5 Okay Yokuşlu	3	137	
6 Ozan Tufan	3	172	
8 Dorukhan Toköz	1	4	
10 Hakan Çalhanoğlu	3	266	1
14 Taylan Antalyalı			
19 Orkun Kökçü	1	10	
20 Abdülkadir Ömür			
21 İrfan Can Kahveci	3	112	1
26 Halil Dervişoğlu	2	29	

### FORWARDS

7 Cengiz Ünder	3	208	
9 Kenan Karaman	3	161	
11 Yusuf Yazıcı	3	117	
16 Enes Ünal			
17 Burak Yılmaz	3	270	
24 Kerem Aktürkoğlu			

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

**AVERAGE AGE**  
24.6


### CARDS

7 0

## SHAPE

Example: v Wales (GS)

☑ 3 In possession ■ 3 Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

GOALS	G	S	OT	xG
1 İrfan Can Kahveci	1	2	1	0.1
2 Burak Yılmaz	0	10	1	1.7
3 Cengiz Ünder	0	8	1	0.4

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

CHANCE CREATION	A	KP	xA
1 Hakan Çalhanoğlu	1	6	0.6
2 Cengiz Ünder	0	7	0.5
3 Yusuf Yazıcı	0	6	0.6

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH ŞENOL GÜNEŞ



**BORN:** 01/06/1952,  
Trabzon (TUR)  
**NATIONALITY:** Turkish  
**HEAD COACH:** Since 18/03/2019

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
<b>UEFA EURO matches</b> (Final tournament)	3	0	0	3	0%
<b>UEFA EURO matches</b> (including qualifying)	23	13	4	6	57%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

49%

Max. 62% v Wales (GS)  
Min. 36% v Italy (GS)  
Rank: 11=

### POSSESSION POSITION

First third	32%
Middle third	51%
Attacking third	17%

449

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 514 v Wales (GS)  
Min. 360 v Italy (GS)  
Rank: 14

83%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 86% v Switzerland (GS)  
Min. 78% v Italy (GS)  
Rank: 12=

### PASS DISTANCE

Long	45 (10% of total)	Rank: 14
Medium	174 (39%)	Rank: 12
Short	230 (51%)	Rank: 14=

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average Rank  
11.9 4=

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD


Average Rank  
2.3 17=

### DISTANCE COVERED

104.0 km

Max. 105.8 km v Italy (GS)  
Min. 102.8 km v Switzerland (GS)  
Rank: 23

## ATTEMPTS



1

### GOALS

0.33 per match; Rank: 22=

3.1

### EXPECTED GOALS (xG)

1 per match; Rank: 20

40

### ATTEMPTS

13.3 per match; Rank: 7=

12

### ON TARGET

4 per match; Rank: 11=

GOALS	3%
SAVED	28%
BLOCKED	30%
WOODWORK	0%
OFF TARGET	40%

## KEY FEATURES

- 1-4-1-4-1 with deep 1-4-5-1 defensive block; mostly positional pressing
- Good vertical or diagonal build-up play with full-backs delivering crosses
- Also direct attacking with long ball to target striker Yılmaz and second ball
- Interchanging wingers with dribbling skills contributing crosses, infield runs
- Individual technique in middle-to-front positions, creating scoring chances
- High-quality passing moves up to final third; unafraid to shoot from long range
- Good shot-stopping by GK Çakır; emphasis on playing long to lone striker
- Attacking mindset, spirit and commitment not translated into goals and results





# UKRAINE

## GROUP C

NED	MKD	AUT	SWE	ENG	SEMI-FINALS	FINAL
L 3-2	W 2-1	L 1-0	W 2-1 After extra time	L 4-0		

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1	Georgiy Bushchan	5	480		
12	Andriy Pyatov				
23	Anatolii Trubin				

### DEFENDERS

2	Eduard Sobol	1	1		
4	Serhiy Kryvtsov	2	155		
13	Illia Zabarnyi	5	480		
16	Vitaliy Mykolenko	4	355		
17	Oleksandr Zinchenko	5	480	1	1
22	Mykola Matviyenko	5	480		
24	Oleksandr Tymchyk				
25	Denys Popov				

### MIDFIELDERS

3	Georgiy Sudakov				
5	Serhiy Sydorchuk	5	374		
6	Taras Stepanenko	2	185		
8	Ruslan Malinovskyi	4	283	1	
10	Mykola Shaparenko	5	323		
11	Marlos	2	73		
14	Yevhen Makarenko	2	51		
15	Viktor Tsygankov	4	139		
18	Roman Bezus	1	2		
20	Oleksandr Zubkov	1	13		
21	Oleksandr Karavaev	5	480	1	

### FORWARDS

7	Andriy Yarmolenko	5	445	2	2
9	Roman Yaremchuk	5	430	2	1
19	Artem Besedin	3	36		
26	Artem Dovbyk	1	15	1	

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

AVERAGE  
AGE  
26


### CARDS

4 0

## SHAPE

Example: v North Macedonia (GS)

3 In possession 3 Out of possession



## COACH | ANDRIY SHEVCHENKO



**BORN:** 29/09/1976,  
Dvirkivshchyna (UKR)  
**NATIONALITY:** Ukrainian  
**HEAD COACH:** 15/07/2016 to  
01/08/2021

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
UEFA EURO matches (Final tournament)	5	2	0	3	40%
UEFA EURO matches (including qualifying)	13	8	2	3	62%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

49%

Max. 54% v Sweden (R16)  
Min. 38% v Netherlands (GS)  
Rank: 11=

### POSSESSION POSITION\*

First third	28%
Middle third	56%
Attacking third	17%

501

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 590 v England (QF)  
Min. 414 v Netherlands (GS)  
Rank: 8

86%

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 89% v England (QF)  
Min. 82% v Netherlands (GS)  
Rank: 7=

### PASS DISTANCE\*

Long	38 (8% of total)	Rank: 24
Medium	194 (39%)	Rank: 9
Short	270 (54%)	Rank: 7

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

Average	Rank
16.5	18

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD

Average	Rank
2.4	16

### DISTANCE COVERED

112.4 km

Max. 142.7 km v Sweden (R16)  
Min. 99.4 km v Netherlands (GS)  
Rank: 9

\*Decimal points account for the extra 1%

## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

	G	S	OT	xG
1 Roman Yaremchuk	2	11	6	1.3
2 Andriy Yarmolenko	2	10	5	1.7
3 Artem Dovbyk	1	2	1	0.8

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### PASSES

	A	S%	PF%
1 Mykola Matviyenko	389	92	35
2 Illia Zabarnyi	323	90	29
3 Oleksandr Zinchenko	266	83	20

A = Attempted; S = Succ; PF = Pass Forward

### CHANCE CREATION

	A	KP	xA
1 Andriy Yarmolenko	2	5	0.5
2 Ruslan Malinovskyi	1	8	1.6
3 Oleksandr Karavaev	1	5	1.1


A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

### DEFENDING

	BR	TW	I
1 Oleksandr Zinchenko	31	7	4
2 Serhiy Sydorchuk	30	2	6
3 Mykola Matviyenko	28	3	12

BR = Balls recovered; TW = Tackles won; I = Interceptions

## ATTEMPTS



6

### GOALS

1.2 per match; Rank: 15=

6.6

### EXPECTED GOALS (xG)

1.3 per match; Rank: 12=

51

### ATTEMPTS

10.2 per match; Rank: 17

20

### ON TARGET

4 per match; Rank: 11=

GOALS	12%
SAVED	27%
BLOCKED	23%
WOODWORK	2%
OFF TARGET	37%

## KEY FEATURES

- 1-4-3-3 with spells of 1-4-4-2; then starting with 1-3-5-2 set-up in KO rounds
- Stepanenko, Shaparenko midfield screens, the latter pushing up to link attacks
- Zinchenko the team leader between lines in midfield or as left wing-back
- Generally deep 1-4-1-4-1 defensive block, looking for vertical counterattacks
- Patient in-possession play, mostly on left, or in-depth passes to striker Yaremchuk
- Yarmolenko lively on right; solo skill, crosses, dangerous linking with Yaremchuk
- Good set plays; crosses by full-backs when wingers cut inside to create spaces
- Tactical flexibility; squad rotation; discipline, mental resilience



GROUP A				ROUND OF 16	QUARTER-FINALS	SEMI-FINALS	FINAL
SUI D 1-1	TUR W 2-0	ITA L 1-0	DEN L 4-0				

## SQUAD

App Min G A

### GOALKEEPERS

1	Wayne Hennessey			
12	Danny Ward	4	360	
21	Adam Davies			

### DEFENDERS

2	Chris Gunter	1	90	
3	Neco Williams	3	137	
4	Ben Davies	4	274	
5	Tom Lockyer			
6	Joe Rodon	4	360	
14	Connor Roberts	4	310	1
15	Ethan Ampadu	3	73	
17	Rhys Norrington-Davies			
22	Chris Mepham	3	270	
24	Ben Cabango			

### MIDFIELDERS

7	Joe Allen	4	339	
8	Harry Wilson	3	52	
10	Aaron Ramsey	4	354	1
16	Joe Morrell	4	299	1
18	Jonny Williams			
19	David Brooks	3	31	
20	Daniel James	4	316	
23	Dylan Levitt	1	4	
25	Rubin Colwill			
26	Matthew Smith			

### FORWARDS

9	Tyler Roberts	1	12	
11	Gareth Bale	4	356	2
13	Kieffer Moore	4	288	1

App = Appearances; Min = Minutes played; G = Goals; A = Assists

**AVERAGE AGE**  
**25.1**

### CARDS


**9** **2**

Sent off:  
Ampadu v Italy (GS),  
Wilson v Denmark (R16)

## SHAPE

Example: v Switzerland (GS)

☒ 3 In possession ☐ 3 Out of possession



## PLAYER STATISTICS

Where totals are equal, rank is decided by next value

### GOALS

GOALS		G	S	OT	xG
1	Aaron Ramsey	1	7	3	1.9
2	Kieffer Moore	1	6	2	0.3
3	Connor Roberts	1	2	1	0.4

G = Goals; S = Shots; OT = On target; xG = Expected goals

### CHANCE CREATION

CHANCE CREATION		A	KP	xA
1	Gareth Bale	2	4	1.4
2	Joe Morrell	1	3	0.2
3	Daniel James	0	10	0.9

A = Assists; KP = Key passes; xA = Expected Assists

## COACH | ROBERT PAGE



**BORN:** 03/09/1974,  
Llwynypia (WAL)  
**NATIONALITY:** Welsh  
**HEAD COACH\*:** Since 03/11/2020  
\*caretaker coach

	Total	W	D	L	Win%
<b>UEFA EURO matches</b> (Final tournament)	4	1	1	2	25%
<b>UEFA EURO matches</b> (including qualifying)	4	1	1	2	25%

## AVERAGES

### POSSESSION

**38%**

Max. 48% v Denmark (R16)  
Min. 31% v Italy (GS)  
Rank: 21

### POSSESSION POSITION\*

First third	33%
Middle third	51%
Attacking third	17%

**310**

### PASSES ATTEMPTED

Max. 389 v Denmark (R16)  
Min. 264 v Italy (GS)  
Rank: 23

**79%**

### PASS ACCURACY

Max. 82% v Denmark (R16)  
Min. 75% v Italy (GS)  
Rank: 17=

### PASS DISTANCE\*

Long	48 (16% of total)	Rank: 7=
Medium	120 (39%)	Rank: 23
Short	142 (46%)	Rank: 23

### PASSES PER DEFENSIVE ACTION

**Average** **Rank**  
20.2 23

### RECOVERIES IN ATTACKING THIRD

**Average** **Rank**  
1.5 23


### DISTANCE COVERED

**99.3 km**

Max. 107.5 km v Turkey (GS)  
Min. 90.3 km v Switzerland (GS)  
Rank: 24

\*Decimal points account for the extra 1%

## ATTEMPTS



**3**

### GOALS

0.75 per match; Rank: 18

**5.2**

### EXPECTED GOALS (xG)

1.3 per match; Rank: 12=

**39**

### ATTEMPTS

9.8 per match; Rank: 18

**11**

### ON TARGET

2.8 per match; Rank: 20

GOALS	<div></div>	8%
SAVED	<div></div>	21%
BLOCKED	<div></div>	36%
WOODWORK	<div></div>	0%
OFF TARGET	<div></div>	36%

## KEY FEATURES

- Variations on 1-4-1-4-1 with spells of 1-4-2-3-1 with twin midfield screen
- Emphasis on direct attacking; supply to striker Moore, winning second ball
- Deep compact defending; aerial power, blocking, tackling, 1v1 know-how
- Decisive shot-stopping by Ward; emphasis on playing long
- Good use of wide areas in transitions using pace of wingers Bale and James
- Balanced midfield; Allen controlling from deep; attacking runs by Ramsey
- Bale hitting excellent diagonal switches, providing attacking sparks, assists
- Clear strategy, playing to strengths with commitment, spirit, strong work ethic



Leonardo Bonucci lifts the Henri Delaunay Cup as Italy celebrate their triumph









# THE CHAMPIONS

**2020** Italy

**2016** Portugal

**2012** Spain

**2008** Spain

**2004** Greece

**2000** France

**1996** Germany

**1992** Denmark

**1988** Netherlands

**1984** France

**1980** West Germany

**1976** Czechoslovakia

**1972** West Germany

**1968** Italy

**1964** Spain

**1960** USSR

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